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This thesis analyses the emergence of Cuba as a sovereign nation, and the 
political corruption that plagued the republic. It investigates in detail, not only the 
independence movement that established this republic in its various wars against the 
Spanish empire, and its fracture and fission under the emerging power of the United 
States, but also the impact that this had on Cuban politics, and the consequences for 
Cuba’s native would-be rulers. The aim is to develop an understanding of what 
became of the veterans of the wars of liberation, and further the somewhat neglected 
subject of the relationship of the official Veterans’ organisations with the political 
parties and associations of the republican period. A short conclusion summarises the 
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Although the Cuban independence movement (1868-98) and the Cuban 
republican period have been documented by Cuban and non-Cuban historians alike, 
the role of veterans and their organisations has been somewhat neglected, with most 
historians only dedicating a few pages, at best, to the prominent and formal 
Veterans’ organisations1 and their protests of 1911-12 and 1923-24. However, if the 
history of other nations is any indication of the importance of a topic, especially if it 
is the history of their emergence from colonialism, then the study of ‘veterans’, 
particularly if they are the veterans of an explicitly nationalist, radically egalitarian, 
and abolitionist fighting force, has surely been overlooked in the case of the Cuban 
nation.  
Moreover, studies of republican Cuban politics, while they have extensively 
focused on the political parties of the new nation, their notoriously corrupt nature, 
and their obstreperous, yet ultimately servile subordination to the interests of the 
United States, they have seldom, if ever, focused on their direct relationship with the 
personnel of the Liberation Army and the various organisations of the disbanded 
revolutionary movement and government. Likewise, they have not looked at the 
relationship of the Veterans’ organisations to the political parties themselves, nor to 
the (in many ways successful) Liberal Party revolt of 1906.  
                                                          
1 I will use the phrases ‘Veterans’ movement’ and/or ‘Veterans’ organisations’ in 
their capitalised forms, to refer collectively, to all the organisations claiming to be 
the authentic representatives of the military veterans of the independence struggles 
during the period from 1900 until 1924. Where there are explicitly named and short-
lived organisations, these will be cited by name. 
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Cuba struggled against the old colonial power of Spain in order to enter the 
twentieth century as a modern republic. Beginning with the Ten Years War of 1868-
78, continuing with the Guerra Chiquita [Little War]2 of 1879-80, and culminating 
with the Spanish-American War (later named the Spanish-Cuban-American War) of 
1895-8, the struggle by Cubans against the Spanish regime was long, protracted, and 
very bloody. Indeed, it was one of the first incidences of guerrilla3 warfare, with 
much of the support for the Cuban Liberation Army coming from the general 
population (farmers and black slaves), while the Spanish in turn implemented the 
reconcentrado policy: one of the first historical manifestations of the concentration 
camp. Clearly then, the Veterans’ organisations are very important to the study of 
the history of Cuba. 
The organisations and their ideology that emerged during this bloody 
struggle for independence were responsible for much of the nationalist feeling in 
Cuban society during the republican period, and it is therefore important to look at 
this in detail to understand the Veterans’ organisations and the politics of the era. 
After three wars of independence, the last one creating a body of over 30,000 armed 
rebels fighting for a unified goal of a free Cuba, the question of what happened to 
those soldiers after the war was over and they were demobilised is a crucial one.  
In Cuba, the familiar economic and social problems were complicated by the 
underlying political one: if tens of thousands of Cubans had fought a bitter war for 
liberation, and racial equality, i.e., for political reasons - then those motives needed 
to be accommodated in the post-war settlement. In such circumstances, any 
                                                          
2 Henceforth, Spanish phrases and passages will be translated immeditately 
afterwards in square brackets. Some English terms however, may also be italicised 
but this will simply be for emphasis.  
3 The term guerrillero, however, refers to the volunteers who fought for the Spanish 
Army.  
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Veterans’ organisations ought to have played some important role, (after all they 
made this liberation possible) - either they might have acted as a brake, to control 
any political unrest from the ex-fighters, or they might have had the opposite effect, 
as a radical rallying-point and platform for action.  
Veterans’ organisations in the years after 1901 were bound to be even more 
significant in Cuba, considering the problems besetting the new republic: US 
hegemony assured by the Platt Amendment, nationalist frustration at the outcome of 
the war, disillusion over corruption, political fraud, political instability, and so on. In 
1898 the United States intervened in the struggle for Cuban independence, but it did 
so for its own economic and strategic interests in the region, setting its own 
interpretation of international law as doctrine: maintaining a military government 
and modelling a civil one for three years, and intervening militarily twice more 
(each time for three years again), before 1924. While the United States ostensibly 
sought to ‘protect’ Cuba’s sovereignty, the veterans of the wars for independence, 
seldom if ever asked for this help, having their own interpretation of a sovereign 
constitutional republic and how it should be protected. This relationship with the 
United States, and its economic basis, was to deeply influence politics and 
government in the early republic. For this reason, it will be necessary also to look at 
Cuba-United States relations in depth to understand the problem of the research 
question.  
While many Cuban veterans and politicians had been schooled in, and 
regularly visited, the United States, the United States itself consistently preferred 
members of the old colonial and ‘autonomist’ regime when suggesting or 
recommending candidates for public administration and political rule after 
independence was attained. Not surprisingly, then, the frustrated nationalism of the 
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revolutionary struggle was exacerbated by the ‘neo-colonial’ practices of the United 
States in the early republican period. Hence, in the early years of the republic, a 
more radical form of nationalism emerged, opposed to the politics-as-usual of the 
civilian políticos4 often inter-mixed with socialist ideas that had existed during the 
independence struggle, usually imported via Spanish immigrants to Cuba and Key 
West, Florida.  
This radical nationalism grew out of the early years of Cuba’s struggle for 
independence. During the years of the various revolutionary wars, anarchism was at 
the height of its ‘propaganda-by-the-deed’ period in Italy, Spain, Russia, and 
elsewhere. Peculiarly, however, in Cuba anarchist organisations and individuals 
shared ideas and achieved intellectual cross-pollination, and indeed even mixed 
personally, with democratic socialists and even liberals. Not only did the issue of 
‘political authority’ not viciously divide the socialist movement in Cuba, as it did in 
many parts of Europe during the revolutionary period of 1868-95, (though it did 
later under President Gerardo Machado with anarchist/Communist Party factional 
conflict), rather, Cuba was unique in that its national independence movement threw 
up an ideological formulation unheard of at the time or since: anarchists advocating 
participation in a national liberation struggle as a means to further socialist struggle 
in the future; a formulation pre-dating that proposed much later, elsewhere in the 
world, by Leninists. 
It is important then to look at theories of ‘nationalism’ and the ideological 
forebears of this within the framework of the Cuban republic, in order to understand 
                                                          
4 This term simply means a politician but often in modern Cuba it holds the negative 
connotation of a corrupt politician, especially of the republican period, although this 
is perhaps because the republican period is seen as entirely corrupt until the 
formation of radical political groups, and of course, the Cuban Communist Party in 
1925. 
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the political factionalism of the period studied, and the role of individual veterans 
and the Veterans’ organisations within this. The Cuban republic, from its inception, 
was characterised by factionalism and discord. Revolution was regularly declared, 
threatened, or actually instigated throughout the period from the establishment of 
relations with the United States (with the Platt Amendment of 1901), until the 
emergence of the Machadato (the dictatorship of President Gerardo Machado) in 
1925. After 1925, with the formation of the Federation of University Students and 
the Cuban Communist Party, and corporatist, and even proto-fascist organisations on 
the right, such as the ABC, Cuban politics was to usher in a new era of ‘radicalism’, 
dominated by the young.  
While individual veterans were involved in some of these groups, it was 
during this period of outright warfare by many factions in Cuba with the Machado 
dictatorship that the Veterans’ organisations declined as a potent form of 
nationalism, their influence eclipsed by the popularity of these new movements. 
Several historians have stressed the importance of the Veterans’ protest in 1911-12, 
and many also emphasise the role of young radicals in the Association of Veterans 
and Patriots of 1923-24, but few have analysed this discernible break between the 
‘old’ and ‘new’ politics.  
In this context, it is perhaps useful to look at theoretical conceptions of the 
state and of civil society, for the Veterans’ organisations were ostensibly ‘civil’ 
organisations. It is therefore proposed to investigate why they were they so closely 
connected to revolutionary organisations, manifestos, and declarations: of 1906, 
1911-12, 1917, 1923-24, and even 1931. Why did the rhetoric of the Liberal Party’s 
Central Revolutionary Committee of 1906 so closely resemble not only the 
‘Regulations of the Institution of the Veterans of Independence’ in 1911, but also the 
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manifestos of the Cuban Socialist Party and Popular Party of Diego Vicente Tejera 
of 1899 and 1900, and also that of the Cuban Workers’ Party founded by Carlos 
Baliño in 1905? Indeed, why were the latter socialist parties, not only, in the case of 
Tejera’s, the first formed in the Cuban nation, but also, the first parties to explicitly 
draw out the fact that José Martí’s ideal of ‘absolute independence’ had not been 
achieved in the republic? 
Therefore the thesis will look at the revolutionary period as a whole, and the 
socialist and anarchist ideas that led to radical forms of nationalism in the republican 
period, as the the repeated calls for armed revolution in the republic can only be 
understood by doing so. The thesis will also look at the concept of hegemony to 
explain theoretically the role of the United States, and the way that its political 
domination of Cuba meant that the only sphere left for revolt was outside of civil 
society. This in turn, was the logically calculated result of social actors who had 
failed to gain patronage under the Cuban state. Therefore, forms of patron-client 
relationship and political patronage will also be analysed in order to explain Cuban 
politics and political revolt in the period under study.  
 
 
Current Historiography and the Veterans’ Organisations in Cuba 
  
 Despite the fact that the history of the Cuban independence movement and 
the republican period have been well documented by Cuban and non-Cuban 
historians alike, and the role of slavery, the Liberation Army, and later, political 
corruption have all been the subject of various studies, the part that the Veterans’ 
organisations played during the period from the disbandment of the forces of 
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liberation until 1911-12 has mostly been ignored, some writers barely dignifying it 
with one or two sentences in an otherwise comprehensive historiography of the 
Cuban revolutionary movement. Likewise, the connections between members of the 
Liberal Party’s Revolutionary Committee in 1906, and the official Veterans’ 
organisations of 1911-12 and 1923-34, have likewise not been looked at, nor has the 
question of the activities in which the personnel of the 1911-12 National Council of 
Veterans were politically engaged in during the years before, or after, the famous 
protest.  
 The wealth of available information surrounding both the National Council 
of Veterans in 1911-12, and the Association of Veterans and Patriots of 1923-24, 
while it has been consulted, has largely not connected their personnel with the 
dominant ruling factions in the republican period, with whom they shared many 
notable figures, with many of the members of the Veterans’ organisations in fact, 
being part of the government at various times.  
 The historiography on this period does admit the importance of the 
Veterans’ organisations, but this is largely within a broader framework of explaining 
political corruption, the struggle for patronage, and the role of the United States in 
determining not only the structure of the Cuban political class, but also general 
political policy. Significantly, the 1923-24 Association is usually looked at in terms 
of the broader anti-imperialist organisations and activities that emerged in Cuba in 
the years after the economic crisis of 1921. Certainly, these are all crucial factors to 
this thesis, but what the thesis will also address is the Veterans’ organisations unique 
role in the republican period as a kind of alternative patronage network, of high-
ranking politicians and ex-military leaders, many Liberals of the 1906 revolt, but 
also many Conservatives, who used the organisations as a rhetorical and recruiting 
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device for the nationalism that was frustrated under the direct domination of the US 
state, and the indirect domination of the corrupt políticos. 
 What the historiography has also overlooked is why the Veterans’ protests 
were merely that: why they were not successful revolutions. This may sound 
confusing; after all why would historians look at unsuccessful revolutions: history 
being written by the victors? In Cuba however, this question becomes more 
complicated, because there were successful revolutions, time and again, that have 
been looked at: in 1906, 1933, and of course, 1959. Similarly, there were aborted 
revolutions or partial revolutions that have been the subject of inquiry: 1917, and 
1931.  
 The fact that the protest of the National Council of Veterans in 1911-12, and 
the aborted revolution of the Association of Veterans in 1923-24, were dominated 
by sections of the political class who had already held positions at the highest levels 
of government, and would later do so again, meant that they were largely seen 
precisely for what they were by the Cuban working class. Their view was that they 
were vehicles of patronage for a disenfranchised section of the Cuban political class 
under the regime of politics-as-usual, rather than the embodiment of authentic 
nationalism personified by the Liberation Army, and the ideals of José Martí, who 
had managed to unite liberal, bourgeois revolutionaries with the rank-and-file 
socialist and radical movement to crush the Spanish imperial forces in a cross-class 
alliance. Indeed, with regard to the movement of 1923-24, workers in Key West 
would outspokenly criticise the leaders of the Association for being corrupt políticos 
beholden to US domination, despite their rhetoric against it. Clearly, their vision of 
Cuban nationalism was more radical than that of the Association. Disillusionment 
with the standard bearers of this type of ‘old-fashioned’ nationalism such as the 
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Association, set in, as the emerging radical, nationalist and anti-imperialist groups of 
the years 1925-33 gained popularity.  
 The thesis will attempt to illuminate another aspect missing from the 
historiography: the fact that the Veterans’ organisations represented the last gasp of 
what was essentially the ‘old’ politics of the years 1895-1920, and which was 
doomed to failure after the banking crisis of 1921 illustrated the effects that the 
radical re-structuring of the Cuban economy under the domination of US sugar 
interests now had on the society at large. In this context, the call for ‘Cubanisation’ 
of the political administration did not encompass anywhere near enough change that 
many of the emerging radical groups envisioned for a Cuban nationalism in 
opposition to US corporate imperialism, and in fact, issues such as payment of, and 
political patronage for, military veterans, was an issue of decreasing importance; 
given that most of these people were now dead or very elderly.  
 This of course throws up another interesting question that much of the 
historiography has ignored, which the thesis will address: why did young students 
and intellectuals, often of a politically radical persuasion (if not de-facto 
Communists), engage with the Association of Veterans in 1923-24? What was it 
about this organisation that made them think it would be an effective vehicle to 
oppose the things they also opposed, namely, US domination of the Cuban economy 
and hence, political structure, and why did these young radicals later become 
disillusioned with this same organisation as a means for doing this? 
 In recent and current historiography, the Veterans’ movement usually only 
receives a few pages of attention, even when it was officially constituted as a 
political organisation that went on to threaten revolution. Peréz, regarding the 
National Council of 1911-12, states that this “was a movement of enormous popular 
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appeal, and difficult to resist. The government did not even try” (Pérez 1986: 147). 
However, in this commentary on the Council, which covers barely two pages, he 
merely describes the suspension of the Civil Service Law, and its re-implementation 
after threats of intervention from the United States. Although Peréz is useful in 
understanding the role of US hegemony as personified by this threat, it can be seen 
that all the points above are notable by their absence from the analysis: what 
happened to the personnel of the movement, why were they unsuccsesful, and how 
did the Council relate to other political parties, organisations, and factions, both 
before and after 1911-12? 
            Thomas, regarding the organisation of 1911-12, states that: 
 
veterans agreed to abandon their campaign against Spanish office holders 
and behave in future as a benevolent association; Gómez [the Cuban 
President] for his part sacked two cabinet members and a number of civil 
servants, suspending the Civil Service Law (Thomas 2001: 305).  
 
            This is in a section barely more than a paragraph long. Again, it is left to the 
imagination where this organisation came from, exactly what its relationship was to 
the Liberation Army and the independence leadership, to the radical socialist parties 
and movement, to the working class in general, to the political class at varying levels 
of government, and the numerous political parties in the republic. Whether looking 
at Cuba-United States relations from an economic viewpoint, or looking at the 
actions of the political class in Cuba, being concerned, as most historians are, with 
the ‘victors’, the Veterans’ organisations, and influential individuals within it, are 
very much on the periphery to this research, if they are mentioned at all. 
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Thomas’s monumental work often mirrors Pérez in his grand scale. The 
protest of 1911-12 is seen in the context of the presidential repression of the press, 
without an analysis of the explicit demands and structure of the Institution of 
Veterans, while the Association of Veterans of 1923-24 is placed in the context of 
the ‘new’ politics of post- 1923 Cuba, with the young radical Rubén Martínez 
Villena held as the common link. This link, as well as that of Julio Antonio Mella 
(who would later be a founding member of the Communist Party), is likewise often 
overemphasised in the Cuban historiography.  
Much has been written about the republican period in order to explain the 
events of 1933, or 1940 (Aguilar 1972, Whitney 2001). The crisis of 1923-24, 
however, largely marked the end of the ‘old’ politics, and Aguilar’s and Whitney’s 
studies, while very good, again analyse the ‘victors’: namely the new corporatist 
political factions, rather than what became of the políticos of the old regime. There 
is also a good deal written about the role of slavery in the Cuban economy and the 
transition to free labour in the context of a national liberation struggle in the 
Caribbean (Scott 1985, Stubbs 1985). These authors give insight into the tensions 
between military men and the civilian leadership of the independence movement 
that is bolstered by the Cuban historiography on this issue, which is closely analysed 
later in the thesis.  
Again there is much written about the Cuban radical labour movement from 
its inception in the 1860s until it was subordinated to, or ultimately obliterated by, 
the Cuban Communist Party of 1925 (Alba 1969, Casanovas 1998, Fernández 2001, 
Liss 1984, Poyo 1985 & 1986, Shaffer 2000). As will be seen later, this research 
provides much explanation of the differing interpretations of nationalism and 
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‘absolute independence’ in the republican era, and helps to explain many of the 
questions around nationalism inherent in the thesis.   
What is missing from much of the historiography is an understanding of 
Cuban politics and society ‘on the ground’: republican presidents and politicians are 
dealt with as if they emerged from nowhere, perhaps with a few biographical details, 
without discussion of their role in the wars of independence, or in the drafting of 
revolutionary manifestos, and in revolutionary organisations. There is little analysis 
of the connections between políticos in power and those on the periphery, and how, 
and why the abuse of power by some, understandably led to the call for revolution 
by others. Likewise, there is almost no analysis of the connections between radical 
and socialist groupings and liberal and ‘revolutionary’, politicians (i.e., those 
seeking revolution to overthrow the current state rather than states per se), despite 
Casanovas’s, and Shaffer’s rich detailing of the history of nineteenth century 
socialist and anarchist movements, and Poyo’s and Fernández’s detailing of the 
anarchists’ battles with Communists and Machado.  
Cuban historians have likewise, often seen the Veterans’ organisations as 
peripheral to the study of the republican period. There are many works grand in 
scale only touching on the topic (Dominguez 1986, Ibarra 1992 & 1998, Le 
Riverend 1971, Pino-Santos 1984, Roig de Leuchsenring 1982). Roa’s work deals 
with events preceding 1923 (Roa 1982), with a view to elaborating his history of 
post- 1923 politics, in much the same way that Thomas references the Association of 
1923-24. The journal Cuban Studies has no articles specifically on the Veterans’ 
organisations.  
Some Cuban works document very well the politics of the period in which 
the Veterans’ organisations were active, giving some context to the political parties 
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at the time (Cairo Ballester 1976, Figarola 1974, Gaunaurd 1954), while the 
collection of the Insituto de Historía del Movimiento Comunista y la Revolución 
Socialista de Cuba [Institute for the History of the Communist Movement and the 
Socialist Revolution of Cuba] is a major and indispensable source on the history of 
the Cuban labour movement (IHMCRSC: 1981). While US scholars have generally 
concentrated on United States-Cuba political and economic relations, often within a 
broader analysis of United States-Latin American ties, Cuban historians have often 
seen the attempt to forge a sovereign Cuban nation as one long and steady path 
leading from José Martí, to Tomás Estrada Palma, to Julio Antonio Mella, to Fidel 
Castro. However, this phenomenon is perhaps not as simple as suggested by some of 
the teleological inferences of current historiography, leading inexorably to the 
shining path of the 26th of July, but rather, was subject to an inter-generational 
conflict and break, unique to the period 1923-25 itself, which can only be 
understood by a thorough analysis of the earlier republican period. The years 1923-
25 very much represented a break with the ‘old’ politics of caudillos, mambises5, 
and políticos and therefore the focus will be on the Institution of the Veterans of 
Independence of 1911-12, and the Association of Veterans and Patriots of 1923-24, 
in order to see how their failure led to frustrations that gave rise to this new politics.  
To return to the start: what is missing from current historiography regarding 
the Veterans’ organisations and their role in the Cuban republic? Largely, what is 
missing is a coherent analysis of these organisations themselves, of their connections 
to political parties and government, and an examination of how they influenced 
other factions, parties and groupings within the Cuban republic. As noted 
previously, this can only be understood by seeing the period from 1868 until 1924 in 
                                                          
5 A caudillo is a strong military or political leader, while a mambí is a fighter in the 
wars of Cuban liberation, especially that of 1895-98. 
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a broader context of disillusioned nationalism, churned up by a heady mixture of 
revolutionary and socialist rhetoric: these ideologies at times mutually reinforcing, 
and at other times radically calling into question, the distribution of the spoils of 
revolutionary war, and political patronage and power, in the emerging republic.  
Further, only by understanding the political and social linkages between 
individual veterans, the Veterans’ organisations, members of the political parties and 
government, and all of the former’s connections to military-revolutionary 
committees and factions, as well as more radical socialist parties and groupings, will 
light be shed on the focus of the thesis.  
Looking at these problems is important for several reasons: it will help 
explain the break between the ‘old’ and the ‘new politics’ occurring in 1923-25, it 
will help to explain the frustrated nationalism of the older generation (of the 
independence period, and of 1895), and the appropriation of this by the generation 
of 1923 (though the latter will not be looked at in detail), it will help explain why the 
politics of the Cuban republic were so tumultuous (though this has already been 
greatly studied), and it will put the Veterans’ organisations of 1911-12 and 1923-24 





 This thesis is not a comparative exercise. The thesis could, for example, have 
compared and contrasted the Veterans’ movement in Cuba with that of another Latin 
American nation that successfully overthrew a colonial power. Similarly, the thesis 
is not simply a linear, historical account, nor does it consist exclusively of textual 
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analysis. It could, for example, simply have investigated and accounted for, the 
emergence of one particular political party in Cuba, which was prominent in the 
early republican period, perhaps the Conservatives, or the Liberal Party of 1906. It 
could have looked at the personnel of the said party, its manifestos and meetings, 
and connected them, where relevant, to the independence struggles, accounting also 
for those who did not fight.  
The thesis is also not simply a study of the various ways in which Cuba was 
dominated by the United States. This phenomenon has been thoroughly explored, 
either explicitly (and almost exclusively in this way by Cuban historians), or, with 
the role of the United States being more positively appraised, though its dominant 
role is also apparent, by many US academics.  Moreover, the thesis is not a work of 
political sociology, nor a sociological analysis of the Veterans’ organisations; of 
their racial, and social-class structure. While work has been carried out in this area, 
and this issue could certainly be researched further, that is not the aim of the thesis. 
In many ways, the aim of the thesis is both broader, and narrower than this. It 
is broader, because the thesis seeks to illuminate a number of lacunae, as highlighted 
above: what connections did the Veterans’ organisations have to the liberation 
movement, to republican politics, and (if any) to the ‘new politics’ after 1923? It is 
narrower, because it closely analyses the movements of 1911-12 and 1923-24 and 
looks at the specific structure, personnel and ideology of these organisations, and 
also why they ultimately failed to institutionalise popular political change. Because 
of this, it will be necessary at times to incorporate a linear historical perspective 
(more or less), extensive textual analysis of primary and other materials, and at least 
some sociological and political analysis, in order to attempt to explain the role and 
function of the Veterans’ organisations in the early republican period.  
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The thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter I looks at the Cuban 
independence movement and seeks to further an understanding of the role of slavery 
in pre-war Cuba, and how its abolition was instrumental, not only to the success of 
the Liberation Army, but also in shaping its radically, racially egalitarian structure. 
This chapter also looks at how the successive independence conflicts failed to 
explicitly formalise relations between the civilian and military arms of the 
revolutionary government, and how, with the formation of the Partido 
Revolucionario Cubano [Cuban Revolutionary Party – PRC], this phenomenon, 
while from then on recognised as a specific problem within the liberation 
movement, was still not officially resolved. Finally, the chapter examines the 
relationship between the workers’ movement and the independence struggle. More 
specifically, it focuses on the radical ideas of socialism and anarchism expounded 
under the Spanish colony, and how the PRC utilised and then ultimately eclipsed 
this radicalism and workers’ interests, and how this brand of nationalism was also 
eclipsed in the liberal, constitutional republic. This will go some way to explaining 
the disillusionment of many of the rank-and-file members of the independence 
movement with politicians under the republic.  
Having fully analysed the conflicts and structure of the independence 
movement, Chapter II analyses the role of the United States in deliberately 
disarming this potentially radical force for social change, and in fostering a political 
culture which it preferred, in order to covertly control the Cuban state, and 
ultimately dominate the Cuban economy. The seeds of this dominance were sown by 
the nature of the destruction of the Cuban economy by warfare, but this was 
explicitly furthered by the terms of United States-Cuba international relations. 
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Cuban politics was further dominated ‘on the ground’ by US economic influence 
and patronage, and the ever present threat of military intervention.  
Chapter III examines the logical outcomes of the factors presented in the 
preceding two. The conflict between civilian and military leaders in the 
independence movement, the eclipse of the movement’s seemingly radical content, 
and the emergence and consolidation of US economic hegemony, meant that the 
forces unleashed by this lengthy process of liberation were ultimately frustrated 
under the new and inherently compromised ‘republic’. This was something of which 
Cubans were aware from the outset, explicitly elaborated via one of the first post-
war patriotic associations, ‘The Emiliano Núñez Club’, whose complaints also ran 
through the first Cuban Constitutional Convention, and they were to be a frequent 
complaint made by marginal Cuban political parties and groups, including the 
Veterans’ organisations.  
Chapter III also investigates how, after the formation of the Cuban 
government, the United States further consolidated its hegemony with the Platt 
Amendment and the Reciprocity Treaty, the former dominating the Cuban state by 
threatening intervention, the latter the Cuban economy, by promoting specialisation 
in the production of sugar. In the light of this domination, prominent Cuban leaders 
who would otherwise have become the economically dominant class, were left to 
compete for the spoils of the state administration; from lucrative yet scarce 
government posts, to the possibility of access to wealth in the form of dubious 
business deals, and payments for serving in the Liberation Army, (usually rising 
according to rank). In this environment, it was perhaps not surprising that Cuban 
politics was defined by corruption, factionalism, and the pursuit of patronage; 
something also examined in this chapter.  
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Chapter IV looks at the Veterans’ organisations from this point until 1913. 
While in the current historiography the analysis is usually restricted to the years 
1911-12, there were Veterans’ organisations both before and after this, which shared 
many personnel with the political parties, inside and outside of government, 
throughout this period. Only by understanding these connections can knowledge of 
the Veterans’ organisation of 1911-12 be furthered. Specifically, the Liberal revolt 
of 1906, and the role of members of the Veterans’ movement on either side of the 
conflict, has been much neglected in the historiography, and therefore it is analysed, 
not only to further knowledge in this area, but to further the aim of the thesis in 
explaining the disillusionment with the supposed representatives of Cuban 
nationalism at this point.  
This disillusionment was to continue under the US-controlled administration 
of the years 1906-9, and hence, the calls for authentic Cuban nationhood continued. 
This culminated in the Veterans’ protest of 1911-12, but again, this protest was only 
partially successful, and hence, there were to be many reasons for frustration with 
the government of Cuban after this. 
Chapter V scrutinises these frustrations and why they did not reach breaking 
point again until after the economic crisis of 1921. It is only with a comprehension 
of the election of Mario García Menocal in 1913, and along with him, some of the 
Veterans’ movement personnel in 1913, that the seeming inactivity of the latter, in 
the years 1913-22, can be understood. Factionalism, corruption, and political 
patronage dominated the regimes of presidents Menocal and Alfredo Zayas, much as 
they had with those of Tomás Estrada Palma and José Miguel Gómez during the 
years 1902-6. Therefore, the abortive rebellion by the Association of Veterans in 
1923-24 was seen precisely for what it was by the younger and more radical 
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nationalist groups (as one more factional struggle among privileged políticos), and 
























Chapter I - The Cuban Independence Movement 
 
This chapter will serve two purposes. The first part will look at the role of 
the independence movement in Cuba, and more closely, the composition and aims of 
the Cuban Revolutionary Party. The divisions between the civilian politicians and 
the military leaders (the mambisado) are important to address because these 
arguments and divisions continued under the political factionalism and persistent 
revolutions, and attempted revolutions, in the early republican period. The second 
aspect will look at the role of workers in the independence movement and how they 
were often influenced by radical, socialist, and anarchist ideas, and hence 
approaches to revolutionary strategy. Looking at this will be important to 
understanding the divisions between military and civilian leaders of the movement, 
and to a sense of betrayal in the minds of these radicals at the new Cuban nation, due 
to the conflict between the republican ideals of the predominantly white leadership 
of the independence movement, and the often more radically egalitarian vision of 
the non-white rank and file of the Liberation Army, and the workers’ patriotic clubs. 
 
 
The Liberation Army, Slavery, and the Ten Years War 
The Liberation Army that was formed in 1868, and that reformed in 1895, to 
fight for a total of thirty years for national independence, played an important part in 
the political formations of the early Cuban state. As one observer notes: 
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Cuba’s nineteenth-century revolution emerged from a society that seemed 
highly unrevolutionary-a society that in the political ferment of the Age of 
Revolution earned the designation “the ever-faithful isle” (Ferrer 1999: 1). 
Cuba was a severely racially divided society at this time. In 1846, 36 per cent  
of the population were slaves. Enslaved and free people of colour constituted the 
majority of the population (Ferrer 1999: 2). According to one source, “[i]n 
1862…Spaniards, who amounted to only 8 per cent of the island’s population, 
appropriated over 90 per cent of its wealth” (Cantón Navarro 1998: 43). Clearly, 
these slaves had indeed nothing to lose but their chains. The remaining white 
population “looked to Haiti and clung to Spain in fear” (Ferrer 1999: 2), wary of the 
potential for a black republic such as the one founded there. It was the conflicting 
opinions about race and class that helped shape the divergent attitudes in the 
Liberation Army and the Partido Revolucionario Cubano [Cuban Revolutionary 
Party - PRC] during the revolutionary wars for independence towards what a new 
Cuban state and society should look like. These conflicts were to continue to be 
fought in the tumultuous politics of the early Cuban republic. 
The Revolution beginning on 10 October 1868 “seemed to defy the fear and 
division that formed the society from which it emerged.” This initial insurrection led 
further to the Guerra Chiquita [Little War] of 1879-80 and the final War of 
Independence or ‘Spanish-American War’ of 1895-98. These insurrections were all 
fought by “an army unique in the history of the Atlantic world - the Liberation 
Army, a multiracial fighting force that was integrated at all ranks” (Ferrer 1999: 3).6  
                                                          
6 If any quotations appear without a reference at first, then this will be part of a 
series of quotations taken from the same page or a short section of the same source 
that will be cited in page numbers, at the end of that section, in brackets.  
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This factor within the army was to have a profound influence hereafter. The 
uprising in 1868 began what was to become the ‘Ten Years War’, when Carlos 
Manuel de Céspedes liberated his slaves, telling them:  “[y]ou are as free,…as I am” 
(Ferrer 1999: 15). While the time for abolition may not have been perfectly ripe 
when Céspedes made his declaration, no doubt his seemingly progressive reasons 
for doing so were in fact, more pragmatic: to consolidate a white-led republic with 
blacks accepting their ‘place’ due to the former’s ‘benevolence’. Indeed, as Ferrer 
notes, “in the eastern regions that sustained the initial uprising, slavery had ceased to 
be a pivotal social or economic institution” (Ferrer 1999: 21). This act of Céspedes 
and men like him was, “important symbolically, [but] legally represented nothing 
more radical than the exercise of the right of a master to manumit his slaves” (Ferrer 
1985: 46).  
  As the rebellion spread, it became a more untenable position to maintain 
gradual abolition through manumission, while reserving freedom for slaves only 
until after the national independence struggle was won. Many slaves and free 
coloured people saw the two struggles as intrinsically linked, joining the ranks of the 
Liberation Army, as they saw it, to achieve both. According to Ferrer, “[t]he same 
army that re-created privilege, however, then functioned to challenge that privilege” 
(Ferrer 1999: 159).  
As more slaves joined the side of the rebellion, they pressed their demands 
on the insurrection leaders, leading to the Constitution of Guáimaro that declared, 
“all citizens of the republic [would be] considered soldiers of the Liberation Army.” 
If the slaves wanted their freedom then it would be on the condition set by white 
leaders that they fight. When the rebellion reached Camagüey, the Revolutionary 
Assembly of the Central Department called for abolition partly to gain US support 
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for the rebellion in light of the latter’s Thirteenth Amendment. The Constitution of 
Guáimaro had proclaimed that, “all inhabitants of the Republic are entirely free.” 
However, the subsequent Reglamento de Libertos [Regulation of Freemen] 
established by the Assembly at Camagüey began the control over libertos by 
patronos, the latter being ex-masters for whom the ex-slaves had to work, and 
whose property they were unable to leave without permission. Céspedes approved of 
the Reglamento but saw employing libertos in agriculture, rather than as soldiers, as 
the best policy (Scott 1985: 47-8). The Constitution of Guáimaro was the first 
instance of a form of genuine independent, constitutional government being 
established in Cuba. The Constitution recognised three powers, “legislative (House 
of Representatives, in permanent session until the end of the war), the executive 
(president named by the House…), and an independent judicial power” (Suchlicki 
1988: 130).  
While there was no doubt, even at these early stages, that Cuban 
revolutionaries wished, upon the establishment of independence, to form a 
constitutional government, this was to remain a problematic issue. The white 
leadership looked to their northern neighbour for the ideal constitutional form, while 
many involved in the later conventions looked to Europe and elsewhere. It was not 
so much the constitutional form that would be at issue, but rather, the designated 
powers of the three branches of government, as will be seen. 
 In many of the western provinces, insurgents attacked estates and confiscated 
slaves, forcing them to fight for the insurrection. This not unnaturally brought up 
questions about the individual freedoms of these slaves (or lack thereof). On 27 
December 1868 the rebel leaders abandoned the notion of gradual abolition with 
indemnification when Céspedes, “decreed that all slaves belonging to known 
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enemies of their cause would be considered free and their owners not subject to 
compensation.” These ‘enemies’ were of course the peninsulares (Spanish-born) 
slave-owners, loyal to the ruling regime and this decree was intended to gain 
fighting strength by making the enemies’ captured slaves part of the Liberation 
Army in line with the Constitution of Guáimaro. Therefore criollo, (i.e., Cuban 
born) owners retained the right of manumission on a “case-by-case basis”: hence 
Céspedes’s declaration likewise, “by default, condoned slavery” (Ferrer 1999: 26). 
 In 1870 Céspedes formally ended the forced labour of libertos. Their time 
and labour was henceforth organised by an, “apprenticeship”, that “focused 
customarily on teaching slaves to sell their labor to others, for a wage”, hence, 
“freedom from slavery, did not imply the freedom not to work” (Ferrer 1999: 29-
30). However, increasingly, ex-slave insurgents began to take their own initiative in 
the rebellion; slave women fled their assigned masters to follow their men to the 
front, and slaves used liberation as a call to arms. All this led to the Liberation Army 
having to establish a “disciplinary apparatus that mirrored the Spanish system of 
military tribunals…[which were] at least as strict as those imposed by their Spanish 
counterparts” (Ferrer 1999: 33). It seems then, that the rebellion was becoming 
increasingly reliant on the majority of the population, enslaved and free people of 
colour, for its success.  
 In the west, however, the slave insurgency never really took root, so these 
conflicts were largely confined to the east. As Scott puts it, “[i]n most of the western 
part of the island, the coercive discipline of a slave plantation regime combined with 
Spanish military force to create an environment inhospitable to effective 
insurgency” (Scott 1985: 62). All this of course, put pressure on Spain; as long as 
slavery existed, slaves had an incentive to join the rebellion, and theoretically at 
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least, the United States had a rationale for aiding the liberationists. Hence, the 
Spanish Cortes introduced the Moret Law in 1870, which was, “in a sense an effort 
by Spain to capture the apparent moral high ground from the insurgents and to win 
gratitude from freed slaves and free people of color, while stalling abolition itself” 
(Scott 1985: 65). The Moret Law freed all children born since 1868. However, all 
that this meant, was simply that, “[t]he epithet attached to their names in the slave 
lists changed from párvulo to liberto, but there is no indication that any alteration in 
their treatment followed” (Scott 1985: 68).  
In 1873 Máximo Gómez took over as military leader in Puerto Príncipe from 
Ignacio Agramonte. Throughout the early part of the war: 
 
the Spanish publicly emphasised the number of blacks and runaway slaves 
among the rebels as part of an attempt to portray the rebellion as a racial 
rather than a political struggle and thus dissuade whites from joining (Scott 
1985: 58).  
 
While there had been desertions on both sides, this issue became critical also 
to the white rebel leadership. Their vision of a national republic was one founded 
and led by white leaders, with gradual abolition of slavery planned only after this 
struggle was won. Céspedes wrote to separatist colleagues in the United States 
saying “annexation” was preferable to a “bitter war of the races” (Ferrer 1999: 54). 
Clearly, there was a conflict of interest between the predominantly white leadership 
of the revolutionary movement and the bulk of the Liberation Army, which was non-
white. Moreover, prominent leaders, such as Máximo Gómez, continued to inspire 
recruitment to the new cause of Cuba Libre [Free Cuba] because of their 
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commitment to the total abolition of slavery. In fact, this abolition, due to the racial 
structure of the liberation forces, became very much a part of that same ideology of 
Cuba Libre. There was perhaps then, already a conflict about what this concept 
meant to the predominantly white leadership of the independence movement, and 
the largely non-white fighting force. 
The preference of the white leadership for support from the United States 
was a crucial aspect of the future republic’s political life, and in many ways the 
attitudes of the white leaders of the independence struggle were to continue to 
manifest themselves among the political and ex-military leaders in the years from 
1900-24. Allegiance to the ideals of the United States and its founding fathers, who 
were very much an elite themselves, was preferable to the inherent radicalism of the 
racially egalitarian Liberation Army, or indeed, as will be seen, to the radical 
ideologies arriving on Cuban shores in the minds of Spanish immigrant workers. 
Similarly, the Veterans’ organisations after independence were inherently, if not 




The Pact of Zanjón and the Guerra Chiquita 
 
On February 10 1878, a Camagüeyan committee agreed to the Pact of 
Zanjón that gave:  
 
concession of administrative and political rights equivalent to those earlier 
granted to Puerto Rico; political pardon for insurgents and deserters from the 
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Spanish Army; and legal freedom for slaves and Chinese contract workers 
currently in the insurrection…a peace that granted neither independence nor 
abolition (Ferrer 1999: 63).  
 
 The mulato general, Antonio Maceo, leading the rebels in Oriente, rejected 
this peace immediately, writing to Spanish authorities to ask what the rebels could 
hope to achieve from this pact (Ferrer 1999: 64). Maceo rejected the terms because 
they included neither the abolition of slavery, nor recognition of Cuban 
independence. His meeting with the Spanish General Martínez Campos led to the 
‘Protest of Baraguá’: fighting resurfaced but was over by May and the rebels were 
forced to accept the Pact (Thomas 2001: 157-8). The issues of slavery and 
independence were fundamentally unresolved, despite the fact that the emancipation 
of both slaves and the nation had been the chief issues that had won supporters over 
to the Liberation Army. The treaty, “freed only those slaves who had rebelled 
against Spain…[which] rather than resolving the issue of emancipation, had only 
produced a new and greater incentive for slaves to mount acts of open rebellion and 
to ally with would-be insurgents” (Ferrer 1999: 71) 
 Not surprisingly, the Guerra Chiquita erupted on 26 August 1879, but lasted 
less than a year. Distinguishing between the Ten Years War and this uprising has 
been seen as an “arbitrary distinction” (Ferrer 1999: 72), however, there were 
significant differences between the two conflicts. The Liberal (Autonomist) Party 
declared the new conflict a “threat to liberty” (Ferrer 1999: 72). The Autonomists 
sought little more than “a system of local self-government patterned after the 
English colonial model” (Suchlicki 1988: 210), and they could not stop the radical 
egalitarian element that had been released by the conflict. The Autonomists’ 
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opposition to the new uprising was no doubt because the Pact had given the 
“propertied element” (Foner 1977: 13) representation in the Spanish Cortes: the 
Autonomist Party was composed of the wealthier elements of both criollo and 
peninsular separatists who hoped for a gradualist political evolution to democracy.  
As Ferrer sees it, during the Guerra Chiquita, “the practice and process of 
insurgency on the ground”, was to paint this rebellion as ‘blacker’ than the previous 
one (Ferrer 1999: 77). Spanish officials tried to depict the new conflict as a ‘race 
war’ and blacks as ‘savages’, sometimes going so far as to steal their clothes to 
make them fit this archetype (Ferrer 1999: 78). By 1880 however, most of the 
leaders of the movement were in exile, in New York, Santo Domingo, and Madrid. 
Only a minor outbreak of fighting in 1885 disrupted the peace that was to last until 
1895 (Foner 1977: 12). While small numbers of separatists joined the ranks of the 
Autonomist Party, Pérez notes that, “[e]xcluded from the new political alignments in 
post-Zanjón Cuba were the irreconcilable veterans of the Ten Years’ War…Exile 
attracted the most intransigent elements of the separatist polity” (Pérez 1988: 140). 
This was to be a turning point in the history of the Cuban independence movement. 
 
 
The Formation of the Cuban Revolutionary Party 
 
On 17 April 1881 the Spanish constitution of 1876 was applied to Cuba and:  
 
the island was to be ruled by laws enacted for it by the legislative body in 
Madrid. But here again, in practice little real change took place…The 
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possibility of criticising Spanish institutions and policies was severely 
limited (Foner 1977: 14). 
 
In response José Martí, proposed the formation of a “revolutionary party” in 
a letter to Máximo Gómez, on 20 July 1882, (Turton 1986: 58), and the latter, along 
with Maceo, moved to New York to join him in 1884, to seek funds for the 
independence movement.  
In 1890 Martí founded La Liga [the League], for the “education and 
advancement of Negro exiles”; this was no doubt in line with Martí’s opinion that 
the new struggle for independence would require a “people’s war” (Foner 1977: 17-
18). Independence as an idea spread amongst the workers of Key West and Tampa 
as lectores, in tobacco factories promoted this doctrine as they read aloud to the 
often-illiterate workers as they laboured, including radical ideas hidden amongst 
their readings. On 26 and 27 November 1890 Martí gave two of his most important 
speeches: ‘With All, and for the Good of All’, and ‘The New Pines’. These speeches 
led to the formation of La Liga de Instrucción [The League of Instruction] in 
Tampa, modelled on the first league, and the adoption of the ‘Tampa Resolutions’ 
on 28 November (Foner 1977: 19-20). The resolutions had four aims: first, to unite 
all pro-independence groups; second, to wage war to form a popular government; 
third, to form a cross-class democratic republic; and fourth, to respect the 
constitutions of the emigrant groups (Foner 1977: 207). These resolutions were to 
become the ‘Platform of the Cuban Revolutionary Party’, founded by Martí on 5 
January 1892. The socialist Carlos Baliño helped to found the Party and his 
radicalism was, according to Blas Roca, to have a profound influence upon it 
(IHMCRSC 1976: 13). Local clubs that supplied funds and recruits for the 
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revolution, which abided by the statutes of the Party, formed the Cuban 
Revolutionary Party. The local clubs’ Presidents were to act as the executive for the 
regional Councils and they in turn were subordinate to the Delegate (the President of 
the Party), and the Treasurer (Foner 1977: 23). As a result a “great check on the 
Delegate and Treasurer was their obligation to present themselves each year for re-
election”, with some historians suggesting that this political formation was 
‘democratic centralism’, and a forerunner of the present-day Cuban Communist 
Party organisation (Turton 1986: 35, referring to Jorge Ibarra).7 
Patria was founded on 14 March 1892 as the official journal of the PRC as 
Martí recognised that one of the failures of the earlier rebellion was a lack of 
communication between forces within Cuba and those outside it (Foner 1977: 38-9). 
Martí had a minor disagreement with Brigadier-General Enrique Collazo, who 
claimed that Martí was not a man of action. Other military veterans were also 
insulted by what they saw as Martí’s self-important attitude, including Fernando 
Figueredo, President of the Cuban Convention of Key West, and Guillermo 
Moncada, a distinguished veteran general (Turton 1986: 32). Martí however, 
received much written support, and was elected Delegate of the PRC on 10 April 
1892 (Foner 1977: 35). On 3 January 1893 General Máximo Gómez was appointed 
military chief of the Liberation Army. Martí came into conflict with Máximo 
Gómez, who he felt seemed to treat the revolutionary movement as though it were 
                                                          
7 In a similar fashion, Cantón Navarro compares the PRC to Lenin’s Social 
Democratic Party (Cantón Navarro 1998: 60). A note of caution must be made, 
however, when Cuban historians of a Communist allegiance portray the evolution 
from José Martí’s PRC to Fidel Castro’s socialist Cuba as a linear progression of 
radical, nationalist and anti-imperialist struggle. José Martí himself was by no means 
a Leninist, nor even a Marxist, having only fleeting sympathy with the latter, and 
vocally criticising both Marxism and anarchism at various points (ironically of 
course, Castro held approximately the same position early on in his career). The 
radical and socialist element in the PRC came from the workers’ patriotic clubs, not 
the leadership, and hence, the structure was not self-consciously Marxist.  
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his exclusive property. Martí informed him that “[a] nation is not founded, General, 
the way one commands a military camp” (Foner 1977: 16). He henceforth remained 
committed to civilian control of the revolutionary movement. Enrique Trujillo, 
editor of the emigré newspaper, El Porvenir, “objected to the PRC’s revolutionary 
nature and what he characterised its dictatorial structure” (Poyo 1986: 24). After 
Martí was elected Delegate of the Party he ordered elections amongst the military 
veterans for a commander. While this election was to some extent, to appease 
military leaders hostile to Martí, this “represented a great step forward in the cause 
of Cuban democracy, since it meant the military had become, theoretically at least, 
an arm of the Party and not vice versa” (Turton 1986: 35). This was not to stop the 
civilian-military contest for the leadership of Cuban nationalism, however, as it will 
be seen that this continued throughout the period under investigation. 
 An early success for the PRC was its defeat of Key West tobacco 
manufacturers. Horatio S. Rubens, a New York lawyer and PRC supporter, 
successfully had Spanish strike breakers deported, after they had been sent from 
Havana in violation of the contract labour law of the US Congress, passed in 1885 
(Foner 1977: 43-4). This importation of strike breakers was no doubt carried out by 
the Spanish authorities to attempt to stop the PRC gaining financial and other 
support from workers in Key West, but this plan clearly backfired, as Cuban 
workers could see that their employers cared little about national borders if these 
could be subordinated to the benefit of their own profits, serving to radicalise the 
PRC.  
After a failed filibustering mission by the PRC on 10 January 1895,8 a new 
insurrection began on 24 February when the military leaders established that at least 
                                                          
8 The United States seized the three ships that were part of the ‘Fernandina plan’, 
full of arms and supplies, costing the rebels $58, 000 and three years work. 
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four provinces would rise in rebellion (Foner 1977: 52-3). On 25 March 1895, Martí 
announced the ‘Montecristi Manifesto’, which declared Cuba’s desire for 
independence, brought about by a just war, and the participation of blacks and ex-
slaves in this struggle, no doubt to counter the charge of the Spanish regime that the, 
“[n]egro race is a threat” (Foner 1977: 394). Martí landed in Cuba on 10 April, and 
on 16 April he was informed that he had been unanimously elected as Major-
General of the Liberation Army. In discussions with Máximo Gómez and Maceo on 
4 May, Martí again explained his fear of military domination of the revolutionary 
process and the possibility of this factor creating a dictatorship (Foner 1977: 54-7). 
PRC leaders met again on 5 May at La Mejorana sugar mill and, “the most 
controversial issue was the organisation of the civilian government and the military 
command and the relationship between them” (Cantón Navarro 1998: 63). The issue 
of this relationship was to plague the independence movement.  
During the Ten Years War the prefecturas [prefectures] had administered the 
territory under the control of the liberation forces, acting as a kind of civil 
government over their district, approving marriages, enforcing criminal laws, and 
educating children and the illiterate (Izquierdo Canosa 1998: 16-17). However, this 
was in the context of a guerrilla war, and this was no doubt not meant to be an 
embryonic form of the future society along ‘democratic-centralist’ lines, as 
Communist historians might like to think, but rather an ad-hoc structure best suited 
to keeping a large population supportive of the rebellion. The issue of how to 
structure a civil, constitutional government after 1902 was very much a conflict in 
its own right.  
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The War of Independence of 1895-8 
 
From the outset, the PRC sought to unify a broad cross-class and cross-race 
nationalist alliance, collecting together, “army veterans of 1868 and the civilian 
separatists of the post- 1868 generation, Cubans from the provinces of the east and 
the west, Cubans who lived inside and outside Cuba, blacks and whites, women and 
men, Cubans of all classes” (Pérez 1988: 148). Not surprisingly, the new uprising 
“was…both a rebellion against Spanish political structures and a revolution against 
the Cuban social system” (Pérez 1988: 159). Perhaps also not surprisingly, the 
Liberal Autonomist Party declared this new uprising “criminal” (Pérez 1986: 20). 
The Ten Years War had been enough for the Autonomists, representing the 
wealthier criollo sector. The social-revolutionary nature of the new insurrection was 
reflected concretely in the practices of the Liberation Army. When the Army 
expanded into the west of the country, Máximo Gómez ordered all economic 
production to cease, and set about destroying sugar plantations and harvests. This 
could be seen as simply a means to cripple their enemies’ resources, but according 
to Pérez, the “western expansion of the insurrection was no less a threat to the 
sovereignty of the colonial administration than to the social system over which it 
presided. Cubans intended to overthrow the former by undermining the latter” 
(Pérez 1988: 153). 
Further, the new rebellion again addressed the problem of civilian versus 
military control of the movement. According to Thomas, “Maceo wanted a military 
junta to control everything till victory. Martí disagreed” (Thomas 2001: 179). Maceo 
emphasised that the failure of a strong military leadership had led to the defeat of the 
Liberation Army in the Ten Years War; however, he also stated that he would not 
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take up any political leadership position, should they triumph. Martí was killed in 
his first encounter in the field on 19 May 1895, thus again leaving the issue 
unresolved. Thomas notes that although Salvador Cisneros Betancourt became the 
provisional President of the Republic after Martí’s death, “[p]ower, such as it was, 
rested on a tacit understanding between the generals – Máximo Gómez, Maceo, and 
later, Calixto García” (Thomas 2001: 180-2). While these leaders seemingly 
controlled the rebellion from their high-ranking positions, it must not be forgotten 
that in many ways the civilian and political leadership used these soldiers for their 
own pragmatic ends. Wealthy white landowners and business-men continued to take 
up leadership positions based purely on their common cultural attributes, rather than 
proven abilities. An accord in November of 1895 by the rebel legislature specified 
that ranks would be assigned to incoming soldiers on the basis of their education 
(Ferrer 1999: 154). According to Ferrer again, “[r]igid social divisions existed 
within the rebel army, not only in the allocation of ranks but also in the exercise of 
military life” (Ferrer 1999: 155). Not surprisingly then, Martí’s death “would 
dramatically weaken the Cuban Revolutionary Party from a political, ideological 
and organizational point of view and would help thwart the patriotic, democratic and 
socially advanced objectives of the Revolution” (Cantón Navarro 1998: 63).  
After the enforced resignation of Martínez Campos, the Spanish general who 
had been in charge of the Spanish forces, the Spanish republic took a firmer stand 
toward crushing the rebellion when it appointed General Valeriano Weyler, who 
claimed: “I believe that war should be answered with war” (Pérez 1988: 165). 
Weyler’s reconcentrado [reconcentration] decree began counter-insurgency against 
rebel guerrilla warfare; subsistence agriculture was burned, livestock was 
confiscated, and homes were razed by the voluntarios, Cuban ‘volunteers’ fighting 
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to preserve the Spanish empire. The rural population was herded into camps, and 
those remaining outside were held to be assisting the enemy. Not surprisingly, these 
“overcrowded reconcentration centres became breeding grounds for disease and 
sickness. The policy led eventually to mass deaths” (Pérez 1988: 167). The invasion 
of the west by the rebel army, which prompted these events, was not only a 
significant military victory, but was also a daring political accomplishment; the 
insurrection of 1868 had largely failed because a successful incursion into the rich 
west had evaded the rebels, indeed, the white leadership had prohibited it (Ferrer 
1999: 143). 
This counter-revolutionary tactic, however, still proved ineffectual in turning 
back rebel success. According to Thomas, by winter 1897-8, “[i]t began to be 
appreciated that self-government would in the end be granted: It was a question of 
what sort” (Thomas 2001: 204). In August 1897 the assassination of the Spanish 
President brought down the Conservative government there and led to the retirement 
of Weyler (Ferrer 1999: 171). His successor, General Ramón Blanco, announced a 
change of policy stating that he had come to give Cubans self-government and 
amnesty, for those who lived ‘within the law’. On 22 November 1897 the new 
administration gave Cubans male suffrage (at least to the propertied classes), 
however, the Spanish Captain-General still retained his power over internal order 
and external affairs. José María Gálvez became the leader of the first home-rule 
government, composed of Autonomists and the Partido Reformista [Reformist 
Party] (Thomas 2001: 204-6). There were riots against autonomy and the USS 
Maine was sent to protect US property interests. On 15 February 1898 an explosion 
destroyed the ship. The Spanish authorities blamed an internal cause and faulty 
gunpowder supplies, while the United States blamed an external cause and Spanish 
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negligence; there was no evidence to link separatists (Thomas 2001: 207-12). The 
US President McKinley at first avoided war and made an unsuccessful offer of 
annexation (Thomas 2001: 212).  
 The war beginning in 1868 combined with the ideology of nationalism to 
give birth to the Cuban nation as a material institution. In turn, “the convergence of 
‘independentismo’ and abolitionism”, meant that, “the war would make inevitable 
the formation of a national juridical structure”, which made a nation independent of 
the Spanish colony possible (Aguirre 1990: 128-9). This independence movement, 
however, due primarily to the social forces in Cuba generally, could not help but 
take on a radical hue, not only because of the role of ex-slaves and non-white 




The Role of Radical Politics in Cuba until the formation of the Cuban 
Revolutionary Party 
 
 Socialist and anarchist intellectuals and workers played an important part in 
the independence struggle, and in the formation and practices of the Cuban 
Revolutionary Party. It is therefore important to understand the influence of these 
intellectuals upon Cuban history. During the latter part of the nineteenth century, 
anarchism was the dominant revolutionary ideology in large parts of Europe, as both 
anarchist and academic historians agree. Anarchism was to influence the Cuban 
workers’ movement due to its colonial relationship with Spain. In 1857, “the first 
Proudhonian mutualist society was founded in Cuba”, according to Fernández 
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(Fernández 2001: 17); however, Foner claims that this was a society whose 
constitution would admit only “all white people of good education” (Foner 1963: 
138, emphasis in original). Fernández’s reference to Proudhon is perhaps an attempt 
to imply that the anarchist movement was the first to establish itself in Cuba, but 
Foner fails to mention Proudhon’s name in the founding of this society, as does 
Casanovas, when he states that there was a “mutual-aid society directly attached to 
El Pilar…that attracted white artisans” (Casanovas 1998: 68).9  In 1858, “the free 
Negro, Antonio Mora” established a mutual aid society, the purpose of which, 
according to him, was to enable “the proletarian class to create a means capable of 
making its misfortunes less calamitous” (Foner 1963: 139). Whether or not they 
were radically racially egalitarian, mutualist and anarchist organisations were 
beginning to take root, and the substantial non-white composition of the Cuban 
working class meant they would have a tendency to develop racial egalitarianism.  
 In 1865 the Asociación de Tabaqueros de La Habana, [Association of 
Tobacco Workers of Havana], a mutual-aid society amongst one of the largest group 
of workers, was established (Stubbs 1985: 85). In 1866, the first strike took place at 
the ‘Hija de Cabañas y Carbajal’ and ‘El Fígaro’ tobacco factories in Havana 
(Fernández 2001: 17, Casanovas 1998: 79), in which workers were successful. In the 
same year Saturnino Martínez began publishing the weekly workers’ paper La 
Aurora, funded by artisans (Foner 1963: 140). Although Martínez was apparently 
                                                          
9 As an aside, Proudhon’s notorious anti-semitism, along with antagonism to 
women’s suffrage, democracy, strikes, and, in later life, his support for Napoleon, 
perhaps muddies the waters on whether this founder of ‘mutualism’ would be for 
racial equality or not. Suffice to say, anarchist connotations do not necessarily infer 
racial egalitarianism, despite what contemporary anarchist historians might say. 
Similarly ‘mutual aid’ was a phrase of the Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkin, with 
Proudhon’s use of the word ‘mutualism’ generally coming later, no doubt to 




“influenced by Poudhon’s ideas of federation and mutual aid, [he] was not an 
anarchist” (Fernández 2001: 18). Writers in La Aurora such as José de J. Márquez, 
preached the virtues of co-operatives and workers’ guilds or trade unions 
(Casanovas 1998: 81). Martínez was instrumental in the establishment of the 
lectura: the practice of a designated individual reading aloud on diverse topics such 
as history, politics, and often novels, to tobacco workers as they worked (Foner 
1963: 143).10 These readings were outlawed by the authorities in 1866 when Florez 
Estrada’s Political Economy was read aloud, which advocated “the right of the 
worker to dispose of the fruit of his labor” (Foner 1963: 146).11 Casanovas states 
that “[w]ith the war, [i.e., the Ten Years War] the labor movement collapsed”; 
however, in 1872 ‘el Sociedad Protectora del Gremio de Escogedores’, [the Cigar 
Selectors’ Protection Society], “the first trade union in Cuba”, was established 
(Casanovas 1998: 109). In 1873 there was an attempt at a general strike (Casanovas 
1998: 119).  
Fernández states that the “first openly anarchist presence” appeared in Cuba 
in the 1880s when J. C. Campos, a Cuban typographer, initiated contact with 
Spanish anarchists, perhaps qualifying his earlier comment on Proudhon. Anarchist 
author Sam Dolgoff states that the “forerunners and organizers of the Cuban labor 
movement were the Spanish anarcho-syndicalist exiles who in the 1880s came to 
Cuba…men like Enrique Messinier [sic], Enrique Roig San Martín, and Enrique 
Cresci [sic]” (Dolgoff 1976: 37). Spanish anarchists had founded the ‘Congress of 
the Federation of the Spanish Region of the International Working Mens’ 
                                                          
10 Sheldon B. Liss refers to “anarchosyndicalist intellectuals Saturnino Martínez and 
José de Jesús Márquez” (Liss 1987: 7), but there seems little evidence elsewhere to 
suggest this was their ideological position, although they were certainly familiar 
with these ideas. 
11 Aguilar tells us they even included the promotion of the ideas of Proudhon and 
Mikhail Bakunin (Aguilar 1972: 78, n.22). 
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Association’ in Barcelona in 1870. According to Dolgoff, this Federation had 
adopted the ideas put forward by the Russian anarchist Mikhail Bakunin in the 
‘Declaration of Principles of the International Alliance of Socialist Democracy’ 
drafted in 1868 and the Resolution of the Basel Congress of the IWMA in 1869 
(Dolgoff 1976: 31-2). Spanish radicals immigrating to Cuba were presumably 
influenced by this method of organising. Casanovas states that the Cuban anarchist 
movement of the 1880s was influenced by what he terms “[a]narcho-collectivism”; 
proposing a system of reward based on workers’ contribution and following the 
rationale of the Federación Regional Española, [Regional Federation of Spain – 
FRE], and later the Federación de Trabajadores de la Región Española, [Federation 
of Workers of the Spanish Region – FTRE], who were influenced by Bakunin’s 
ideas, and according to Casanovas, opposed violent methods. This is supposedly in 
contrast to the “anarcho-communism” of Errico Malatesta and Peter Kropotkin, 
which espoused violence, asserted a system of reward based on need, and “came to 
dominate European anarchism everywhere except in Spain” (Casanovas 1998: 147-
51).12 According to Casanovas, the Junta Central de Artesanos de la Habana, 
[Central Assembly of Artisans of Havana - JCA], was established in 1882 with the 
FTRE in mind.  
Enrique Roig San Martín (1843-1889) became editor of El Obrero in 1883, a 
paper founded by republican democrats (Casnovas 1998: 150), which was, under his 
leadership, to become, “the first Cuban paper to espouse a specifically anarchist 
position to the Cuban working class” (Fernández 2001: 20). While Liss claims that 
Roig San Martín is, “often considered Cuba’s first Marxist of note” (Liss 1987: 32), 
                                                          
12 This interpretation is Casanovas’s. While Bakunin certainly advocated 
collectivism, as opposed to full communism, it seems a little unusual to refer to 
anything under his notoriously inflammatory influence as ‘non-violent’! 
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this is no doubt an erroneous description of his viewpoint, and he was merely 
familiar with Marxism, as Fernández points out, “like any other anarchist of his 
time…he would have felt obligated to be informed about everything relating to 
socialism” (Fernández 2001: 25). Liss cites Roig San Martín as influenced by 
Bakunin, Kropotkin, Marx and Engels, and claims that he “advocated replacing the 
state as it existed with worker control”, but still refers to him as, “Cuba’s first major 
Marxist social critic” (Liss 1987: 35-7). In 1885 the Junta Central de Trabajadores 
[Central Assembly of Workers], and the Círculo de Trabajadores [Workers’ Circle], 
an “anarchist-orientated” organisation, were founded (Fernández 2001: 20), the 
latter being “an attempt at rebuilding the JCA and giving it a stronger anarchist 
orientation” (Casanovas1998: 161).13  
In 1887 Roig San Martín replaced El Obrero with El Productor. Messonier, 
Manuel Fuentes and Enrique Creci also wrote for this paper. El Productor was 
instrumental in the creation of the Alianza Obrera [Worker Alliance] or the 
Asociación Benéfica y de Protección á los Trabajadores [Association for the 
Protection and Benefit of Workers] to give it its full title (Casanovas 1998: 190), 
which held its first Congress in Havana in 1887, supported by another recent 
creation, La Federación de Trabajadores de Cuba [The Federation of Workers of 
Cuba – FTC]. The Congress stressed opposition to “all vestiges of authority” and 
adopted the federative principle (Fernández 2001: 21).  
In 1888, the izquierdista [leftist] dissidence emerged from within the Unión 
Constitucional [Constitutional Union]. It, “claimed to support some of labor’s 
demands”, even proposing modification of the electoral census in order to allow 
                                                          
13 According to Hernández, the Círculo changed its name to the Sociedad General de 
Trabajadores [General Society of Workers – SGT] in 1893 and was led by Sabino 
Muñiz and José González Aguirre (Fernández 2001: 43) 
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working-class suffrage, and El Productor went so far as to declare that “we must 
help the [izquierdista] dissidents to win” (Casanovas 1998: 191). In 1889, “the 
burial of Enrique Roig became the first massive socialist demonstration in Cuba”, 
with more than 4000 marching to celebrate the life of the late anarchist who died 
after imprisonment had worsened his health (Casanovas 1998: 199). In 1890, May 
Day celebrations took place for the first time in Cuba. In 1892 the first Regional 
Workers’ Congress was founded, negating the use of the word ‘national’ as 
anarchists stressed that the social problem would not be solved by independence. 
This coincided with the establishment of the Cuban Revolutionary Party and the 
emphasis by Martí on the social struggle. The authorities’ response was to prohibit 
free assembly, close El Productor, and to persecute the Círculo and the Junta 
Central (Fernández: 2001:28). 
 Anarchism in Cuba then, played much the same role as it did in Europe 
generally: acting often as a progressive force, and often in unity with democratic and 
radical socialists (despite some anarchists’, and anarchist historians’ claims to 
ideological purity). It was not entirely surprising then, that many within this 
movement would offer their support for an independence struggle, this nationalist 
sympathy only being formed on the grounds that a republic would be more just for 
workers than a colony. It is also not entirely surprising that these same supporters 




The Cuban Revolutionary Party and the Workers’ Movement 
 
According to Poyo, “many of the popular anarchist leaders of the 1880s 
eventually found their way into the PRC as office-holders and publicists” (Poyo 
1986: 22). It even appears that the murder of Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, “the 
architect of the constitutional restoration”, by the Italian anarchist and practitioner of 
‘propaganda by the deed’, Miguel Angiolillo, was only made possible by the 
financial assistance of Cuban rebel Rámon Emeterio Betances (Thomas 2001: 203). 
Indeed, according to Casanovas, Betances was the “PRC’s agent in Paris”, and it 
was this act which led to the “establishment of an autonomous government in Cuba” 
(Thomas 2001: 228). Enrique Trujillo suggested that the PRC would be 
compromised by anarchist membership and contributions as “every gift creates a 
commitment”, while the annexationist José I Rodríguez labelled Martí, “eminently 
socialist and anarchist” (Abel 1986: 25), but this was clearly an exaggerated and 
erroneous depiction designed to smear Martí’s name and the PRC. More accurately, 
perhaps, according to Turton, Martí “had a special dislike for anarchists” (Turton 
1986: 123).  
In April 1884 Carlos Agüero, with the authorisation of separatists in Key 
West, had launched a guerrilla expedition to Cuba leading to kidnappings of planters 
in Matanzas and Santa Clara. Supposedly influenced by the Russian nihilist 
movement (at this time the phrase ‘nihilism’ was often associated with the anarchist 
Bakunin), and Irish nationalists, the guerrillas promoted “scientific war” of dynamite 
and property destruction claiming, “the best argument against oppression is and will 
be the explosion” (Casanovas 1998: 159). A similar uprising occurred in April 1893 
in Holguín, when Manuel and Ricardo Sartorius led a rebellion outside of PRC 
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control that was quickly defeated by Spanish forces. As a result, in ‘The 
Revolutionary Party in Cuba’, the PRC declared itself, “a vigorous critic of every 
partial or inadequate rebellion” (Foner 1977: 327). 
 It was the Haymarket Affair in Chicago that was to alter Martí’s views 
towards anarchists and extra-parliamentary socialists. This led to a further influx of 
labour radicals into prominent PRC positions and a further cross-fertilisation of 
ideas between those who sought national independence and those who sought social 
revolution. Turton tells us that; “Martí’s faith in the United States had received a 
mortal blow in the Haymarket events” (Turton 1986: 143). Previously, Martí had 
seen anarchists as a dangerous rabble, especially German and European anarchists, 
being influenced by the ideas of Johann Möst (a strange mixture of Marxist doctrine 
and anarchist method), in the era of ‘propaganda by the deed’, in which barely a 
nation in Europe existed without an attempted assassination of some head of state by 
an anarchist of some description. The Chicago massacre made Martí realise that the 
US state was at least as prepared to use violence, even without due process, to 
protect capitalists’ interests (Turton 1986: 126-44). 
 It was under these conditions that “inside Cuba, the emigré working class 
communities began to move closer to the left wing of the separatist movement led 
by José Martí” (Casanovas 1998: 216). The anarchist fortnightly El Despertar even 
claimed that the separatist movement had failed because elite leaders had 
compromised working-class whites and blacks when they signed the Pact of Zanjón. 
The Spanish state’s repression following the attempted May Day general strike of 
1892, “prompted prominent anarchists such as Enrique Messonier to emigrate to the 
United States to join the PRC.” An economic crisis caused by the McKinley Tarriff 
Act led many workers to leave Cuba for Key West, Tampa, and New York, and this, 
 49
along with the Spanish repression, caused “phenomenal growth in the number of 
working-class clubs associated with the PRC in the United States.” Carlos Baliño 
founded the ‘Enrique Roig’ club with the anarchist Joaquín Izaguirre, and socialist 
and anarchist journals such as El Proletario, El Productor, and El Despertar 
maintained close relations with Patria, the main periodical of the PRC (Casanovas 
1998: 217).  
 In fact, Carlos Baliño was perhaps the other major radicalising influence on 
the PRC and the independence movement at this stage. On the other hand, if he was 
not in fact that influential at the time, he has certainly been held in high regard by 
Cuban historians, due to his importance within the PRC, his friendship with Martí, 
and his later friendship with the young intellectual (and later Cuban Communist 
Party member) Julio Antonio Mella (Suchlicki 1988: 20). Baliño was instrumental in 
founding the Cuban Communist Party with Mella, as he was earlier in founding the 
PRC with Martí, and this no doubt helps Cuban historians to portray the 
independence movement as radical from the outset. In fact, many agree that Baliño 
was more or less an anarchist before the 1890s, only turning to Marxism later on in 
his life. Further, as seen above, anarchists were perhaps a more important influence 
on the PRC, and certainly provided a lot of the rank-and-file recruits. In any case, 
there is no doubt, at least among non-Cuban historians of Cuba, that the Cuban 
Communist Party of 1925 underwent many changes of personnel and form before 
becoming the Cuban Communist Party consolidated after the triumph of the various 
forces of the 26th July Movement.14  
                                                          
14 In fact, some historians claim that not only did the Cuban Communist Party of 
1925 go on to support the right-wing dictatorship of Gerardo Machado of 1925-33 
(the Machadato), but it also made up much of the state bureaucracy that the 
coalition of forces of the 26th July movement was physically opposed to until 1959 
(Thomas 2001: 344-382, and, 586-625).  
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 In 1892 the Cuban regional labour Congress, “decided to support – or at least 
not to oppose – the overthrow of Spanish rule in Cuba as a necessary precondition 
for a future social revolution.” This was achieved by allowing, “workers…[to] join 
the separatist movement individually” (Casanovas 1998: 230). Many members of 
the anarchist-led labour movement joined the PRC in Tampa or Key West. This 
perhaps indicates the strength of the influence of the PRC, as the traditional 
anarchist view holds that any participation in ‘politics’ is counter-revolutionary and 
itself sanctions domination that is to be transcended by the social revolution. No 
doubt some of this conversion was due to the powerful arguments put forth by Martí 
in Patria that ‘political’ action was not always futile, if it was to combat the 
oppressing colonial nation. There was even a new ‘anarcho-separatist’ periodical 
begun in Florida, El Esclavo, when El Despertar distanced itself from the PRC. 
When war broke out in 1895 an anarchist pamphlet expressly called for unity 
between criollo and peninsular workers to fight for national liberation. The anarchist 
group that edited El Corsario in Galicia, Spain, likewise supported Cuban 
separatism (Casanovas 1998: 220-6). While workers may not have been the main 
fighting force during the War of Independence, they did “collect funds,…build 
information networks, and…channel supplies for the Liberating Army…[and were] 
undoubtedly essential to maintaining the separatist army throughout the war.” 
Anarchists also used their skills in manufacturing dynamite to aid the separatist 
military struggle and even made the bomb that was used to attempt to kill General 





The PRC and Socialist Ideology 
 
 Martí saw himself as a true ‘radical’. As he put it: “[t]he genuine man always 
goes to the roots. That is what it means to be a radical” (Kirk 1983: 108). Indeed, 
according to another author, “the moral indignation pervading Martí’s critique of the 
dehumanising power of monopoly capital is comparable only with that felt by Marx 
and Engels against the abuses of bourgeois society” (Turton 1986: 99). However, 
Martí sought both working-class, and employer’s support, for the PRC. According to 
Poyo, he had a “good relationship with the Cuban cigar manufacturers and other 
entrepreneurs and professionals in the Florida communities.” In turn, “they did not 
consider Martí’s social ideas a threat to their economic interests” (Poyo 1986: 23).  
 Martí was a great admirer of Marx; however, he thought he moved ‘too fast’. 
According to Turton: 
 
for both Martí and Marx the goal was the same: a society where each 
individual would be able to cultivate his talent to the maximum of his 
desires…But for Cuba, at least in its immediate post-revolutionary stage, he 
wanted a free-enterprise system, albeit, as has been shown, with curbs 
against the grosser forms of exploitation (Turton 1986: 52).  
 
Martí was influenced by Henry George’s Progress and Poverty, which 
suggested the nationalisation of land and its rental to those who wanted it, thus 
easing the surplus population of the cities. Turton asserts that “[w]hatever Martí’s 
exact ideas on George’s system, there is no doubt that he wanted for Cuba a society 
of small and medium producers” (Turton 1986: 53). According to Ibarra, the 
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difference was that George proffered his theories as a means to preserve industrial 
capitalism, while Martí saw his ideas as an alternative to it. Ibarra declares that in 
‘Escenas norteamericanas’ Martí “delivered one of the most severe attacks of the 
nineteenth century against monopoly power” (Ibarra 1986: 100). As one writer has 
correctly noted, “his political programs…resembled quite closely many of the ideas 
of the French so-called utopian socialists in the early nineteenth century” (Kirk 
1983: 47).15  
Caution is needed, however, in resting on truth claims, and the multifarious 
interplay of dynamic social forces in Martí’s philosophy should be noted, and hence, 
the same interplay within the PRC: nationalism, ‘bourgeois’ socialism, and 
liberalism. While advocates of these varying doctrines may often be mutually 
opposed to each other, these ideas should be understood as ‘discursive formations’: 
all concerned primarily with man as a political subject to varying degrees, and with 
quantifying, qualifying, and observing his behaviour, a practice hitherto absent in 
the pre-industrial Cuba. The PRC wished to unite: “[d]octors and workers, factory 
owners and mechanics, tradesmen and generals,…to vote and elect their 
representatives.” Voting would be made compulsory in order to “educate the public 
and balance out classes” (Turton 1986: 49-50). Whether this form of political matrix 
was national or not, it seemed to serve the mordernising influence of capitalism: the 
further division and specialisation of labour and the development of productive 
processes. 
                                                          
15 In point of fact, many of the North American anarchists at the other end of the 
scale, the Proudhon-inspired ‘individualists’ such as Benjamin Tucker, Josiah 
Warren, Ezra Heywood, and Lysander Spooner, were peripherally influenced also 
by Henry George’s nationalisation system, amongst a rather bizarre melting pot of 
ideas including Herbert Spencer, Max Stirner, and Charles Fourier. Martin, J.J. 
(1970), Men Against the State, Colorado Springs. 
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 Turton states that Martí had a, “bias towards the poor, in a rather evangelical 
way…This is why he gave his support to the Knights of Labor,…which was against 
violent methods on the behalf of workers.” Of course, as Turton correctly points out, 
while Martí may have felt that Marx went ‘too fast’, this is not “to condemn him out 
of hand” (Turton 1986: 123-5). Martí did however, disapprove of the Knights of 
Labor’s later claim for workers’ control after “more extreme elements” had 
influenced it, and “Martí denounced [this] as absurd, since the workers, he said, 
constituted only one factor of production” (Turton 1986: 128). This was of course, 
the idea of the classical economists such as Ricardo and Smith, with land and capital 
serving as the other two ‘factors’, and the ‘right’ of some to own these as a given: 
the theory, of course, which Marx himself was to ruthlessly deconstruct. While 
radical politics could not help but influence the separatist movement, due to the very 
real need, on the part of the PRC leadership for working-class support, this same 
leadership, like Martí, was not in favour of the revolutionary abolition of capitalism.  
 
 
The Influence of Radicalism on the Independence Movement 
 
In 1887 El Productor had asserted that “[t]he fatherland is a prison, and the 
state its warden” (Casanovas 1998: 192). In 1889, Enrique Messonier led a strike in 
Key West in which he called for workers to leave for Havana. The Spanish 
authorities provided some of the steamers used to transport workers, leading the 
nationalist journal El Yara to declare that the anarchists were Spanish sympathisers. 
According to Poyo the Spanish, “were clearly taking advantage of the situation to 
undermine the…separatist community” (Poyo 1985: 38). These events in turn led 
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Martí to realise the, “necessity of broadening the nationalist ideology to include the 
concerns of the all-important working classes” (Poyo 1985: 39). With the formation 
of the PRC, “the majority of exiled anarchists began to support the independence 
cause…however, [they] continued to hold to the ideas of…revolutionary anarchism” 
(Fernández 2001: 31). Martí's ‘With All, and for the Good of All’ speech had, 
however, won much of the labour movement over to the separatist cause, at least in 
their own pragmatic interests. With the anarchists this was largely with the 
qualification of seeing a Cuban republic as potentially less oppressive economically 
than a Spanish colony; however, they maintained that, unless capitalism was 
overthrown, this ‘independence’ would mean little politically. 
Poyo claims that the presidents of Tampa’s, “two revolutionary clubs, Néstor 
Carbonell and Ramón Rivero” (i.e. revolution against Spain), were pro-labour and 
that, “Carbonell openly characterised himself as a socialist and Rivero had 
maintained close relations with the Havana anarchists in 1889” (Poyo 1986: 21). 
Kirwin Shaffer has attempted to understand anarchist support for a nationalist 
struggle by claiming that, “[a]narchists did not interpret the war as a ‘nationalist’ 
struggle, but as a legitimate struggle against imperialism and patriotic nationalism” 
(Shaffer 2000: 45). However, the relations between the PRC and the labour 
movement were not without conflict. According to Poyo, “El Yara the most 
important patriot newspaper in Key West…rejected the call for workers to abandon 
compromise in matters of labor-management relations and condemned the political 
propositions of anarchism” (Poyo 1985: 34). As Fernández puts it, “Martí dreamed 
of a republic as an end in itself; the anarchists regarded it only as a means” 
(Fernández 2001: 32).  
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As seen above, the independence leaders charged the anarchists with 
‘compromising’ with the Spanish authorities, but the anarchists saw any negotiation 
with capitalists, regardless of their nationality, as ‘compromise’; thus highlighting 
how the two groups attempted to use each other for their mutual advantage, a 
situation perhaps unique to Cuba. Shaffer observed that El Nuevo Ideal, published 
by Adrián del Valle and Luis Barcia, “led the anarchist critique of the meaning of 
independence, challenging the elite class’s abandonment of the popular sentiment 
for broad social change” (Shaffer 2000: 54). The anarchists recognised that the 
United States used exactly the same justifications as the Spanish for not allowing the 
Cubans to run their own country: that they were not ready for self-rule, and “[f]rom 
an anarchist perspective, it was obvious that the Platt Amendment negated Cuba’s 
independence” (Shaffer 2000: 56). 
 Radical politics and radical praxis were then, undoubtedly of profound 
influence upon the PRC and the independence movement, both during the Ten Years 
War and the final struggle of 1895-98. This radicalism, however, was merely 
utilised by the leadership of the independence movement for their own pragmatic 
ends, rather than to achieve any social-revolutionary goals in the republic. As will be 
seen later, the Veterans’ organisations that emerged after the disbandment of the 
Liberation Army also shrewdly used the working class and working-class radicals to 






Chapter II – The Relationship of the United States to the Emerging Cuban 
Nation and the Disarming of the Cuban Revolution 
 
In this chapter, the role of the United States in disarming the Cuban 
revolutionary movement and in cementing a new form of economic and political 
dominance over the island will be looked at. Understanding this dominance is 
instrumental to understanding the rationale and aims of further US interventions into 
Cuban political life in the republican period. Understanding these interventions is, in 
turn, instrumental to understanding Cuban nationalism and the claims of varying 
political parties and organisations to be the authentic standard-bearer of this same 
nationalism. It is essential to understand the end of the War of Independence, and 
how the United States actively engaged in dissolving the forces of the revolutionary 
wars, perhaps because of the former’s fear of the latter’s inherently radical nature, or 
more than likely simply for the United States’ own crude economic interests in the 
island. Only after this is understood, can an attempt be made to understand the 
forces of nationalism that had been released under the Ten Years War and the War 
of Independence, and how, in the Cuban republic, this nationalism was to be 
repeatedly frustrated by the role of the United States and by Cuban politicians. 
 
 
The Impact of the Ten Years War and the Emergence of US Hegemony 
  
 In the 1880s, Cuban society was still reeling from the impact of the Ten 
Years War. The insurgent army’s destruction of sugar estates had “encouraged the 
expansion of sugar elsewhere in the world” (Pérez 1997: 56), due to the fact that 
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sugar “production was subsidized by the governments of most of the great 
continental powers” (Healy 1963: 7). The economic situation was indeed desperate, 
and worse than under slavery, as the number of vagrants in Cuba increased (Pérez 
1986: 9), and workers were paid in devalued script (Pérez 1995: 132).  
 In this context, plantation owners sold their product increasingly to US 
corporations, and, as wage labour was economically more profitable than slave 
labour (Thomas 2001: 166), due both to the resources saved during the dead season 
and to the higher productivity rates achieved by increasing technology and the 
division of labour, which in turn fostered further US capital investment.16 As a 
consequence, the, “[c]reole bourgeoisie…were obliged to exchange titles of property 
for ownership of stocks in U.S. corporations” (Pérez 1997: 57). The intensification 
of the division of labour meant “the extraction of sugar required an apparatus which 
grew in expense with advances in technique” (Jenks 1970: 24), and this, along with 
the collapse of sugar prices due to European beet competition, led to, “rising taxes, 
increased operating costs, falling prices, and deepening indebtedness [which] forced 
many planters into bankruptcy” (Pérez 1995: 131). Similarly, the Bessemer steel 
manufacturing technique meant that railways in the 1880s could be built for a “fifth 
of what they had cost ten years earlier” (Thomas 2001: 163), railways being 
instrumental in the development of the central system, whereby mills became larger 
and mechanised. As one commentator puts it: 
  
This brought about three economic-social developments: the revival of the 
sharecropping system of cultivation, the anonymous stockholders’ 
                                                          
16 This was the, “adolescence of the latifundia era that came to maturity in the 
twentieth century” (Ritter 1974: 15).  
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corporations, and the direct control of foreign capital over the management 
and ordering of centrals (Ortiz 1995: 63).  
  
              While one source asserts that this intensification of the division of labour, 
“saved the Cuban industry” (International Missionary Council 1942: 24), the Cuban 
independence movement was quick to see the consequences of these economic 
developments, with Martí declaring in 1883 that a “people that puts its trust in a 
single product in order to subsist is committing suicide” (Dumont 1970: 6). The 
impact of the war, the ending of slavery, and the expansion of European sugar all 
served to foster the development of Cuban mono-crop dependency. 
              These technological, and hence, economic, developments revolutionised 
Cuban society. The plantation-owning class (which in Cuba was largely made up of 
the criollo bourgeoisie), virtually disappeared, becoming colonos (mostly tenant 
farmers), raising cane for US owned centrales, massive complexes two to three 
times more efficient in extracting cane than the previous methods (Foreign Policy 
Association Inc. 1935: 219). Of course, this process carried out the logic of 
capitalism, as “U.S. refiners sought to increase their capacity and thus reduce their 
operating expenses” (Benjamin 1977: 5), but, as Thomas notes, the “essential mark 
of this system of economic organization was,…less its size, its origin, its high 
capital costs or its technological efficiency than the fact that,…sugar grinding was 
no longer carried out by the person who grew it” (Thomas 2001: 163). All this 
meant increased economic alienation, and a further displacement of the control of 
the productive process into the hands of US specialists, administrators and 
technicians.  
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 This, “process of denationalization…and…decapitalization” (Ibarra 1998: 
14, emphasis in original), put an end to a native Cuban bourgeoisie, meaning that 
“Cuba would no longer possess a wealthy class independent of U.S. capital” 
(Benjamin 1977: 4).  This US capital then took control by “way of secured loans to 
planters in distress”, or, “direct ownership through foreclosures” (Pérez 1986: 13). 
By the late 1880s, “94 percent of Cuba’s total sugar production was exported to the 
United States”, and in 1891 the Foster-Cánovas agreement gave Cuba preferential 
tariff access to US markets in exchange for Spanish concessions to American 
imports (Pérez 1997: 61).17 In 1890 the American Sugar Refining Company was 
formed with investments in Cuba which supplied 70-90% of the refined sugar of the 
United States (Jenks 197: 29), and, by 1894 sugar production reached 1 million tons 
(Pérez 1997: 61).  
 On the other hand, US protectionist measures on tobacco meant much of 
this industry had already re-located to Key West and Tampa in Florida by 1898, and 
thus, a decline of the industry in Cuba and subsequent unemployment (Pérez 1997: 
64). Indeed, the Foster-Cánovas treaty of 1891 was largely a response by Spain to 
McKinley’s tariff, the latter leading almost to the destruction of the Cuban tobacco 
industry, the former to the expansion of sugar (Jenks 1970: 39). This led to the 
specialisation of the Cuban market in producing increasingly the leaf raw material 
rather than cigars, and the founding of the Havana Commercial Company which 
“facilitated the later absorption of Havana’s tobacco industry into the American 
Tobacco Company” (Stubbs 1985: 22-3).  
 In 1894 the United States removed its preferential access and, with the 
Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act, imposed a duty of 40 per cent on sugar entering the 
                                                          
17 Ritter says the treaty gave Cuban sugar “free entry” into the United States (Ritter 
1974: 16).  
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nation, which, along with a world drop in sugar prices, paralysed the Cuban 
economy (Pérez 1997: 74). In effect the tariff, “did what the 1890 tariff threatened to 
do-that is, it reduced U.S. raw sugar purchases” (Ritter 1974: 16). These economic 
events led to political disillusionment with the reformism of the Autonomist Party. 
The Autonomist Party largely represented the interests of the criollo bourgeoisie, as 
opposed to the peninsular bourgeoisie, a conflict of interests superseded by an 
alliance of working and middle-classes represented by the independent polity (Ibarra 
1998: 33, Pérez 1995: 161).  
 The conflict of 1895 was again disastrous for the economy with sugar falling 
from 1 million tons to 225,000 in 1896 (Pérez 1997: 82). In this renewed war, “sugar 
fields became the battlefields”, again, and the independence army declared a 
“moratorium on all economic activity” and a redistribution of property amongst 
those who defended Cuba Libre. The Spanish reaction, in the form of General 
Weyler’s reconcentrado policy caused further devastation, but also served to drive 
support towards the Liberation Army, with the criollo bourgeoisie crushed between 
the two (Pérez 1995: 162-75). As a result, “[m]embers of the beleaguered 
bourgeoisie contemplated their impending extinction with despair…they were now 
prepared to sacrifice traditional colonial relationships for an alternative source of 
protection and patronage” (Pérez 1997: 83), namely, the United States. 
 
 
The US role in the War of Independence 
 
In April 1898, US President McKinley requested Congressional authority to 
intervene militarily in the Spanish-Cuban War, with: 
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 no mention of Cuban independence, not a hint of sympathy with Cuba 
Libre, nowhere even an allusion to the renunciation of territorial 
aggrandizement-only a request for congressional authorization to take 
measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the 
Government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the island the 
establishment of a stable government, capable of maintaining order and 
observing its international obligations. 
 
Article IV of a Congressional resolution, the Teller Amendment, was added, 
which: 
 
hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, 
jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, 
and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the 
government and control of the island to its people (Pérez 1988: 177-8).  
 
This was to be the arrangement for some time to come, and the US 
justification for intervention, or at least its threat, many times. On 19 April these 
resolutions were passed and McKinley sent an ultimatum to Spain. On 22 April 
Spanish General Blanco even suggested an alliance between Spanish and Cuban 
forces to the independence leader Máximo Gómez, but this was rejected (Thomas 
2001: 217-8).  
When the US occupation commenced, there was a great contrast between the 
US forces and the rebels. The US Army was mostly white and “felt more drawn 
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towards their chivalrous enemy than to their Cuban allies” (Thomas 2001: 232). The 
rebels lost further support when they failed to help the US forces in Santiago.  After 
victory the United States dictated their terms on 30 July: guidance in the 
establishment of an ‘independent’ Cuban government. Military administration began 
on 1 January 1899, after nearly a century of US desires for annexation of the island. 
This was a crushing blow for the rebel forces and for the outcome for which they 
had hoped for. Ferrer notes that: 
 
the victors could not celebrate their victory, or bear arms, or exercise 
authority. The vanquished (for the moment) remained in positions of power, 
and the strange transition was supervised by emissaries of a foreign 
government newly arrived (Ferrer 1999: 187). 
  
In many ways, this was a betrayal of the rebellion by the white leadership, 
just as the Pact of Zanjón had been, as the anarchists claimed. Further, it seems the 
anarchist support for separatism may well have been ‘counter-revolutionary’ as 
anarchism usually insists on opposition to any nationalist war, seeing them as 
struggles between competing factions of the capitalist class, in this case an apt 
analysis. Pérez states that the change from a colonial regime to a republic had meant 
“a descent into destitution” for working-class Cubans (Pérez 1986: 177). This 
desperation was no doubt the cause of increasing divisions between criollos and 
peninsulares, and led the anarchist leader Mirandita to the more traditional anarchist 
conclusions that this had fed support for the Spanish regime amongst the latter group 
(Casanovas 1998: 230). Martí and the leaders of the rebel army, Maceo and Máximo 
Gómez, were genuine in their egalitarian rhetoric. However, many peninsular 
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bureaucrats stayed in place and negotiated a compromised settlement with the 
Americans. Ferrer observes that:  
 
Juan Gualberto Gómez and Antonio Maceo had defined civilization as the 
elimination of slavery and racism; José Martí and Ricardo Batrell as the 
transcendence of race and the perfection of humanity. But it was not these 
versions of civilization that prominent white leaders opted to perform before 
American audiences in 1898. Rather, they chose to define civilization as 
refinement, civility, and whiteness (Ferrer 1999: 191). 
 
The United States “followed a policy that was shrewd, purposeful and 
calculated” (Pérez 1983: xviii), because they recognised that Cuba Libre demanded 
“more than independence, for it subsumed a social imperative into its vision of a 
free Cuba” (Pérez 1983: xvii). Even at this early stage of US capital investment in 
Cuba, the intervention was designed to protect US property interests, or at least, the 
potential for Cuba to be a source of investment and cheap labour for the United 
States. As US Secretary of State Olney put it, there would be, “tremendous 
pecuniary loss” (Jenks 1970: 43) if the United States did not intervene, and Senator 
Thurston noted that, “[w]ar with Spain would increase the business and the earnings 
of every American railroad” (Jenks 1970: 54).  
The United States intervened, “[o]stensibly…against Spain, but in 
fact…against Cubans” (Pérez 1983: 94). The intervention was in effect, according to 
Pérez, designed, “to neutralize the two competing claims of sovereignty and 
establish by superior force of arms a third”, by imposing, “hostile constraint” upon 
the competing parties (Pérez 1997: 95). Horatio S. Rubens, now the lawyer for the 
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Cuban Council of Government in New York, warned that this was an attempt to 
initiate annexation at a later date, that the Cuban revolutionists would consider such 
withholding of independence as a declaration of war, and that the US forces would 
be met with total non-compliance (Pérez 1983: 184-5). The US Senate authorised 
the President to use force to end Spain’s control of Cuba, but went on to claim that 
Cubans “are, and of right ought to be, free and independent” and recognised the 
Cuban republic as the, “true and lawful government of that island”. These 
injunctions were incorporated into the Turpie Amendment, to which the Teller 
Amendment, discussed earlier, was to be an addition (Healy 1963: 22-4).  
Tomás Estrada Palma, the President of the civilian arm of the liberation 
forces, placed the Liberation Army under the command of the United States, without 
consulting the Provisional Government (Pérez 1983: 188). This caused dismay 
among the military leaders, as they no doubt resented their new role, with the Army 
subordinate to the civilian power. Máximo Gómez told Domingo Méndez Capote, 
the Vice-president of the Cuban Council of Government (the civilian arm of the 
independence leadership), that, “[t]his Government is not the work of an assembly 
of the people, but one of the army” (Pérez 1983: 190).  
As a result of the intervention, a “Cuban war of liberation was transformed 
into a North American war of conquest” (Pérez 1986: 30). Certainly, this was a 
shrewd move, for, “in appropriating responsibility for ending Spanish colonial 
government, the United States claimed the right to supervise Cuban national 
government” (Pérez 1986: 31). Indeed, Hernández claims that Cubans in “positions 
of leadership” had only ever wanted arms and supplies from the United States and, 
“[n]o one…ever thought that U.S. armed intervention was a requisite for victory” 
(Hernández 1993: 32).  
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The US intervention “upset the fragile separatist political equilibrium” 
(Pérez 1983: 188) and Hernández agrees that Washington’s decisions “tended either 
directly or indirectly to weaken or destroy the tenuous bonds that held together the 
insurgent polity. The most crucial…[of which] was…McKinley’s steadfast refusal 
to recognize the rebel government” (Hernández 1993: 30). Cubans were excluded 
from the negotiations for the surrender of Santiago in July, the terms of the peace 
protocol in August18 and the agreement between US and Spanish commissions that 
met in Paris on 1 October, in which Spain pledged to leave Cuba by 1 January 1899 
(Thomas 2001: 236). Spain reached a decision on 10 December 1898 when it was 
apparently ready to accept “absolute independence, or independence under an 
American protectorate, or annexation to the United States, preferring annexation” 
which was rejected in favour of the United States becoming a, “trustee of the island” 
(Chapman 1927: 94).  
Immediately following the war, Cuba was devastated by its consequences. 
There were now “only a few more than 200 sugar mills in any state worth reviving, 
compared with 1,110 in 1894” (Thomas 2001: 247), only one sixth of the horses, 
and one eighth of the cattle there had been in 1899 (Thomas 2001: 250), while the 
total “indebtedness was about two-thirds of the total declared value of all property” 
(Thomas 2001: 253, see also, Pérez 1997: 118). One commentator put this debt in 
dollars as $500 million (Jenks 1970: 60), and another slightly lower at $400 million 
(Healy 1963: 40). The consequence of the war meant there was, “a new and decisive 
phase in North American economic penetration of the island” (Pérez 1997: 117). 
Thus, a, “second army, almost as large” (Jenks 1970: 67), “swarmed to Cuba” 
(Pérez 1997: 118). A US company gained the franchise for Havana Street Railway, 
                                                          
18 The war formally ended on 12 August 1898 (Pérez 1983: 210).  
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and the expansion of William Van Horne’s railway and ‘Jai Alai’ gambling licenses 
were granted by the provisional US Governor General Wood (Jenks 1970: 66-70).  
 As can be seen, the US intervention in the War of Independence was 
primarily to enhance further economic investment, and hence a similar economic 
return from the island. This factor in turn led to greater mono-crop dependency, and 
this revolutionary change in society, along with the erasure of the power of the 
criollo bourgeoisie due to the structure and ideology of the PRC and the influence of 
radicals on this movement, meant that the potentially radical nationalism of these 
forces was to be frustrated by the United States from this point on.  
 
 
The End of the ‘Spanish-American War’ 
 
In May 1898, in New York, exile members of the PRC had accepted the 
Joint Resolution which gave the United States the right to rule Cuba militarily. The 
actions of the civilian PRC President, Estrada Palma, which submitted the Cuban 
Army to US forces “deepened existing tensions within the separatist polity and 
created new ones” (Pérez 1983: 188-9). The Provisional Government in Cuba then 
“grudgingly accepted the fait accompli”, but sent Méndez Capote to the United 
States to replace Estrada Palma (Pérez 1983: 190). However, the “schism between 
civilian leaders and military chieftains” was then further deepened when the Cuban 
Council of Government (this was not the ‘Provisional Government’ of Cuba, but 
rather, the Cuban exile leadership in the United States) likewise ordered the military 
to submit to the authority of the United States (Pérez 1983: 190).  
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Clearly then, the civilian-military conflict within the Cuban independence 
leadership flowed hierarchically downwards from the most pro-US sentiments at the 
top, (within the exile community of civilian PRC leaders), towards a guarded 
attitude, but ultimately realistic recognition of the United States as a player that had 
to be granted concessions for helping Cuba against Spain, (by the native Cuban 
civilian leadership of the amorphous ‘Provisional Government’), to the high-ranking 
military leaders in Cuba, who had always held that Cubans could have won the war 
against Spain without outside help. It was the final group that was in many ways to 
retain the support of many rank-and-file veterans of the Liberation Army, and led to 
more frustration with the official organisations of the Veterans’ movement that 
claimed to represent them. 
This third group represented the most incendiary brand of the independence 
movement, and was no doubt to fuel much of the violent turmoil of the early 
Republic. Máximo Gómez had challenged the claimed authority of the two civilian 
camps when he claimed that the government was in fact nothing more than “the 
government of the revolution, and not the government of the Republic.” This state of 
affairs led him to ask, “to whom were military chieftains now responsible?”19 
Similarly, as General Calixto García put it to Estrada Palma; “[i]f we accept the 
intervention…we accept also that…the Council of Government is incapable of 
fulfilling the most elementary duties”. A member of the commission that had been 
sent to Washington by the Cuban Assembly of Representatives noted that even 
banditry on the part of ex-soldiers was understandable, given the devastation 
wrought upon the Cuban economy and society by the war (Pérez 1983: 191). 
                                                          
19 His correspondence to Méndez Capote and Estrada Palma respectively (Pérez 
1983: 190). 
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For their part, the expatriates also had problems with the Provisional 
Government in Cuba. Emilio Núñez denounced Méndez Capote’s mission and told 
Gonzalo de Quesada to “use all the means at your disposal to prevent this man from 
placing himself in contact with the official element in Washington” (Pérez 1983: 
191). The culmination of these events was that: 
 
The decision to place the Liberation Army under American 
command,…blurred [the] lines of separatist authority. In relinquishing its 
authority over the insurgent armed forces the Council of Government added 
to the conditions that allowed the United States to continue to ignore the 
provisional government and deal directly with individual military 
chieftains…the expatriate leadership and the army command had arrived at 
similar conclusions-the provisional government represented an obstacle to 
the resolution of the Cuban question. This, too, was the central assumption of 
American policy in 1898 (Pérez 1983: 192). 
 
Méndez Capote spoke unofficially with President McKinley, receiving 
assurances of intent to honour the Joint Resolution (Pérez 1983: 192), however, 
McKinley, “continued to ignore scrupulously the official agencies of the separatist 
movement” (Pérez 1983: 196).  
When the US General William R Shafter had agreed the terms of Spanish 
surrender on 17 July 1898 he had entered Santiago and excluded the Liberation 
Army from doing so, proclaiming the territory “part of the Union” (Pérez 1997: 97), 
and flying the US flag (Thomas 2001: 233). Although the Spanish-American War 
was formally ended on 12 August 1898, Cubans continued to fight until 3 days later, 
 69
when Estrada Palma accepted the peace protocol (Pérez 1983: 210). In fact, protests 
continued further, and: 
 
national feelings were expressed in different ways including patriotic rallies 
organized against the US authorities’ will:…and above all, the establishment 
of patriotic clubs and other organizations in many parts of the country which 
brought together members of the dissolved Mambí Army and all 
independence fighters (Cantón Navarro 1998: 77).  
 
This situation had produced a strong dichotomy in Cuban nationalism. The 
expatriate leadership of the PRC in New York was the most pro-US faction of the 
revolutionary movement; they sought a modern constitutional republic and they saw 
nothing hypocritical in this being established under US tutelage, as long, of course, 
as they were guaranteed political patronage. At the other end of the scale, the 
military, largely non-white even in its prominent leadership positions, sought 
welfare and dignity for veterans physically and mentally scarred by warfare, and did 
not concern itself with political patronage. Between these two poles, the Provisional 
Government in Cuba spoke of a nation occupied by a foreign power (Pichardo 1973: 
29), hoping for a native democracy, free of US interference. Despite the Provisional 
Government’s attempt to assert itself against the military leadership, they were to be 
eclipsed in turn, by the United States. The eclipse of the most militant and 
egalitarian nationalism represented by the military leadership and the largely non-
white rank-and-file veterans, meant that these ex-soldiers would remain a force for 
political patronage, and the various political parties and factions would often appeal 
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to this in the new republic. The patriotic clubs that Cantón Navarro mentions were 
the backbone of support for the Veterans’ organisations.  
 
 
The US disbands the Liberation Army 
 
Cuban historian Planos Viñalis states that the Constitution of La Yaya of 
1895, had stipulated that the ‘Council of Government of the Republic in Arms’ (to 
give it its full title), must subordinate itself to the ‘Assembly of Representatives of 
the Liberation Army’, so that the latter could establish a Constitutional Assembly to 
go about framing a Constitution for the nascent Republic (Viñalis 1998: 7-8). The 
Assembly of Representatives of the Liberation Army met on 24 October 1898 in 
Santa Cruz del Sur in Camagüey, with President Bartolomé Masó, and Vice-
President Méndez Capote, of the Council of Government of the Republic in Arms,20 
underlining the necessity for official US recognition of the Cuban administration. 
The members of the Assembly of Representatives were directly elected by the 
regiments of the Army (Roig de Leuchsenring 1974: 79). On 10 November 1898 the 
Assembly decided to send a commission to Washington to meet McKinley in 
December 1898, and again in 1899 (consisting of Calixto García Iñiguez, Manuel 
Sanguily, José Antonio González Lanuza, José Ramón Villalón and José Miguel 
                                                          
20 The Assembly of Representatives of the Liberation Army and the Council of 
Government of the Republic in Arms forming collectively, the ‘Provisional 
Government of Cuba’ referred to earlier by Pérez. 
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Gómez).21 The commission sought a loan from the United States (Roig de 
Leuchsenring 1982: 11).  
On 10 December 1898 the Treaty of Paris was signed with no Cuban 
delegates present, with the United States assuming the powers of Spain, and the 
latter acquiescing, as the Spanish delegates, “erroneously preferred to stimulate the 
possibility of annexation rather than to accept defeat and the establishment of a 
sovereign state”, in order to “conserve a good part of the predominance it had in 
Cuba” (Le Riverend 1971: 2). 
As mentioned earlier, the United States no doubt saw the Cuban exile 
community and PRC leadership as the most pro-US element of the independence 
movement, in some cases as even in favour of annexation.  In order to cement US 
economic interests in the region, US politicians engaged in a further case of ‘divide 
and rule’ in Cuba. When the commission of Cuban leaders was sent to the United 
States in December 1898, and again in January 1899, McKinley at the same time 
sent Gonzalo de Quesada and his own personal representative, Robert Porter, to 
meet Máximo Gómez in Cuba. The commission rejected a $3 million offer of 
payment to the Liberation Army on the basis that it would disarm the Cuban people 
without having achieved their aim of independence. At the same time, Porter assured 
Máximo Gómez that the United States would honour the Joint Resolution, and that 
US troops would remain only until internal order was guaranteed, which helped to 
sow doubt in Máximo Gómez’s mind that the commission had preferred to indebt 
Cuba rather than accept the $3 million donation. At the same time, Calixto García 
had died on 11 December in Washington on this trip (Thomas 2001: 239), and, with 
                                                          
21 Cosme de la Torriente attended as Calixto García’s secretary, the former 
becoming a member of the National Council of Veterans in 1911-12 (Roig de 
Leuchsenring 1982: 4).  
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him, “the support of an ally possessed of impeccable patriotic credentials and 
universally venerated within armed separatist ranks” (Pérez 1983: 261). 
In fact, as a member of the commission to Washington notes, they 
themselves had asked for exactly $3 million (Pichardo 1973: 30). However, 
McKinley had refused on the grounds that not only might it be unconstitutional for 
the President to assign that much funding to a foreign army, but it would also imply 
recognition of the validity of the revolutionary government, which would contradict 
the position the United States had held up until that point. McKinley had proposed 
the alternative of incorporation of the Cuban forces into a ‘colonial army’, of 
perhaps 10,000 men. He also assured the commission “categorically and 
emphatically” that Cubans would occupy public posts (Pichardo 1973: 21).  
While the Cuban commission sought payment of $10 million, the bill 
addressed to the US Senate only asked for $3 million, where each soldier would 
receive $100, on the supposition that the Cuban Army contained no more than 
30,000 men (Pichardo 1973: 22). The commission again appealed for $10 million, 
but the US administration explained that Congress would not authorise more funds 
for the same end, and that only Cubans who handed in their arms and returned to 
work would be paid (Pichardo 1973: 23). The civilian políticos Juan Gualberto 
Gómez and Manuel Sanguily had been influential in the commission, and they 
accepted not only the figure of $3 million, but the suggestion of a public debt, rather 
than an outright payment for the Liberation Army. Roig de Leuchsenring confirms 
that José Antonio González indicated that the commission was prepared to accept 
indebtedness (Roig de Leuchsenring 1982: 13). This no doubt led to further division 
between the políticos and the military leaders and just as predictably, an increase in 
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the suspicion of the authenticity of the former’s patriotism by the rank-and-file 
military veterans. 
The exile community in New York was even more pro-US. On 21 December 
1898 Estrada Palma set forth the proposition in Patria that the object for which the 
PRC had been founded had come to an end, and, as a consequence, the revolutionary 
clubs and associations should dissolve themselves. With this dissolution of the 
revolution’s “principal instrument of mobilisation and of combat”, the wheels were 
set in motion so that “the reactionary orientation led by Estrada Palma prepared the 
path to remove all possible political resistance to the forces of annexation” (Le 
Riverend 1971: 42). 
The absence of Cubans at the signing of the Treaty of Paris and the 
continued occupation by the US Army, led Máximo Gómez to make his 
‘Proclamation of Narcisa’ on 29 December 1898. In it he stated that the Liberation 
Army would disband only when both Spanish and US forces had entirely left the 
island (Pichardo 1977: 536). Later he made another proclamation, which was 
directed at the Executive Commission of the Assembly of Representatives, in which 
he called on it to establish a Cuban constitution, as, according to him, continued 
occupation by the United States “constitutes a serious danger to the absolute 
independence of Cuba” (Pichardo 1977: 537). He did, however, recognise that the 
military withdrawal of the United States could not succeed unless a Cuban 
government was properly formed. Máximo Gómez’s sentiments were widely shared 
among the Cuban people, and according to Pichardo, only those with vested 
economic interests would have been interested in further ties to the United States 
(Pichardo 1977: 538). While Máximo Gómez agreed to accept a $3 million payment 
from McKinley if it did not mean indebtedness, the políticos, while they had initially 
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sought a much higher figure than $3 million, had no problem with receiving a loan 
as payment.  
This division between Máximo Gómez and the Assembly of Representatives, 
which had now re-aligned itself as the Asamblea del Cerro,22 deepened, when the 
latter agreed to payment of Liberation Army veterans by a private US bank 
represented by C. M. Cohen. The Asamblea del Cerro thought that this would mean 
that the US government would have to authorise the negotiations for the loan, hence 
tacitly recognising the authority of this same body (which McKinley did not want to 
do), while Máximo Gómez wished to avoid indebtedness at all costs (Viñalis 1998: 
9). The Asamblea del Cerro sent five of its members to ask Máximo Gómez to 
publicly support their position, which he declined to do, and as a result the former 
group, as “Supreme Power of the Revolution”, removed the latter from his position 
as Chief of the Liberation Army on 12 March 1899 (Pichardo 1973: 29).  
This caused a rift in public opinion, as Máximo Gómez had always been the 
popular figurehead of Cuban independence and the military veterans supported his 
opposition to compromising Cuban nationalism by indebtedness. With his removal, 
McKinley then claimed that he had no recognised authority with whom to negotiate 
the disarmament of the Army, and the Asamblea del Cerro, discredited by the 
popular protest in favour of Máximo Gómez, had failed to establish itself as such an 
authority, and then agreed to dissolve itself thus the Army was effectively disarmed 
on 4 April 1899 (Le Riverend 1971: 9). Eventually, the United States did pay $3 
million to the Army, which was broken down into $75 to each soldier that had 
served in the Liberation Army on or before 17 July 1898, on condition that he hand 
in equipment and arms (Pichardo 1973: 30). A total of 33,390 personnel were 
                                                          
22 The same Assembly, but this time meeting in Cerro in Havana. 
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eventually paid, with payment beginning at the end of May 1899 (Thomas 2001: 
256). This was a crushing blow for the cause of Cuba Libre, as the Liberation Army: 
 
would contain the most radical potential, and would come to constitute a real 
obstacle both to the activities of American intervention and to the reform and 
perfection of imperialist penetration in Cuba (Chang 1981: 4). 
 
In international matters the US Congress refused to recognise any Cuban 
authority, including either a republic or that of the previously ruling Autonomist 
government; however, the note of US Senator Morgan stated that it did declare that 
the people of Cuba “are, and by right must be, free and independent”. This was not 
however a law or decree, but simply a moral obligation on the part of the United 
States which it would carry out in “a manner and time which would be determined 
by the authorities of the US”. The US Military Government would remain until “a 
permanent Civil Government had been established” and the Cuban Army “will 
subordinate itself to the military power of the US”, while sovereignty would be 
granted when the people of Cuba “had established a permanent Government, in 
Republican form”. The same note also declared that “peace between Spain and the 
United States does not establish peace in Cuba, if there are organisations there that 
refuse to accept the military authority of the United States” (Pichardo 1973: 26-7). 
The US attitude to disarmament was indicated in the words of the US 
Military Governor of Havana, William Ludlow, when he declared that there were 
arms and munitions distributed among the population which were “in excess of that 
which is necessary…now that the city is in a state of profound peace in which no 
member of the community has the need to use arms” (Roig de Leuchsenring 1982: 
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16). However, from the outset, militant military leaders were inclined to be sceptical 
of US ambitions in the region, up to and including secretly maintaining hidden 
caches of arms. Roig de Leuchsenring cites Oswaldo Morales Patiño’s El Capitán 
Chino, which claims that Lieutenant Colonel Quirino Zamora told Rafael Cárdenas 
(the latter at this point second in command of the Havana Police), that for the time 
being arms would remain under US authority. However, Zamora went on to say that 
it may be necessary to take up arms in the future, so that it would be convenient to 
maintain a reserve of arms, and, indeed, Morales Patiño states that Zamora indicated 
to Rafael Cárdenas that he keep the best arms. With great secrecy, Zamora sought 
out the most trusted of his men, in order to secure a safe place to conceal weapons. 
Interestingly, Morales Patiño notes that Ernesto Asbert and Mario García Menocal 
were also in the 5th corps of the North Brigade; they were prominent veterans, later 
leaders of military revolt (Roig de Leuchsenring 1982: 18), and would also be 
members of the Veterans’ movement. The US role in the dissolution of the forces of 
Cuban independence is instrumental to understanding the persistent sense of a 
frustrated patriotism in Cuba, and how political parties and organisations, including 
the Veterans’ movement, would use this fact to further their own agendas.  
 
 
Consequences of the dissolution of the forces of Cuba Libre 
 
While Cuban historians often openly suggest that disarmament of the Cuban 
revolutionary forces could not be achieved by the United States unless some division 
were sown amongst the ranks, Pérez is perhaps closer to the truth when he highlights 
the civilian-military conflict of authority that had persisted throughout the period of 
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revolutionary war. According to him, exiles in New York, the Provisional 
Government in Cuba, and the Liberation Army, all held different views over who 
held authority, or should hold authority, in the newly liberated Cuba. As he put it: 
 
The institutional entities around which the forces of Cuba Libre had 
organised between 1892 and 1895 existed in an unstable coalition, united 
only by a common but vague commitment to Cuba’s independence from 
Spain. The PRC abroad, on one hand, and the Liberation Army and the 
provisional government on the other, had not resolved the disparate and 
contradictory versions of Cuba Libre. Nor had the civil-military agencies in 
Cuba reconciled their outstanding differences. In 1898, only the most 
tenuous consensus, held intact by the exigencies of the war, had prevented 
discord from openly shattering the separatist polity (Pérez 1983: 188). 
 
By 1899 this polity was shattered. Cuban historiography makes much more 
of the disbandment of the Army and McKinley’s failure to recognise a Cuban 
authority than English-language sources. While Pérez claims that “McKinley’s 
intentions were clear: a declaration of war on both parties…and the assertion of a 
third claim to rule Cuba”, he also notes that this logically meant that the United 
States would have to turn to the “conservative expatriate representation” (Pérez 
1983: 188). Le Riverend likewise notes that the division of the revolutionary forces 
served not only to isolate Máximo Gómez from the Assembly of Representatives, 
but also led the United States to co-operate with the conservative forces of the 
country and those who had collaborated with Spain (Le Riverend: 1971: 9-10).  
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Figarola notes that the conflict between Máximo Gómez and the Assembly 
was sad, as “in reality…both pursued essentially the same thing: recognition of 
independence,…and payment of the Liberation Army” (Figarola 1974: 23). He notes 
that the Assembly was polarised between veteran caudillos (prominent leaders) like 
Emilio Núñez who supported Máximo Gómez, and civilians like Juan Gualberto 
Gómez who had only been a part of the final struggle of 1895-8. Figarola sees this 
as “the old conflict” (Figarola 1974: 25), between the civilian and military factions 
of the revolutionary movement, and the dismissal of Máximo Gómez as 
symptomatic of this conflict as the Army leader was, according to Núñez, “the 
incarnation of a noble and elevated ideal: the idea of the union and agreement 
between all the elements of this unfortunate land” (Martínez Ortiz 1964: 54-5). 
According to Figarola, the conflict between Gómez and the Assembly led to 
the development of two tendencies in Cuban politics between 1898 and 1902: 
federalist and centralist. The former were the civilian political enemies of Máximo 
Gómez, while the latter were led by his party, the Partido Nacional [National Party] 
(Figarola 1974: 31). The United States’ tactic of negotiating with individuals 
directly meant that no corporative body took up the vacuum of power left after the 
dissolution of the “triangle of authorities” (Figarola 1974: 27), of the exile’s 
leadership, the Assembly of civilian políticos in Cuba, and the military leadership. 
Clearly then, rather than being resolved by the transition to a nascent 
republic, the civilian-military conflict that had plagued the Ten Years War, the 
Guerra Chiquita, and the War of Independence was to characterise the politics of 
the new era. Perhaps this conflict was endemic to the structure of the PRC and only 
came to the fore of the revolutionary movement after its formation in 1892. Perhaps 
it was an inherent aspect of Cuban society. Perhaps, however, it was related to issues 
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of race and social class; the rank-and-file membership of the Army were largely 
black or of mixed race and poor, and sought tangible material rewards for having 
physically fought for independence, while the civilian políticos were white and 
middle-class, and hence found it easier to control the more social-revolutionary 
aspects of the ‘revolutionary’ movement, ultimately subordinating the local 
‘patriotic clubs’ more easily to the nationalist interests of those at the top, than the 
leadership of the Army could manage, or indeed wished to.   
 
 
Cuba under US Military Government  
 
US actions during the transfer of power were again indicative of US racism. 
The Liberation Army was excluded from formal ceremonies marking the end of 
Spanish rule,23 which led to public protest, the removal of US flags and the landing 
of four battleships in Cuban waters by the United States (Pérez 1983: 257). Many 
Spanish bureaucrats remained in their positions; hence “Cuba's liberators lost rather 
than gained control of the country that they had fought to liberate” (Hernández 
1993: 59). When a state funeral was held for Calixto García, Cuban army officers 
refused to march behind US military authorities in the position designated to them 
by the United States (Thomas 2001: 245), causing some ill feeling.  
                                                          
23 Hernández claims that this was on the order of General Brooke, for fear that 
insurgents would attack departing Spaniards at the Havana waterfront (Hernández 
1993: 74). Similarly, General William R. Shafter excluded Army members from 
celebrations in Santiago (Benjamin 1990: 53). 
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In March 1899, to appease members of Congress who opposed US expansion 
in Cuba, the US Congress passed the Foraker Amendment to the Military 
Appropriation Bill. This stated that:  
 
No franchises of any kind whatever shall be granted by the United States, or 
by any military or other authority whatever in the island of Cuba during the 
occupation thereof by the United States (Jenks  1970: 68).24 
 
General Brooke was the first Military Governor of Cuba. He established a 
civil administration consisting of four departments, each headed by a Cuban: Justice 
and Public Instruction, under José Antonio Gonzáles Lanuza, Commerce, Industries 
and Public Works, under Adolfo Sáenz Yanez, Finance, under Pablo Desvernine 
(though customs duties were actually collected by the United States), and the 
Department of State and Government under Méndez Capote. The Military Governor 
appointed all officers of government (Healy 1963: 56-7). There was apparently a 
“wholesale redistribution” of places in the higher levels of civil administration 
designed to “placate the leaders of the Cuban revolutionary movement” (Healy1963: 
59). Brooke also began the restoration of public buildings, the cleaning up of the 
cities, and the distribution of food rations to the poor (Healy 1963: 63-4).  
In September 1898 Leonard Wood had become Governor of Oriente. Within 
this province he had appointed judges, issued a Bill of Rights, imposed taxes on 
trade licences, ordered the building of limestone highways and a waterfront wall, 
                                                          
24 According to Healy, a second section, which recommended the withdrawing of 
troops after pacification, had been removed when the Senate committee looked at it 
(Healy 1963: 83). Also, Foraker did actually favour annexation, but felt that this 
could only come about “on her [i.e., Cuba's] own voluntary application” (Healy 
1963: 95).  
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renovated the gaol and slaughterhouses, banned bull fighting and gambling, and 
planned the building of a new water system (Thomas 2001: 238-9). Spaniards had 
looted public buildings before leaving and it had been left to the United States to 
restore them (Chapman 1927: 97). Wood had, in his own words, “prescribed liberal 
doses of the US Constitution” to Cubans (Thomas 2001: 239), and in December 
1899, Wood took over from General Brooke as Governor of Cuba, with instructions 
from McKinley to “go down there to get the people ready for a Republican form of 
government” (Thomas 2001: 258).  
Wood began a system of salaries for judges, replacing the corrupt system of 
fees, and he also enacted a law providing lawyers for the poor. The establishment of 
juries was attempted but replaced by tribunals because, according to Chapman, of 
“[h]ispanic peoples…little willingness to pass judgement on one another” (Chapman 
1927: 108). Wood also established a local tax system, replacing a general treasury, 
and set up a school system with teachers receiving training in the United States 
(Chapman 1927: 112-3), and outlawed the employment of those under fourteen 
(Thomas 2001: 259). However, school textbooks were translated straight from 
English, with “no attempt to make them comprehensible in Cuban terms” (Thomas 
2001: 259), and the “only permanent governmental institutions” established were 
“[a]n industrial school for boys”, as well as one for girls (Chapman 1927: 33-4). 
Wood established a General Inspector of Prisons, appointing a Cuban to the task, 
and created a board of pardons (Fitzgibbon 1935: 33). The system of pardons and 
the license given for criminal activity on the part of Cuban politicians would become 
a constant concern of political parties, and of the Veterans’ movement.  
General Brooke had introduced a marriage law recognising only civil 
partnerships, which the Catholic Church, much disliked by many Cubans, had 
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opposed. Wood changed the law in 1900 to recognise both religious and civil 
marriages (Fitzgibbon 1935: 35-6). Fitzgibbon states that “the most spectacular 
achievement of the entire period of the military occupation” (Fitzgibbon 1935: 37) 
was the eradication of yellow fever, after it was discovered that it was transmitted by 
mosquito bite. Wood also developed a telephone and telegraphs service, and ended 
graft in the post office (Chapman 1927: 118). The Cuban Railway Company began 
construction under Wood (Chapman 1927: 123), but faced some difficulty because 
of the Foraker Amendment. The Customs Service was under the direction of Tasker 
H. Bliss, who abolished the Havana lottery, as it was a persistent source of 
corruption (Fitzgibbon 1935: 59).  
 As can be seen, not only did the United States play an active, and in fact, 
instrumental, part in the disarming of the forces of the Cuban revolution, but it also 
went about constructing a particular political and social framework beneficial to it. 
This framework was to form the background of a continued sense of a frustrated 
nationalism on the part of Cubans. This frustration was constantly utilised by Cuban 
politicians and leaders for rhetorical and ideological ends in the new republic. In 
order to understand this framework, it will be necessary to look at the structure of 
this republic, and the continued role of the United States in this formation. However, 
it will be necessary, first, to look at the views of prominent Cuban political and 
military leaders at the turn of the century, to see how these men voiced their 
frustrations at the role of the United States in Cuban affairs at the time. This is 
important not only because many of these people were important veterans who 
would go on to play crucial roles in the official organisations of the Veterans’ 
movement, but also because this analysis will show how the complaints of this 
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Chapter III – The Frustration of Cuban Nationalism and the Foundation of US 
Hegemony 
 
This chapter will serve two purposes. The first part will look at the response 
of Cuban políticos and mabises to the emerging political issues they saw as 
important. Often, they had a different view of ‘constitutional’ government to that of 
the United States. Many times, the United States wished to either impose its own 
values on Cuba directly, or have candidates favourable to it in power. This will also 
be looked at. From the Cuban Constitutional Convention, it was clear there were 
going to be problems that would plague the republic, and indeed, it was the very 
problems cited here that went on to be the focus of político factions like the 
Veterans’ movement and the political parties more generally.  
It is difficult to establish exactly when the first Veterans’ organisation was 
established. Secondary sources such as Secades Japón, and the biographies of 
Emilio Núñez (Secades Japón 1912, de Arce 1943, Rodríguez Altunaga 1958), only 
pay attention to when the national organ, the ‘Institution of Veterans of 
Independence’ formally established itself in 1911. This is no doubt due to the fact 
that to Cuban historiography, Emilio Núñez’s Veterans’ organisation of 1911-12, 
and the ‘Association of Veterans’ of 1923-24 are important for very different 
reasons. Indeed, these organisations were very different from each other, and this 
will be a central point of the thesis’s argument. Likewise, prominent leadership 
positions seem to change as friends of Emilio Núñez and his faction enter the 
government, or alternatively they are frustrated at not doing so.  
In many ways, the frustrations of Cuban leaders from 1900-12 were 
expressed through a large number of periodicals, political party manifestos and 
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decrees, into which the Veterans’ organisations fit, often citing the same problems. 
The Constitutional Convention addressed problems that were the focus of these 
periodicals and manifestos throughout the early republican period, and it is therefore 
important to look at this in detail and the specific complaints. Also interesting was 
the manifesto of ‘The Emiliano Núñez Club’, which not only contained personnel 
that crossed the divergent spectrum of the independence movement, but also which 
mirrored the structure of the later Institution of Veterans of Independence of 1911-
12, as well as being, apparently, the first body to suggest a commission to visit the 
US government to establish international relations (as opposed to them being a 
constitutional issue). It is important to look at these issues, before investigating the 
aforementioned US hegemony. 
 
 
The Emiliano Núñez Club 
  
At the turn of the century, Cuban periodicals such as El Mundo and La 
Discusión highlighted the existence of ‘Patriotic Clubs’ across the length and 
breadth of Cuba, though these had no formal national structure with continuity to the 
PRC. The press published the opinions of these clubs, as well as of respected voices 
of indepentismo like Manuel Sanguily, Juan Gualberto Gómez and others. These 
opinions included the right to celebrate acts of patriotism, brought attention to the 
lack of working-class members of the public administration, called on the US 
government to recognise the authority of the Asamblea del Cerro, and also 
expressed their anger at the indebting of the Cuban government in order to pay the 
Army (Viñalis 1998: 20). Proclamations that the revolution had been betrayed came 
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thick and fast after the signing of the Treaty of Paris. The ‘Manifesto of the Club 
Emiliano Núñez’ declared that the United States had succeeded in warfare against 
Spain “because of us, and only because of us” (Gaunaurd 1954: 79), and the same 
manifesto called for “absolute independence” (Gaunaurd 1954: 81). 
 Most interestingly however, the club claimed to be an, “institution 
composed of Spaniards and Cubans”, and called upon the Ayuntamientos as 
“administrative corporations of eminently popular character”, to convoke a public 
assembly of the people to elect municipal delegates. If they failed to do so then men 
of “greater prestige and popularity”, would have to convoke an assembly to do so. 
These municipal delegates would then in turn elect representatives to the national 
convention, consisting of five per province, hence 30 in total (Gaunaurd 1954: 82). 
When the National Convention was formed it would send an Executive Committee 
from its ranks to Washington to inform the United States of the establishment of said 
Convention. The city of Santa Clara would be the site of the National Convention, 
and the Executive Committee would return to Havana after its visit to the United 
States, in order to meet its obligations to the latter in the organisation of the 
government of the country.  
Surprisingly the 10th declaration of the Manifesto called for the United States 
to cover the costs of the actions of the Executive Committee, without obligations on 
the part of Cubans. They were very precise on this issue, stating that, if the United 
States denied this necessary protection, the Cuban people would know “if it was 
convenient or not to abandon its representatives”, therefore implicitly suggesting the 
possibility of revolution. They proposed to convoke the National Convention on 30 
January 1900. 
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Signatories of the Manifesto include Máximo Gómez and Enrique Mesonier. 
As was seen earlier, the latter had initially been an anarchist and founded the journal 
El Productor. He had argued for national liberation from the perspective of 
establishing socialism under a republic, as many anarchists active in the PRC had 
done. Later he was active in the Liberal faction allied to Máximo Gómez. Perhaps 
Messonier genuinely altered his political outlook throughout this period, perhaps he 
compromised his anarchist principles to political expediency, or perhaps he 
realistically thought the establishment of a republic would further anarchist ends. 
What is certain is the influence of anarchist and socialist agitators on the Liberation 
Army leaders.  
While the name of this organisation was the ‘Emiliano Núñez Club’, Núñez 
himself is not listed as a signatory. The name does confirm the point made by 
Figarola, however, that Núñez and Máximo Gómez supported each other. There can 
also be little doubt of the deepening of the civilian (político) – military conflict in 
the Cuban republic, and that the latter group was more likely to call for violent 
revolt, having both the experience, and the capacity to do so. Nor can there be much 
doubt that this was the faction anarchist and socialist leaders, and workers generally 
sympathetic to these ideologies, were more likely to be active in, hence giving this 
group its more radical form of nationalist ideology.  
With its stress on the power of the Ayuntamientos as organs of local political 
power, the Emiliano Núñez Club outwardly appeared Federalist in nature. Military 
leaders of 1895 at other times were often allied to conservative politicians and 
members of the Nationalist Party. This issue will be looked at more closely in the 
section on political parties and political factionalism. What is important to note at 
this stage is the hope of this wing of military and radical leaders for ‘absolute 
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independence’; by which they meant free reign in establishing the entire structure of 
their government, taking it as a given that the Assembly of Representatives of the 
Republic in Arms and its progeny was the only legitimate body in deciding this 
issue.  
The issue of ‘absolute independence’ had been important also to Máximo 
Gómez. This is no doubt why he had refused indebtedness when negotiating with the 
United States over disarmament, recognising how the latter would manipulate this 
factor. For their part, the Assembly of Representatives of the Republic in Arms 
seems to have seen a loan for payment of the Army, or for the financing of the visit 
of the Executive Committee to the Unites States, as all that was required of them, 
with immediate military withdrawal being assumed.  As will be seen later, the 
concept of ‘absolute independence’ as the most authentic expression of nationalism, 
was to be the foundation for the formation of various political parties and factions in 
the new republic. 
 
 
The Proceedings of the Cuban Constitutional Convention 
 
 The principal recurring point of contention in the republican period, not only 
between the Veterans’ organisations and the Cuban President, but also between the 
main political parties and the President, was the interpretation and implementation 
of a constitutional form of government. The legacy of the War of Independence, the 
republican ideology of the PRC, and the struggle against Spanish imperialism, had 
fostered a radical milieu across Cuba. Many of the políticos and veterans believed 
that a constitutional government was guaranteed by a people armed and vigilant, 
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much as the United States had defeated a colonial power. That is often the place to 
which they attributed these values, and they sought to practise these values 
themselves.  
It is therefore important to look at the objections of Convention members to 
aspects of the Constitution, in order to see their resonance in the demands of the 
Liberal Party revolt of 1906, but also again, of the Institution of the Veterans of 
Independence of 1911. Only by understanding this continuity and context will it be 
seen how, later on, political factions and parties based around charismatic authority 
and allegiance to the ideals of ‘absolute independence’ coalesced and came into 
conflict with each other.  
 On 25 July 1900 the new US Military Governor issued order number 301 
demanding the Cuban people convoke a Constitutional Convention. On 15 
September the 31 delegates had been selected, and on 5 November they met (Viñalis 
1998: 24, Pichardo 1973: 70-72). In the current historiography, much is made of the 
issue of forming official relations with the United States being a constitutional issue, 
and many Cubans’ objections to this. Certainly, this is the background of the events 
being looked at. However, with regard to the complaints of the Veterans’ 
organisations, it will be necessary to look more closely at a wider set of 
constitutional questions.  
From the notes on the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention 
collected in Gaunaurd, it can be seen that many of the complaints and disagreements 
brought up at this stage were left unresolved. Not surprisingly then, similar 
complaints were to form parts of the manifestos of the Liberal Revolutionary 
Committee of 1906, and of the Institution of Veterans of 1911. Civil organisations 
repeatedly pressured the Cuban administration to attend to these faults, and when 
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this failed, these civil organisations were likely to take on a more revolutionary role. 
In fact it could be argued that much of the membership of these groupings was so 
accustomed to warfare, and so inexperienced in governing, that this was their only 
means of redress against being sidelined in the new regime. The major points of 






The Constitutional Convention addressed a letter to the Cuban people, 
declaring their opposition to Article 40, which allowed the suspension of 
Constitutional guarantees, and which was thus to them, “inadmissible in a 
Democratic Republic”, and “reminiscent of Absolutism”. The suspension of 
constitutional guarantees is one of the crucial factors in the 1906 revolt, the 
Veterans’ threatened protest in 1911-12, and the aborted uprising in 1923-24. The 
Convention then went on to stress that  “the provision of public positions, 
principally, must constitute a constitutional precept” (Gaunaurd 1954: 88), invoking 
the US system, (and indeed many European ones), whereby public employees are 
not appointed according to political favouritism, but all government positions are 
open to any citizens who can prove their aptitude for these.  
The Convention further went on to say, that there must be delegates to 
examine public expenses, again invoking the US system of elected County 
Commissioners. The Convention emphasised that, without a system whereby public 
expenses are examined, and future payments refused unless approved by this 
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delegation of the people, then Cuba’s “sovereignty is fictitious” (Gaunaurd 1954: 
89). There were objections to the reference in the preamble to the Constitution 
invoking the favour of God, delegates preferring that of a ‘universal moral law’ 
(Gaunaurd 1954: 90). 
 There was objection to Article 28; in addition to the right to associate, a 
suggestion was the addition of the right to keep arms in one’s house, for means of 
self-defence (Gaunaurd 1954: 92), as some felt the need to restate that the Cuban 
people must reserve the right to resist their own government by force of arms, again 
influenced by US constitutionalism. This would be a crucial factor in the aborted 
1923-24 revolt, as the Cuban President invaded the homes of members of the 
Association of Veterans. Delegates also proposed an additional Article 116 to 
Section 13, requiring a plebiscite for any proposed reforms to the Constitution 
(Gaunaurd 1954: 100). 
There were objections at the outset to the five proposed amendments to the 
Constitution outlined by Elihu Root, namely those regarding Cuba’s international 
obligations, the US right to intervene, the refusal to allow Cuba to contract debts, the 
upholding of the laws established by the US Military Government, and the 
maintenance of naval bases; what was essentially to become the Platt Amendment. 
All of these clauses were held to be a flagrant violation of the internationally 
recognised right to self-determination.  
As noted earlier, the Commission that went to Washington to object to the 
articles on intervention and naval bases featured prominent members of the 
Liberation Army: Méndez Capote, Rafael Portuondo Tamayo, and Pedro Betancourt 
(Gaunaurd 1954: 109). They compared the role of the United States to that of the 
empires of Europe, and suggested not a Constitutional Convention vote on the issue 
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of Cuba-United States relations, but, again, a plebiscite of the Cuban people as a 
whole. This was not to be, and in the end, prominent veterans and políticos voted 
both for and against the Platt Amendment. The aforementioned Rafael Portuondo 
and José Fernández de Castro, along with future Cuban President Alfredo Zayas 
voted “no”. Voting “yes” was future Cuban President José Miguel Gómez as well as 
President of the Institution of the Veterans of Independence and future Vice-





 The Convention called for a compulsory jury service, finding this omission 
seemingly incomprehensible when countries such as England, Spain and Italy had 
recognised their efficacy. Further, they proposed amending Article 12 to include a 
right to public trial before a judge. While Article 27 of the Constitution upheld the 
right to petition the government, the Constitutional delegates proposed the right of 
any citizen to dispute any disposition, resolution, or agreement before the Supreme 
Court of Justice, and if necessary, subject it to majority vote (Gaunaurd 1954: 91). 
An extra clause was also proposed in Article 81 insisting upon the absolute 
independence of the Judiciary and that judges and magistrates should be assigned by 
direct electoral suffrage (Gaunaurd 1954: 98). There were also objections to Article 
87 that protected public functionaries, on the basis that this contravened equality 
before the law. These were again issues crucial to the Veterans’ organisations. 
 Another object of contention that was suggested at this early stage concerned 
Article 68, Paragraph 9, which granted the President the power to appoint 
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magistrates of the Supreme Court of Justice, diplomatic representatives, and 
consular agents, with delegates objecting that this paragraph must exclude members 
of the Court, as they must be voted in by popular suffrage in order to assure the 
complete independence of the judiciary. Again, this issue was to be of vital 
importance to the Veterans’ movement. 
 
 
The Armed Forces 
 
Delegates asserted that the Penal Code and Military Law must only apply to 
members of the Army and the Navy, not civilians within these institutions, and spelt 
out that all members of the armed forces must be held responsible for civil and 
criminal offences only before ordinary courts, for offences committed outside the 
military zone (Gaunaurd 1954: 99). 
There was also a proposed alteration to Paragraph 11, to include a National 
Militia which would be a civic-military institution and would support the police in 
the maintenance of order, and the army and naval forces in the case of national self-
defence. This was perhaps a very realistic proposal on how to accommodate the 
thousands of veterans of the Liberation Army into an important position in the 
Cuban republic, but it was one that the United States did not accept then, later 
having to grant some of these proposals in the re-structuring of the army in 1909. In 
fact, the organisation of a regular standing army capable of defending a constituted 
Cuban government was one of the main problems to plague the early years of the 
republic and leave the incumbent administrations open to revolt.  
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Senate and Congress 
 
 With regard to public representatives, delegates proposed that Senators hold 
their seats for four years, instead of the eight stated in Article 45, and also that no 
one could be elected to a third term of office. They also proposed an alteration to 
Article 47, to include the right of the Senate’s Court of Justice to try members of the 
House, and also the need for a Grand Jury in the case of allegations of crimes by the 
Court itself.  
 There were proposed alterations to Article 53 which would hold 
Congressmen accountable civilly and criminally to the Courts of Justice in the case 
of common crimes as, without this addition, Article 53 would contravene Article 11, 
which held all Cubans to be equal before the law. Likewise, a proposed alteration to 
Article 59, Paragraph 10, was to include a clause for political crimes so that 
amnesties could not be granted through political patronage. This was an important 
political issue in the early republic, as opposition to amnesty for políticos was a 
concern of the Liberal Committee of 1906, as was hope for amnesty for their own 
members after 1906 when they felt were being illegitimately imprisoned. The use of 
amnesty as a tool of political patronage was a constant complaint of the Veterans’ 





 To limit presidential power, the delegates suggested that the President be 
elected by direct suffrage rather than the second grade suffrage mentioned in the 
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proposed Constitution. It was also argued that no one should be allowed to hold 
presidential office more than once, and that the President must execute laws, but 
could never contravene them (Gaunaurd 1954: 96). The passage which cited the 
President’s duty to dictate regulations for the better execution of the law, was held to 
be superfluous, as it would give to this paragraph a dangerous elasticity. There was 
proposed an addition to his powers elaborated in Article 68 Paragraph 8, namely to 
appoint and remove his cabinet.  
Another object of contention at this early stage was that of presidential 
power in relation to the judiciary. While Article 68, Paragraph 9, granted the 
President the power to appoint Magistrates of the Supreme Court of Justice, and 
delegates stressed that this paragraph must exclude members of the Court as they 
must be elected by popular suffrage in order to assure the complete independence of 
the judiciary, something they had affirmed in their objections about the judiciary. 
 Of particular importance for the future republic was the objection to Article 
68, Paragraph 10. This granted the President the power to appoint, with the approval 
of the Senate, any remaining public positions and designate their functions, if this 
was not stipulated by any other authority (Pichardo 1973: 90). Delegates demanded 
the removal of this paragraph, because they felt that it established appointment by 
influence rather than merit, and that it would entrench despotism and injustice. As 
with their objection to the presidential appointment of the judiciary, this was to 
prove a prominent complaint of the Institution of the Veterans of Independence, and 
a main demand stated during the threatened uprising of 1911-12.  
Article 68, Paragraph 11, gave the President the power to suspend 
constitutional guarantees named in Article 40, in accordance with procedures 
described in Articles 41 and 42. Delegates felt that this was an unacceptable 
 96
designation of power in a democracy. Article 40 allowed the suspension of Articles 
15, 16, 17, 19, 22, 23, 24, and 27, in the case of ‘invasion of the territory or a grave 
disturbance which threatens the public peace’. These articles dealt mainly with 
legally permissible lengths of detention, the right to trial by jury, the right to privacy 
in personal correspondence, and the right to petition the government for redress. 
Article 41 set out the procedures for carrying out the suspension of guarantees; 
including the Law of Public Order, and Article 42 stipulated that the President could 
only do so when Congress had not convened, and that this suspension could not last 
more than 30 days, without convoking Congress (Pichardo 1973: 78-82). All this, 
delegates felt to be impermissible in a democracy, and the presidential suspension of 
constitutional guarantees was the major issue of contention when fighting broke out 
in 1906, and was indeed to be the cause of the threatened uprising again in 1911-12.  
Delegates also proposed an addition to Article 68, Paragraph 17, seeking 
assurances that petitioning the government would not be seen as ‘rebellion’. This 
was of critical importance in the meetings of the Institution of the Veterans of 
Independence in 1911-12. Similarly, the Convention objected to the clause in Article 
70 that required the Senate to authorise the Supreme Court of Justice to try the 
President for common crimes, as this contravened equality before the law 





There were numerous complaints about public expenditures. Article 93 of 
the Constitution deals with the Provincial Councils, and much of this is to do with 
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institutions for public works and the funding thereof. In the view of delegates, these 
councils should simply be dissolved. Article 99 established the powers of the 
Provincial Governors, including the right to appoint and remove state employees. 
Delegates proposed that this right, elaborated in Article 99, Paragraph 7, must refer 
back to Article 4, namely that these employees must be Cubans by birth or 
naturalisation. They proposed the same with regard to the Ayuntamientos [Town 
Councils] and also with Mayors. 
Regarding the National Treasury and the Tribunal of Public Funds, delegates 
proposed that the latter would be composed of those elected by direct suffrage for 4 
years in national elections, and 3 years at the provincial level, and that delegates 
must again be Cubans by birth or naturalisation of 40 years. This Tribunal should 
examine the use of public funds and publish the results quarterly.  
The conflict between the President and the judiciary, the issue of public 
positions, the abuse of constitutional guarantees, the powers, structure and payment 
of a national army; all these issues were central to both the rebellion caused by the 
factional revolt of 1906, and the protest by the Institution of the Veterans of 
Independence in 1911-12.  
Clearly, these issues were unresolved by political actors throughout the 
period, even after the wholesale redistribution of administrative positions under US 
tutelage in 1906-9. In order to understand why políticos failed to accommodate the 
demands of veterans it will be necessary to look, in the next chapter, at political 
parties and factionalism in the republic. Now, however, it is important to understand 




A note on US Hegemony 
 
Before looking at the establishment of US hegemony over Cuba, it must be 
clarified what this term means. According to the Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci: 
 
What we can do, for the moment is to fix two major superstructural ‘levels’: 
the one that can be called ‘civil society’, that is the ensemble of organisms 
commonly called ‘private’, and that of ‘political society’ or ‘the State’. 
These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of 
‘hegemony’…to that of ‘direct domination’…through the state and 
‘juridical’ government (Gramsci 1986: 12). 
 
While we can see that ‘civil society’ is functionally the same in Gramsci as 
in his ideological forefather, Marx (i.e. the ‘private economy’), it is schematically 
relocated: from the base to the superstructure. It is the ‘hegemony’ achieved in civil 
society that achieves the domination of classes (Gramsci 1986: 253).25 
 In Gramsci’s political thought the “key concept…is that of civil 
society…which differs significantly from that of not only Hegel but also Marx and 
Engels” (Bobbio 1988: 77). Apparently, in Gramsci there is a “profound innovation 
with respect to the whole Marxist tradition”, namely that “[c]ivil society does not 
                                                          
25 This means, “the base is no longer the subordinating moment of history, but 
becomes the subordinate one” (Bobbio’s interpretation of Gramsci, Bobbio: 1988: 
87). The supposed aim of Gramsci was to “formulate an interpretation of historical 
materialism which would relocate it as a mode of intervention in the course of the 
historical political process” (Mouffe 1979: 6). 
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belong to the structural sphere, but to the superstuctural sphere” (Bobbio 1988: 
82).26 
 While contemporary Marxism is not the subject of the thesis, Gramsci’s 
concept of hegemony will certainly be useful in an historical analysis of the role of 
the United States towards Cuba in the republican period, albeit in terms of a ‘neo-
imperial’ relationship, rather than simply understanding the role of the native Cuban 
‘civil society’. In fact, as shown earlier on, it was the fact that Cuba’s criollo 
bourgeoisie was crushed between the two forces of the radically egalitarian 
independence movement and the Spanish empire, that led to its dissolution. This 
meant Cuba effectively had no civil society in either the traditional Liberal sense, or 
in Gramsci’s: the economy was virtually destroyed by the tactics of both the 
Liberation Army and the reconcentrado policy of Spain; hence, the United States 
stepped in to take over the role of the economic element of civil society. In this 
sense, the international obligation the United States stressed, and was to go on to 
embellish with the Platt Amendment of 1901, meant that this ‘superstructural 
sphere’ was to a large extent taken up by US corporate interests. The US state then 
acted much as Gramsci would posit: using the legal relations between the two states 
to aggrandise its economic dominance.27  
 Later in the thesis, Gramsci’s concept will be useful for explaining why 
ostensibly civil society institutions like the Veterans’ organisations, were so likely to 
turn to armed revolution: because they represented elements of the Cuban ruling 
class in waiting, whose factional interests had been frustrated, both by the increasing 
                                                          
26 Perhaps it would be less confusing simply to say it is not Marxism any more. It is 
‘Gramsci-ism’. Indeed, as Bobbio notes “Gramsci does not derive his concept of 
civil society from Marx but is openly indebted to Hegel for it” (Bobbio: 1988: 83). 
27 Although this dominance was largely at the expense of other foreign economic 
interests in Cuba, as well as against any potential Cuban bourgeoisie.  
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dominance of this US hegemony, and by the complicity of the existing Cuban 
leaders with this, in seeking US patronage.28 Given that the Cuban state would come 
to be dominated by the patronage network of US hegemony, itself dominated by US 
corporations, the only recourse to the Cuban faction not in power, to seek economic 
interests, (i.e., the traditional civil society ones), was revolt.  
 
 
Cuba begins Self-Government 
 
After defeating the Spanish, the United States stressed its perennial fear that 
the ‘right people’ would not be able to assume power in Cuba. According to Pérez, 
an: 
 
electoral system based on popular suffrage threatened to overwhelm the 
‘better classes,’ and all but guaranteed the triumph of the representatives of 
the revolutionary polity…Leonard Wood warned that liberal suffrage posed 
a ‘menace to Cuba’ (Pérez 1986: 36).  
 
Military Governor Wood had been appointed without the consultation of the 
provisional Cuban authorities (Chapman 1927: 127). In early 1900 the United States 
conducted a census of the island to secure requirements for voting in the municipal 
elections scheduled for June that year. Elihu Root, the US Secretary of War, 
                                                          
28 Alex Weingrod states that, “[p]atronage in the anthropological usage…is meant to 
designate a particular kind of interpersonal relationship…[it] could be classed with 
terms such as…’kinship behaviour’”, and, “patronage in the vocabulary of political 
science…refers to the ways in which party politicians distribute public jobs or 
special favors in exchange for electoral support” (Weingrod 1967-8: 378-9). This 
concept will be looked at more closely later on. 
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immediately wished to exclude the “mass of ignorant and incompetent” (Pérez 1986: 
37), from exercising suffrage rights. However, he did recognise how important an 
issue male suffrage had been in the separatist cause, and that; similarly, any literacy 
clause would likewise exclude the majority of veterans. Governor Wood proposed a 
‘soldier clause’, waiving literacy demands for officers and NCOs, which was finally 
expanded to include all veterans. All voters had to be over 21, free of convictions 
and, if they were illiterate or did not own at least $250 of property, then they could 
only vote if they had served honourably in the Liberation Army prior to 18 July 
1898.29 Even then, the voting population was effectively limited to 5 per cent of the 
total population (Pérez 1986: 38). This disenfranchisement of a large segment of the 
population who had actually fought for independence was to prove a constant source 
of conflict with the demands of US hegemony. Increasingly, it would also mean 
disillusionment and factional splitting within the political parties claiming to 
represent authentic Cuban nationalism as they lost the support of the constituency 
who had made up the independence movement.  
On 16 June 1900 the municipal elections took place with three parties 
contesting: “the Republicans,…[whose] leader was General José Miguel 
Gómez,…[the] Nationalists of Havana,…the party of Máximo…[and] the Unión 
Democrática, a conservative grouping” (Thomas 2001: 260). Hernández states there 
were four parties; “the Cuban Nationals,…the Federal Republicans,…the 
Republicans of Havana,…and the Union Democrats” (Hernández 1993: 98). 
                                                          
29 This was the date that US General William R. Shafter had negotiated the 
surrender of the Spanish forces, as noted earlier. Cuban forces did not agree to stop 
fighting until 12 August, and some continued until three days later. Presumably, 
these were not ‘honourable’ soldiers, and it is interesting to wonder who else may 
have been included.  
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In any case, Unión Democrática [Democratic Union] ceased to be of 
importance early on, the conservatives of this group representing ex-Autonomists, so 
the competition for the first elections was largely between three parties. Apparently, 
the elections “were peaceful enough. There were some claims of fraud, but, on the 
whole, the result was reasonably fair” (Chapman 1927: 131). 
When Wood called for the election of delegates there was much debate over 
presidential qualifications, the use of the word ‘God’ in the preamble, and the 
suggested maintenance of US naval bases. Root informed Wood of US President 
McKinley’s determination to retain the right to intervene to prevent Cuba from 
contracting debts or making treaties with a foreign power, to hold US naval stations 
to maintain Cuba’s independence, and to preserve the military statutes of the US 
government already implemented. The Constitution was signed by the delegates on 
21 February 1901 (Chapman 1927: 134), despite the numerous reservations noted 
earlier. The delegates, of course, had very little choice. 
As a result, Cubans “could not transform the ideology of the colonial 
revolution into a program of national regeneration” (Pérez 1986: 57). What all this 
meant was that: 
 
separation from Spain did not signify independence for Cuba or control over 
the state apparatus. Rather, it precipitated U.S. intervention…[as a result] 
The revolutionary polity lost institutional cohesion and ideological unity 
(Pérez 1986: 56).  
 
Perhaps this is why there continued to be armed conspiracies against the 
Estrada Palma government: in July 1903, at both Guanabacoa and Vicana, as well as 
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a plan to abduct the president in Sevilla, near Santiago on 13 September, and an 




The Platt Amendment – The Foundation for US Intervention 
 
The quality of Cuban political leaders and their inability to establish the kind 
of regime the United States sought was again an issue. Orville Platt argued that the 
Constitutional Convention was dominated by “the absolutely irresponsible and 
unreliable element” (Pérez 1986: 40). In the Treaty of Paris of 1898 the United 
States had contracted to, “assume and discharge the obligations that may under 
international law result from the fact of its occupation, for the protection of life and 
property”, which would be “limited to the time of its occupancy” (Fitzgibbon 1935: 
67). Throughout June and July the United States’ supervision of the elections, faced 
a crucial problem, as one observer notes, “[t]he basic weakness, of course, lay in the 
attempt to engraft the Anglo-Saxon principle of local self-government on an Iberian 
system to which it was wholly foreign” (Fitzgibbon 1935: 62). Further, Cubans 
objected to one provision of Wood’s order for a Constitutional Convention because 
it stated that the purpose was to “provide for and agree with the government of the 
United States upon the relations to exist between that government and the 
government of Cuba”, as they considered this a diplomatic, not a constitutional 
question. When the Convention met again in November 1900, Wood told the 
delegates that, “it will be your duty, first, to frame and adopt a constitution for Cuba, 
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and…to formulate what, in your opinion, ought to be the relations between Cuba 
and the United States” (Fitzgibbon 1935: 72).  
It is not difficult to understand the undercurrent of resentment that was to 
persist through the early years of the republic, which led to the continual recurrences 
of nationalist feelings, and the increasingly radical nature of this phenomenon, 
among Cubans. Indeed, Pérez argues that it was the success of what he calls the 
independentista coalition in the 1900 elections which led Root to see this as a, “great 
danger”, which could mean the United States was in the same position as when 
Cuba was under Spanish control, having to deal with a sovereign nation (Pérez 
1986: 46-7). This clearly indicates again the US desire for commercial expansion in 
the region, and its perturbation that the right ‘element’ had not gained political 
power: its pursuit of hegemony.  
In this context, the United States sought to ensure hegemony over Cuba 
through direct domination of international agreements. An, “unofficial Cuban 
proposal” for United States-Cuba relations in 1901, suggested naval and coaling 
stations for the United States. A later unofficial Cuban proposal even proposed US 
troops occupy Cuban forts with both flags flying (Fitzgibbon 1935: 74). Following 
this, Root was to send Wood a communication that “contained the well-developed 
germ of the Platt Amendment”,30 and listed five provisions stating that: 
 
[firstly] the Cuban government should not conclude treaties impairing its 
independence nor grant foreign powers any special privileges…[secondly] 
public debts should be only of such size that interest payments could be 
made from ordinary revenues after meeting current governmental 
                                                          
30 According to one writer, Root was the “true author” of the Amendment (Roig de 
Leuchsenring 1974: 113).  
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expenses…[thirdly] the United States reserved the right of intervention for 
the preservation of Cuban independence and the maintenance of stable 
government…[fourthly] all acts of the military government be ratified and 
maintained by Cuba…[fifthly] the right of the United States to operate naval 
stations on Cuban soil (Fitzgibbon 1935: 75). 31 
 
Wood reported that there was no serious objection to the provisions except 
for those on naval bases and intervention.32 The Cuban Constitutional Convention’s 
committee on relations with the United States made five propositions; firstly no 
limitation of independence by treaty nor to give any foreign power control over 
military affairs, secondly; prohibition of the use of the island as a military base for 
foreign nations, thirdly; Cuban acceptance of the treaty obligations of the United 
States, fourthly; acceptance of the Foraker Amendment and the acts of the US 
Military Government, and finally suggestion of a reciprocal commercial treaty 
(Fitzgibbon 1935: 77). It is worthy of note at this point that members of the 
Convention specifically opposed the intervention Article, and were more interested 
in reciprocal trade than the Article prohibiting debts. It was these two proposed 
clauses that were to form Articles Two and Three of the Platt Amendment: the most 
often used justification for the United States to intervene. 
Because the Cuban Constitution had already been defined and issued, the 
United States saw the need for a new pact. Chairman of the Senate Committee on 
                                                          
31 Pérez claims that Root sent Secretary of State John Hay “four provisions” (Pérez 
1986: 45), and that the clause concerning debt was introduced during a meeting of 
Republican Senators because they feared indebtedness to a European power (Pérez 
1986: 47). Thomas quotes the letter of 9 February from Root to Wood at length, 
which has five provisions, including that on debt (Thomas 2001: 262-3).  
32 According to Munro, Estrada Palma was later to make a “futile effort” to have the 
wording of article three changed (Munro 1964: 36).  
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Relations with Cuba, Senator Platt, introduced an Amendment, “which far 
overshadowed the parent bill to which it was attached”, namely, the Army 
Appropriations Act for 1901 (Fitzgibbon 1935: 78). The Amendment included all 
five of the provisions of Root, additionally an article for the safeguarding of 
sanitation as proposed by Wood, another declaring the “Isle of Pines shall be 
omitted from the proposed constitutional boundaries of Cuba, the title thereto being 
left to future adjustment by treaty”,33 and also a clause stating that all these 
provisions would be incorporated into a Permanent Treaty with the United States 
(Healy 1963: 163-4). The US Senate passed the Act on 27 February 1901 and the 
House on 1 March, with McKinley signing the bill on 2 March (Fitzgibbon 1935: 
79). Immediately, the journal that would become the publisher of the Veterans’ 
manifestos, La Discusión, condemned the agreement, stating that it would infringe 
“absolute independence”, and, “complete sovereignty” (Gómez 1974: 118-19). 
During the Senate debate, Foraker pointed out that the Amendment could simply 
mean that the losing Cuban political party would complain and make “trouble”, thus 
forcing intervention (Thomas 2001: 264), a prophetic point. 
As early as 1899 General James H. Wilson had authored a report suggesting 
that a Cuban Constitutional Convention should be formed, that the United States 
should guarantee Cuba a peaceable, republican government, that the United States 
should oversee the customs and sanitary services of Cuba, that there should be a 
postal union between the two, and also naval stations (Healy 1963: 96). However, 
regarding the final Amendment, the “major share of the credit of authorship should 
                                                          
33 In November 1905 there was a “revolution” on the Isle of Pines in which the US 
residents “proclaimed their adherence to the American Union” but a later US 
Supreme Court decision held that the Isle was Cuban territory (Jenks 1970: 149). 
The Borah Amendment was eventually ratified in March 1925, conceding the Isle to 
Cuba (Smith 1960: 111).   
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go to Root” (Fitzgibbon 1935: 81), as the eight articles contained five of his 
provisions and Wood’s suggestion, as well as two others.  
Fitzgibbon states that, “Cuban sentiment was deeply stirred by this alleged 
invasion of Cuban rights”, particularly the suggestions for naval bases, intervention, 
and regarding the Isle of Pines (Fitzgibbon 1935: 81). Méndez Capote quite 
correctly prophesised that if the Cubans were to concede Article three, referring to 
intervention, “there will be born a government resting upon a supposition of 
incapacity” (Pérez 1983: 315). The Cubans again felt the issue should be left until a 
Cuban government was established, but Root insisted that this would leave Cuba 
temporarily without the ‘protection’ of the United States, and hence other nations 
could deny the United States’ rights, and the only defence the latter would have was 
the Monroe Doctrine, which was not recognised in international law as readily as the 
Permanent Treaty was.34 When Manuel Sanguily later called for the dissolution of 
the Cuban Convention after McKinley had signed the Act, the Secretary of War 
spelt out what was to become the Root interpretation of the Platt Amendment: 
suggesting it was no more than the Monroe Doctrine and was not “synonymous with 
intermeddling or interference with the affairs of the Cuban government” (Fitzgibbon 
1935: 82). 
The Cuban Convention voted to reject the Amendment. On 24 April 1901 a 
committee of Convention members met Root with the latter claiming that the 
intervention provision would only follow a state of “anarchy” in the island, that the 
right of the United States to intervene without Cuban consent was “unquestionable”, 
and that Cuban submission to the Amendment was conditional for US withdrawal 
(Fitzgibbon 1935: 83-4). McKinley told the delegation that met him that it did not 
                                                          
34 Root's commentary is quoted at length by Pérez 1986: 45. 
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signify “intermeddling or intervention” (Pérez 1986: 54). Senator Platt sent a letter 
to the Convention emphasising that the Amendment did not mean a protectorate; 
however, later US policy would contravene Root and Platt’s assurances. The Cuban 
Convention passed an altered amendment on 28 May, McKinley disapproved of this, 
and so the original Amendment was passed without qualification on 12 June and 
adopted as an appendix to the Cuban Constitution, was ratified on 25 June 1901 by 
Roosevelt and eventually declared in effect on 1 July 1902 (Fitzgibbon 1935: 84-5).  
The last order of the US Military Government declared the Constitution of 
the Republic on 20 May, and all US troops were finally withdrawn by 4 February 
1904. There was some protest at the Military Government’s final orders infringing 
on civil law and overstepping the Teller Amendment (Fitzgibbon 88-9). The 
Permanent Treaty enforcing the Platt Amendment was made law on 22 May 1903 
(Pérez 1986: 135). Some international law experts now felt Cuba was ‘sovereign’, 
while others felt it was a “protectorate” (Fitzgibbon 1935: 90). Máximo Gómez felt 
that this was “not the absolute independence we dreamed about” (Pérez 1983: xv), 
an indication of the earlier attitude of many Cubans that they could have won the 
battle against Spain without foreign interference, and a portent that the stirrings of 
nationalism were to remain a potent political force for some time to come.  
During the same period, elections for the Cuban presidency were ordered by 
Governor Wood for 31 December 1901. Máximo Gómez was popular among 
Cubans but declined to run, preferring to support Estrada Palma’s nomination. 
Estrada Palma had been President of the Provisional Government in 1876, he had 
also served as a minister of the Provisional Republic in 1895 and 1898, was at one 
time an advocate of annexation, and was a supporter of the Platt Amendment and the 
proposed Reciprocity Treaty (Pérez 1986: 89), as well as being a US citizen. 
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Bartolomé Masó opposed Estrada Palma, and he was joined by politically 
unaffiliated independents who published a manifesto on 2 June 1901, before 
competing in the local elections (Hernández 1993: 99). Bartolomé Masó withdrew 
when the Central Board of Scrutiny created to supervise the elections failed to 
include any members of his party, and after his appeals to Governor Wood to ensure 
it did were unsuccessful (Hernández 1993: 101), leaving Estrada Palma to be elected 
without opposition. The Cuban flag was hoisted, and Estrada Palma took formal 
power on 20 May 1902 (Thomas 2001: 267). 
 
 
The Reciprocity Treaty – Tool of US Economic Tutelage 
 
With the destruction of the criollo bourgeoisie, and hence without the 
possibility of native capital formation, Cuba was forced to depend on the US market 
for sugar, and the large amounts of investment needed for its increasingly technical 
production. Indeed, the US Military Government had twice prohibited the 
establishment of banks under the Foraker Amendment (Pérez 1986: 67), despite the 
allowances mentioned above, given to US corporations. In fact, the National Bank 
of Cuba established in 1901 had nothing national about it, being in fact a US 
financial enterprise (Le Riverend 1967: 220). As well as virtually controlling sugar 
and tobacco production, the US corporations now also furthered their attempts to 
monopolise mining,35 transportation, and public utilities (Pérez 1997: 119-20). The 
Hawley Company took over the Chaparra central, symbolically, the largest in the 
country, and the Cuba Company (in fact a US corporation) was formed to build a 
nation-wide railroad. By 1902, the US Tobacco Trust controlled 90 per cent of the 
                                                          
35 Of which they apparently controlled 80 per cent in 1901 (Le Riverend 1967: 220).  
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export trade of Havana cigars (Pérez 1997: 119). In this year, “U.S. investment in 
Cuba was more than double what it had been before the Independence War” 
(Benjamin 1977: 9). The United States also gave its first loan of $35,000,000, 
significantly, to pay army veterans and $16,500,000 for the Treasury (Le Riverend 
1967: 221).36 
 It seemed that little could save Cuba except dependency upon the United 
States.  Cuban acceptance of the Platt Amendment was based on the United States’ 
promise of granting reciprocity (Healy 1963: 194), but this was consistently opposed 
by US beet sugar interests. The United States debated over the Payne Bill, modified 
to become the Platt Bill, both unsuccessful when it became known that the US 
Military Government of Cuba had spent thousands promoting the Reciprocity Bill. 
Annexation to the United States was again discussed in the Senate in November of 
1903 (Viñalis 2002: 16). The United States was also in fear of losing Cuban markets 
to Great Britain (Viñalis 2002: 18). To the Cubans: 
 
The central point of discrepancy related to whether or not the President had 
the power to grant customs concessions to a foreign power (Viñalis 2002: 
20). 
 
 A new proposal was made that looked hopeful when government export 
bounties on European beet were abolished which would thus lead to a decline in its 
production and increased demand for Cuban sugar. In any case, the American Sugar 
Refining Company invested in beet sugar, thus eliminating the competition between 
the two producers.  
                                                          
36 This loan for veterans was 10 times the $3 million payment, but as will be seen, 
rank-and-file veterans saw little of it.  
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 The Reciprocity Treaty then passed the US House and Senate, giving Cuba 
a 20 percent tariff reduction in return for 20, 25, 30, and 40 per cent on US products 
entering Cuba and both were bound not to give such rates to any other nation. This 
meant that: 
  
By tying Cuba’s principal export crop to the American market, and by 
keeping the marketing conditions subject to its control, the United States 
government gained an influence in Cuba more enduring than that based on 
the terms of the Platt Amendment (Healy 1963: 206).  
 
              Or put another way, “[d]isguised under the name of ‘reciprocity’, this treaty 
represented the basis of the North American endeavour to undermine Cuban 
sovereignty through economic control of sugar” (Ruffin 1990: 57).37Cubans were 
also to be the losers in another way; as, under the Treaty “U.S. goods saturated the 
market and hindered local competition…[which] deterred new industry,…[and] had 
a deleterious effect on existing enterprises” (Pérez 1986: 77). Reciprocity also 
“discouraged diversification and perpetuated local reliance on imported foodstuffs” 
(Pérez 1997: 122).  
 When the US Military Government withdrew “US capital in Cuba totalled 
$100m, of which $45m was in tobacco, $25m in sugar” (Thomas 2001: 271). The 
Reciprocity Treaty had almost immediate consequences. In 1901 sugar production 
was at 1.5 million tons, rising to 4 million by 1920 (Dumont 1970: 8), while cigar 
                                                          
37 There is little to support the comment that, “[n]either the official record nor their 
private correspondence give any support to the idea that Roosevelt and Root had 
ulterior motives in pressing for reciprocity” (Munro 1964: 33). Indeed, the increase 
in sugar production of US firms in Cuba and the expansion of US exports was an 
unwritten given of policy.  
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exports to the United States rose from 50 to 80 million from 1902-05 (Stubbs 1985: 
31). This of course reflected the phenomenon cited earlier: the intensification of the 
specialisation of production, the division of labour, and mono-crop production on an 
international scale. Cuba turned to primary products: refined sugar and leaf tobacco 
(the latter to export to Key West and Tampa to be made into cigars). Sugar was of 
course processed to some extent, but as the sugar industry was more highly 
mechanised and the final product was subject ultimately to the skills of US 
technicians and administrators, rather than skilled workers (as in the case of cigars), 
it made sense to refine sugar as part of the same production process, there being 
little chance of class unity between US technicians and unskilled Cuban cane 
cutters.  
 Cuban sugar exports increased from $52 million in 1902-6 to $426 million 
in 1917-21. The US share of this fluctuated slightly from 83 per cent at the highest 
level and 76 per cent at the lowest, during the same period (Seers 1964: 8). Cuba had 
supplied 12 to 14 per cent of the world supply of sugar before the war, dropping to 
3.5 per cent in 1900, but again reaching 14 per cent by 1914 as a result of both 
reciprocity and the decline of beet mentioned earlier (Jenks 1970: 129-39). Total 
Cuban exports rose from $64.3 million in 1902 to $174 million in 1914, while total 
imports rose from $60.5 million to $140.1 million in 1913, declining slightly to 
$118.2 million in 1914 (Foreign Policy Association Inc. 1935: 44). US capital 
invested in railways increased from 0.246 million pesos in 1900 to 1.14 million 
pesos in 1911 (British capital remained powerful in this area, increasing from 0.926 
to 1.926 for the same dates, Ibarra 1998: 9), and US imports made up 62.8 per cent 
of the Cuban market throughout 1900-34 (Ibarra 1998: 18). In 1904 “60 percent of 
all rural property in Cuba was owned by foreign companies”. The Banco Nacional 
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de Cuba and the Banco de La Habana “were formed with U.S. capital” (Pérez 1986: 
72-4). US investments had increased from $50 million in 1894 to $160 million in 
1906 (Ruffin 1990: 58).  
Of course, what all this increased capital needed was more labour, this time 
in the economically cheaper (due to technological developments), form of wage 
labour. Between 1902 and 1919, 700,000 immigrants came to Cuba; from Spain, 
Puerto Rico, China, North America and after 1910, Haiti and Jamaica. They were 
“disposed to work hard at almost any job, at almost any wage”, which not 
surprisingly, “served to depress wages” (Pérez 1995: 202-4). This “[i]mmigration 
served primarily the interests of foreign capital” not the working class, as illustrated 
by the fact that prices increased steadily between 1904 and 1912 on basic foodstuffs 
(Pérez 1986: 79-81).    
The Platt Amendment and the Reciprocity Treaty were to serve as the 
hegemonic backdrop to Cuban society. By setting the political agenda in terms of 
international obligations and economic agreement, the United States gained a form 
of direct domination, through the state, over the economic sphere of Cuba. Hence, 
any form of resistance to US hegemony was likely to take the form of attacking the 
economic structure of US interests, in order to bring about political change. 
However, as the United States also, in turn, dominated the Cuban state by favouring 
its preferred candidates through economic and political patronage, Cuban nationalist 
feeling was to continue to be frustrated for some time. It is now necessary to look at 
the nature of Cuban politics in detail, in order to understand how these constant 




Political Parties and Political Factionalism in the Republic 
 
The objections of the Cuban Constitutional Convention were to form the 
basis of repeated complaints against those in power. The threatened uprising of the 
Veterans’ organisation of 1911-12 again raised all of the major issues and objections 
that had been raised at the time of the Constitutional Convention. Some of the most 
radical elements within the Convention had sought universal suffrage, including 
women, as the latter had “participated arm-in-arm with men in the war of national 
liberation” (Viñalis 1998: 27). However, the United States had been opposed even to 
universal male suffrage, before the municipal elections to elect constitutional 
delegates held on June 16 1900. Secretary of War Elihu Root feared the “perpetual 
revolutions of Central America and other West India islands” (Pérez 1986: 37), if 
this was allowed. Unfortunately for the United States, Pérez notes that, “universal 
manhood suffrage had been centrally important in the separatist program”. More 
immediately, a literacy requirement threatened to “disenfranchise the majority of 
army veterans”. In the end restrictions were as strict as the United States had hoped, 
as according to Pérez: 
 
Final suffrage requirements balanced immediate political obligations with 
long-term policy objectives. Voters for the June 1900 municipal elections 
were required to be Cuban-born males or sons of Cuban parents born while 
in temporary residence abroad or Spaniards who had renounced their 
citizenship. All voting males were to be twenty-one years of age, free of 
felony conviction, and residents of the municipality in which they intended 
to vote at least thirty days preceding the first day of registration. In addition, 
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voters were required either to be able to read and write, or to own real or 
personal property worth $250, or to have served honourably in the Liberation 
Army prior to July 18, 1898…Suffrage restrictions reduced the 
electorate…to some 5 percent of the total population (Pérez 1986: 38) 
 
While this granting of electoral rights to soldiers was a reality the United 
States had to accept, it also left out vast sectors of Cuban society who were 
susceptible to radical ideas and radical notions of democracy; not only women of 
course, but those hundreds of thousands of ordinary working-class Cubans without 
whom the Liberation Army’s victory wouldn’t have been possible, as they had 
provided the essential infrastructure to achieving that victory. This group were to 
remain a coherent political constituency for parties proposing the enlargement of 
suffrage, and more importantly, a basis for material support for threatened 
rebellions. More significant, especially with regard to the discussion of the 
acceptance of the Platt Amendment from the US standpoint, was the possibility of 
insurrection, as most of the army veterans chose not to hand in their weapons for the 
payment of $75 awarded to them. According to Figarola, only 8967 out of 38,156 
soldiers did so (Figarola 1974: 49).  
It was in the above context that the first political parties were formed in 
Cuba, after the PRC. Indeed, the PRC was an organisation of national unity designed 
simply to win the independence struggle. There was in this sense, some truth to the 
claim of exile leader of the PRC in New York, Estrada Palma, that since the struggle 
had been won, then it should disband. However, this was simply Estrada Palma’s 
pro-US sentiment. Many felt that the presence of US troops meant the struggle had 
not been won, and parties formed around interpretations about what a new 
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constitution and government should look like. In fact the presence of such large 
numbers of army veterans meant it was inevitable they would have an impact and 
influence upon the foundation and structure of government, and, if they did not, or 
were not allowed to, then they would remain a persistent military threat.  
It was the structure of the PRC, and the issue of civilian or military control, 
exacerbated by the claim of radicals that they represented the true heirs to the ideals 
of José Martí, that led to different conceptions of ‘absolute independence’ in the new 
republic, as will be seen. As one commentator states: 
 
reconstruction of the country did not resolve the situation of unemployment, 
nor stabilise wages or fix the length of the working day. In fact, the US 
administration promoted nationalist tensions between Cuban and Spanish 
workers 
 
But this backfired for the United States, as: 
         
these same socio-economic conditions caused the reappearance of workers’ 
organisations that had been eliminated by the persecution of the Spanish 
colonial government (Viñalis 1998: 21).  
 
Not surprisingly then, one of the first political parties of the republic was that 
founded by the poet Diego Vicente Tejera, namely the Partido Socialista Cubano, 
[Cuban Socialist Party – PSC]. Both Pichardo and Viñalis agree that Tejera was a 
‘utopian socialist’ while the manifesto of his party claimed to be, “the heir of the 
ideology of Martí expressed in the Manifesto of Montecristi and in the statutes of the 
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Cuban Revolutionary Party” (Viñalis 1998: 22). Published on March 29 1899, in the 
manifesto, Tejera stated that his organisation was a, “party of peace, of evolution”, 
which would only use the means of, “propaganda, discussion and the moral force of 
the immense masses which it will motivate and lead”. Perhaps the party’s real 
‘utopianism’ however, was in its claim that “we do not want, and shall not incite the 
war of classes, as we are convinced that violence will not bring a victory as 
complete and durable as that of reason and love” (Pichardo 1973: 35).  
This brand of utopian socialism, while in the case of Tejera’s party 
essentially parliamentary, had not been popular in Cuba since the importation of 
socialist ideas into Cuba from the 1860s onwards. As shown earlier, the mutualist 
socialism influenced by Proudhon had been eclipsed by that of thinkers like 
Bakunin. While it was noted earlier that it was not entirely clear whether anarchists 
joined the PRC as a matter of expediency, or as a matter of abandonment of their 
principles, perhaps the two were not entirely separate.  
The belief in class struggle was confirmed by immediate events. A strike by 
bricklayers on 20 August for higher salaries and an eight-hour working day, led to a 
general assembly of all workers being established on 16 September 1899 when 
demands were not met, with a unanimous vote for a general strike on 29 September. 
Preparations were not successful, however, due to tactical and ideological 
differences within the workers’ movement, and threatened intervention on the part 
of the United States. This no doubt influenced the US goal of providing a permanent 
state of hegemony in the form of the Platt Amendment. When a new meeting was 
held on 24 September in “solidarity with the strike of those workers whose leaders 
were still vacillating”, the US Governor of Havana, William Ludlow, imprisoned the 
leaders of the strike committee, and the police and army patrolled the streets 
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breaking up workers’ meetings.  
However, this merely consolidated workers’ sense of internationalism, as 
militants stressed that their cause and that of the Haymarket martyrs was the same. 
According to one source, the agitation had been led by Juan Tenorio, Francisco de 
Armas y López, Sarafín Busto, Evaristo E. Estenoz, Simón Camacho, José Fraga 
and Juan Ayer (Le Riverend 1971: 52). Estenoz was to go on to found the Partido 
Independiente de Color [Independent Party of Colour – PIC] in 1912. While some 
workplaces implemented an eight-hour day, the struggle was not a complete success, 
with workers’ in the Liga General de Trabajadores [General League of Workers – 
LGT] blaming, principally, the political attitude of its President Enrique Messonier. 
Despite Ludlow’s claims that the strikers were, demagogues, supported by a larger 
group that prefers idleness to work (IHMRSC 1981: 171-2), Tejera’s Party and 
Messonier’s league were both discredited by their failure to take action and broaden 
the strike.  
Ludlow accused the strikers of prolonging the occupation by the United 
States, but when Military Governor of the island, General Wood, met leaders of the 
Liberation Army, future member of the Institution of the Veterans of Independence, 
José Miró Argenter, accused Wood of being annexationist (Viñalis 1998: 23). What 
is important is that after the failure of the supposedly ‘radical’ parties in 1899, 
workers became more likely to support a liberal political faction than a supposedly 
socialist one, if the latter’s ideas were not based on the hard material realities of 
Cuban national life, while the formers’ were: that workers’ rights could only be 
gained through violent conflict.  This was cemented by the membership of many 
army veterans in liberal factions; men acquainted with, and prepared to continue 
fighting for ‘absolute independence’. Viñalis claims that when the General League 
 119
of Cuban Workers opposed Wood’s attempts to recruit strike breakers to send to 
Tampa in 1901, another future member of the Institution of the Veterans of 
Independence (and the President of the Association of Veterans in 1923), Carlos 
García Vélez, openly supported the stance of workers not to break the strike. 
Perhaps by now, a military leader (and member of both the 1911 and 1923 Veterans’ 
organisations), such as himself was becoming more popular among workers than 
socialist políticos like Tejera and Messonier (Viñalis 1998: 44, n.56).  
In a wider sense, in order to understand the politics of the Cuban Republic, 
and to fully understand the emergence of a sense of betrayal of Cuban nationalism 
by políticos, the formation of the government and political parties in the era studied 
must be looked at in depth. However, as a preliminary measure, the advice of 
another historian regarding the concept of a ‘party’ in the Cuban republic must be 
heeded. As he put it:  
 
It is necessary to clarify that the concept of ‘party’ is accepted with 
reservations; in reality there is not a sufficiently stable and deep cohesion to 
affirm that there are strictly political parties. They did not meet the 
requirements of political membership; rather those men with some respect 
and political influence would share in supporting similar positions and 
express an identity of interest during a determined electoral campaign. This 
reality means that the process under study has a certain peculiarity, on 
account that these associations did not come about as a result of class 
interests, but rather from ideas about how to organise the Republic and about 
proper attitudes to adopt towards Man, which was the most obvious factor 
for national cohesion (Figarola 1975: 32). 
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Figarola posits that there were two political tendencies, that of federalism; 
largely of the party of the Federal Republicans, and that of centralism, largely that of 
the National Party, Máximo Gómez’s party. As noted earlier, those in the Emiliano 
Núñez Club were much more in favour of federal accountability (as were many of 
the constitutional delegates), when they highlighted the power of the already 
existing Ayuntamientos or Town Councils. The practical differences between 
provincial autonomy and central sovereignty were eclipsed however, by the issue of 
charisma. Máximo Gómez was still seen as the legitimate expression of the 
independence ideal. According to Figarola, Máximo Gómez was most closely 
supported by the members of the revolutionary elite: by future President of the 
Institution of Veterans, Emilio Núñez, and by the future first President of the Cuban 
Republic, Estrada Palma. Those most opposed to Máximo Gómez were Manuel 
Sanguily, Juan Gualberto Gómez, Salvador Cisneros Betancourt and the coalition 
around Bartolomé Masó (Figarola 1974: 33-6). According to Figarola, Sanguily, 
while a Lieutenant Colonel, was, representative of “the petit-bourgeoisie and middle 
class” (Figarola 1974: 35). Juan Gualberto Gómez was entirely a civilian leader, 
Cisneros Betancourt had asserted the primacy of the civil power, and while he had 
served as President of the Republic in Arms, his influence was not as strong as that 
of military men like Máximo Gómez. 
Viñalis concurs with Figarola’s assessment of political ‘parties’ when he 
points out that, “ assembly delegates did not act in agreement with the principles of 
the party they represented, but with their personal opinions” (Viñalis 1998: 24). 
Three parties were officially formed on a local level to elect delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention; the National Party of Havana, the Federal Republicans 
of Las Villas, and the Democratic Union. The third of these was composed of many 
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members of the old Autonomist government and members of the Asamblea del 
Cerro, joining forces, largely because they feared the charismatic authority of 
Máximo Gómez and his party (Pichardo 1973: 70). 
There was a division over whether the Constitution should only allow native 
Cubans to stand as President, largely a concern of the supporters of Máximo Gómez 
(he was Dominican); the men of 1895, who were to fill the ranks of the 1906 
rebellion and the Institution of the Veterans of Independence in 1911. Cisneros 
Betancourt attempted to resolve the civilian-military conflict that had plagued all the 
independence struggles by simply proposing that, “no citizen who has obtained the 
grade of Brigadier or above, in the army or militias of the Cuban republic will be 
allowed to be President or Vice-president”. As Figarola notes however, this was not 
only, “to marginalise Máximo Gómez but to destroy constitutionally the possibility 
of his substitution by some other exceptional insurrectionary leader” (Figarola 1974: 
63). In any case, Máximo Gómez himself refused to run, placing his support behind 
Estrada Palma, who was very much a político (as seen above he had been President 
of the Republic in Arms but was later the exile leader of the PRC in New York). 
An alliance between ex-Autonomists and the ‘left-independents’ of 
Bartolomé Masó was unpopular because of its perceived connections with Spanish 
collaboration (Figarola 1974: 80). Similarly for his part, Bartlomé Masó was a 
político and he was unable to form a successful ‘national coalition’ for his followers: 
many members of his group, likewise, being tainted by collaborationist connections 
(Figarola 1974: 82).  
It is difficult to say exactly why this political factionalism occurred in the 
early years of the republic. Perhaps, it was because of the role of the United States in 
consolidating political hegemony over the Cuban state. Perhaps it was because, in 
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the absence of war, this may have happened anyway, Cubans being unused to 
democratic systems at the time. Perhaps it was a combination of both, with the 
limited resources of state revenues proving a prize too rare to share with many 
others, with each faction seeking out a patronage network. In any case, this 
phenomenon was to continue, for many reasons, during the coming years, and this 
was to be a continual source of material for the rhetorical denunciation of corrupt 
politicians and a betrayed republic, by various political actors. This, along with the 
role the Liberation Army had played, and their now humble place in the new nation 
was a further source of feelings of frustration, and hence, a fertile ground for 
political capital to be made.  
 
 
Factionalism and Patronage 
 
 Central to understanding the political factionalism in the early Cuban 
republic, is an understanding of patronage. As one observer notes, political 
clientelism is, “central…to basic theoretical problems and controversies in all the 
social sciences” (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1980: 49). Alex Weingrod states that 
“patronage in the vocabulary of political science…refers to the ways in which party 
politicians distribute public jobs or special favors in exchange for electoral support” 
(Weingrod 1967-8: 378-9).  
 This gives rise to ‘patronage networks’, which, “are built around 
asymmetric but mutually beneficial and open-ended transactions and predicated on 
the differential control by social actors over the access and flow of resources in 
stratified societies. In some cases they produce a social order of their  own” 
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(Roniger 1994: 3-4). The ‘reciprocity’ of patron-client relations must be contrasted 
with the more openly forceful relations of the pre-capitalist era. Powell notes that 
patron-client realtions, do not include “relationships based on coercion, authority, 
manipulation, and so forth” (Powell 1970: 412), and Scott likewise observes that 
“the power imbalance is not so great as to permit a pure command relationship”  
(Scott 1977: 125). 
 Of course, no social relationship of ‘reciprocity’ between two individuals 
takes place within a vacuum. Social relations, and the perceptions of the social 
actors within them, take place inside the wider socio-economic system, and 
accompanying cultural forms of behaviour. Clientelism, “flourishes where markets 
are no longer controlled through primordial units, where social interaction is based 
on nonascriptive criteria, and where emphasis is placed on the open flow of 
resources and opportunities for mobility” (Roniger 1994: 11). Powell declares that 
“state centralization and market expansion” (Powell 1970: 413) leads to the need for 
brokers: mediators between several patrons at the local level and those superordinate 
to them in the national structure. These “regional brokers are often used to expand 
the control of the central government and to increase its political integration” 
(Kettering 1988: 432), whose “significance…increases in proportion to the 
expansion of state structures,…providing in effect the linkages necessary for 
bureaucratic action to reach into the periphery” (Legg and Lemarchand 1972: 154).  
 This results in a pyramidal structure in which one patron may himself be a 
client, and hence, a broker between someone further up the national hierarchy than 
himself and someone else further down. A multi-tiered national system is formed in 
which patrons are, “party officials and functionaries, bureaucrats and economic 
managers” (Tarkowski 1981: 178). This in turn means that, “patrons…compete for 
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client support…altering the psychological character of the patron-client 
relationship” which now rests, “upon an implicit element of bargaining” (Belloni 
1981: 40) among the rival patrons. This change usually accompanies “rapid 
urbanization, the shift of the work force from agricultural to other economic activity, 
and widespread exposure to mass media” (Belloni 1981: 36).   
 Viewing Cuban party politics in this way is often useful. Members of the 
mambisado and influential políticos established networks of patronage based on 
their old military or civilian ties, held over from the independence struggle. Factions 
in the new republic were then based upon allegiance to centralism (the ex-military 
influence), and that of federalism (of the civilian arms of the Provisional Cuban 
Government). This in turn, filtered down as patronage networks were established at 
the local level, with this often resulting in a political corruption which is very 
significant for the early republican period in Cuba: that of manipulatively 
controlling local elections by controlling the electoral boards for that municipality 
via a system of patronage.  
 
 
Corruption in the early Republic 
 
 The United States realised early on that a “way had to be found to 
accommodate the urgent requirement for livelihood among the 50,000 army 
veterans. Employment for soldiers was the minimum condition for social peace” 
(Pérez 1986: 86).38 Veteran General Julio Sanguily (brother of Manuel Sanguily) 
even threatened to go to war with the United States unless all public office posts 
                                                          
38 Note the much larger figure than that offered payment by the United States.  
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were given to veterans. Not surprisingly; “[t]housands of ex-soldiers joined the 
public roll as day laborers in public works programs” (Pérez 1986: 87). The United 
States feared Estrada Palma’s Rural Guard and Artillery force were not sufficient to 
protect his government, and at one stage Robert Squiers proposed annexation 
because of this (Yglesia Martínez 1976: 144).  
Despite the support for Estrada Palma by veteran General Máximo Gómez, 
in many ways, the former’s regime represented what the United States wanted: the 
government of the ‘better classes’. Hernández states that: 
 
his cabinet,…[were] known for their conservatism. One of them, Carlos de 
Zaldo Beurman, belonged to a family of bankers; another, Emilio Terry 
Dorticós, was one of the wealthiest planters on the island. Half of the 
secretaries were erstwhile autonomists-Zaldo, Terry and José María García 
Montes. Two were Cuban Nationals-Diego Tamayo and Manuel Luciano 
Díaz; two were Republicans-Zaldo and García Montes; and two were the 
president's personal friends-Terry and Eduardo Yero. None of them was a 
high ranking liberator (Hernández 1993: 104). 
 
They were also, clearly, a very tight patronage network. Scandal 
immediately followed the beginnings of Cuban independence. The Cuban Congress 
awarded itself lavish salaries and pay outs for veterans (often going to the same 
people). Hernández states that Alfredo Zayas (who had been the rebels’ chief 
representative in Havana during part of the war), and others, had diverted funds 
from illiterate veterans, and even some money found its way to US investors 
(Hernández 1993: 107). Zayas went to prison for this (Thomas 2002: 275). The 
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United States’ attempt to forge a constitutional regime from without was clearly a 
limited idea, failing to address the need for internal civil structures, which could 
avoid patronage.  
The first national elections for Congress in February 1904 were fraudulent. 
In Pinar del Río two electoral boards flourished separately, Juan Gualberto Gómez 
received more votes than were cast (a phenomenon repeated in all the elections in 
the early republic), and, when the Congress opened, the newly formed ‘National 
Liberals’ did not attend, preventing the majority needed for a quorum (Thomas 
2002: 276). According to Chapman, at this time the two main parties were, firstly, 
the same National Liberal Party that Thomas mentions, and secondly, that of Senator 
Ricardo Dolz in Havana and the Governor of Santa Clara, José Miguel Gómez: the 
Conservative Republicans (Chapman 1927: 169). Emilio Terry, of Estrada Palma’s 
cabinet, claimed the elections were a, “farce represented with less shame than in the 
times of the colony” (Chapman 1927: 170), with each party attempting to eliminate 
its minority, a method known as el copo.39  
 It was because of this that “some of the Liberals and the 
Republicans…jointly reformed themselves as the Moderate Party” (Thomas 2002: 
277). Hernández states that, “one-third of the senators and congressmen were former 
officers of the liberating army,…these men and their colleagues proved to be the 
stumbling block of the administration.” They were little interested in addressing any 
political issues that did not immediately affect them, often failing to attend 
Congress, and also giving themselves various political immunities, including, in the 
                                                          
39 Chapman says, “…in politics the ‘copo’ is applicable only where the law calls for 
representation of minorities, as is the case in Cuba. By means of the ‘copo’ the 
majority not only elects its own candidates but also elects others as if of the 
majority, thus falsely gaining unanimous representation accorded by law to a 
majority party” (Chapman 1927: 170, n.26)  
 
 127
case of Mariano Carona, immunity for murder (Hernández 1993: 105). All of these 
aspects of political corruption were to continue to plague the nascent Republic. 
This chapter has shown that the Cuban ideal of absolute independence and 
the desire of the United States for hegemonic political control were clearly not 
compatible. The result of this conflict of forces produced, in Cuba, factionalism, 
patronage and corruption. This was due to the forces of Cuban liberation being 
demobilised and differing views among Cubans themselves about how their 
government should function. While the Veterans’ organisations of 1911-12 and 
1923-24 have been mentioned by other commentators, it will be necessary to look at 
how the personnel of these organisations fit into the political factionalism and 
patronage of the period studied. This will go some way towards developing an 
argument that these organisations were very much a part of the ‘old’ politics, and 
hence, were unlikely to remain popular after the emergence of radical nationalism in 






Chapter IV - The Veterans’ Campaign 1902-12 
  
As can be seen from the preceding chapters, politics in the early Cuban 
republic was framed by three realities: the role of US hegemony, the disbandment of 
the forces of Cuban nationalism (which were in many ways inherently radical 
forces) and the corrupt nature of Cuban patronage politics. The central focus of the 
thesis is the form and content of Cuban nationalism in the republican period and the 
concomitant dissatisfaction with the realities of Cuban nationhood, with emphasis 
on such factors as the reorganisation of the army in 1909, the nature of the Veterans’ 
organisations as supposedly civil society associations, and their role in political 
patronage networks. As will be seen regarding the 1906 revolt, the Veterans’ 
movement was split, with many prominent military leaders of 1895 being leaders of 
the Liberals’ Central Revolutionary Committee, while many of the usually older 
Veterans who often held positions of power locally, sought a peaceful compromise.  
By 1902 many prominent military veterans, as well as members of the 
Council of Government in New York, and at the same time the Provisional 
Government and Constituent Assembly in Cuba, had not attained positions of power 
in the new regime, under the two major political parties. The Veterans’ organisations 
in some ways represented this disaffected part of the political class. They felt that 
the Republic had been ‘betrayed’. The Veterans’ organisational programme from 
1902 until 1924 included some or all of the following demands: 
 
i) The payment of pensions. Compensation was sought for having fought 
the war for national liberation. Compensation was also sought for the 
orphaned offspring of soldiers.  
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 ii) Suspension of the Civil Service Law. This was one of the explicitly 
political demands of the organisations. The organisations demanded the 
removal from public office of all those who had supported Spain during 
the struggle for independence.  
 
iii) Amnesty. For the veterans still imprisoned as a consequence of the 
general strikes of 1899 and 1902, and the rebellion of 1906 which the 
Liberals, and hence many of the Veterans, felt was justified and 
constitutional. As will be seen, the actions of the United States partly 
justified the revolt, by re-structuring the administration with many 
Liberals in positions of power, and by politicising the Army as a Liberal 
force.  
 
iv) The Veterans sought an end to what they saw as the unconstitutional 
practice of the President appointing the judiciary and a fundamental 
reassessment of the structure of the judicial power. 
 
The major conflict within the Veterans’ movement, according to the 
historiography, was the conflict between ‘radicals’ such as the future Communist 
intellectuals Julio Antonio Mella, Rubén Martínez Villena and others, along with 
working-class militants, and on the other hand the políticos: those who may have 
been members of the movement or closely tied to it, who represented what would 
have perhaps been the natural ‘ruling class’ of Cuba, but who were frustrated by US 
hegemony in their attempts to gain economic ascendancy in Cuba. This view, 
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however, ignores the conflict within the movement between the older and the 
younger members that pre-dated the involvement of Marxists and intellectuals in the 
Association of 1923-24, which perhaps only exacerbated this tension. As was seen 
from the chapter on the independence movement, this was a conflict occurring in 
most institutions and political parties of the early Cuban republic. As a division 
between civil and military leadership had never been properly institutionalised 
during the various wars of independence, there was a tendency for civil 
organisations to take on revolutionary or radical ends: ‘revolutionary’ and ‘radical’ 
in the sense of ousting the current regime and replacing it with another by force, 
rather than a conception of social revolution.  
More importantly, it is difficult to see any consistent institutional 
organisation of ‘Veterans’ that had coherence from the break up of the Cuban 
Liberation Army to the protests of 1911-12 and 1923-24. While there is much that 
will be explained and analysed in the following chapters, from the ‘Centre of 
Veterans’ that intervened as a mediator in the 1902 strike in Havana, to letters in the 
press by the ‘Veterans of Independence’ commenting upon the revolt of 1906 and 
the reorganisation of the army in 1909, to the protests of the Institution of the 
Veterans of Independence in 1911-12 and the Association of Veterans of 1923-24, 
there is no record of a civil society Veterans’ organisation that met frequently or 
even annually in the intervening years. Rather, these amorphous organisations acted 
as a repository of nationalism throughout the period, when this was felt to have been 
betrayed by governmental or presidential abuses of the Constitution, by those in 
revolt or on strike, or by anyone else otherwise disrupting what they felt to be the 
good exercise of republican government.  
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While these supposedly civil society organisations acted in many ways not 
normally expected of such goups, they were not explicitly revolutionary. The 
protests of 1911-12 and 1923-24 were just that, protests, and while the Institution of 
1911-12 and the Association of 1923-24 may have shared many personnel with 
those in revolt in 1906, 1917, and even 1931, in these instances of actual revolt they 
usually acted as a conservative force, calling for an end to both violence on the part 
of those in revolt, and abuses by the government. Additionally, while the various 
Veterans’ organisations may have been a repository of an implicit radicalism in the 
sense that they were dedicated to Martí’s and the PRC’s vision of racial equality, 
this was largely because so many of the veterans of the struggle for independence, 
and, hence, some of the personnel of the various Veterans’ organisations were black. 
A certain caveat should be noted, however, at this point: that nationalist entities such 
as the Veterans’ organisations were implicitly ‘radical’ in one sense: the prominence 
of blacks and mulatos in the movement and their call for an authentic republic of 
racial equality, as originally envisioned by Martí, was still very much a radical 
proposition in the early 1900s.  
This radical position was not social-revolutionary, in the sense that it was 
compatible, as the Veterans correctly pointed out, with good republican government. 
Similarly, it will be seen that the Veterans’ organisations did not share the desires of 
the more radical elements of the Cuban working-class movement. The Veterans 
called for an end to strikes on the basis that they could cause US intervention under 
the auspices of the Platt Amendment, as, perhaps surprisingly, so did many of the 
political parties and groupings that claimed to represent the working class. The 
capitulation of the latter organisations may have led to rank-and-file members of 
these supposedly working-class entities, and also the black working class, to see the 
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Veterans’ organisations as more authentic expressions of Cuban nationalism. The 
Veterans’ organisations, however, often simply utilised this support and potential for 




The inauguration of the Republic 
 
 In the debate in the Cuban legislature in 1903 over the acceptance of the 
Reciprocity Treaty, Alfredo Zayas (ex-Autonomist and PRC member) supported 
Manuel Sanguily’s position that the Constitution did not grant power to the 
President to allow customs concessions to a foreign power. Salvador Cisneros 
Betancourt argued against the Treaty as an instrument of ‘americanisation’ and 
Tomás A. Recio argued that the supposed benefits that would come with the Treaty 
would in fact go to US sugar refinery trusts (Viñalis 2002: 22). All of these men 
were prominent in the Liberation movement (though not seasoned military fighters), 
and their recognition that US economic dominance would necessarily imply political 
dominance was prophetic. They were not social-revolutionaries of course, and the 
alternative they wished for was their own hegemony over that of the United States.  
 On 11 March 1903 the Cubans had rejected the Reciprocity Treaty by 16 
votes to 5. Voting to approve the Treaty were such prominent future members of the 
Veterans’ organisations as; Alfredo Zayas, Pedro Betancourt, Francisco Carrillo, 
José de J. Monteagudo, Manuel Lazo, Antonio Sánchez de Bustamente, and 
Domingo Méndez Capote. Voting against the Treaty were Veterans’ organisation 
members; Tomas A. Recio, Manuel Sanguily, Eudaldo Tamayo, and Salvador 
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Cisneros Betancourt (Viñalis 2002: 89, n.28). On 19 March the US Senate 
introduced amendments to the Treaty that were detrimental to Cuba. On 26 March 
Edualdo Tamayo suggested voting against the recommendations of the Commission 
of Foreign Relations that had supported the Treaty with amendments, and was 
supported by Tomás Recio and others as this time it was rejected by the Cuban 
Senate by a vote of 13 to 7. There were more discussions and a Treaty decided, on 
28 March, was approved by only 11 votes to 9 on 27 December 1903. Many of those 
who had long been in favour of the Treaty would later be Moderate Party members 
and supporters of Estrada Palma’s re-election.  
 The Platt Amendment and the Reciprocity Treaty are seen by many Cuban 
historians as beginning a system of ‘neo-colonial’ rule by US financial corporations 
(though they do not all see things this way), which thus established Cuba as a 
subordinate neo-colony providing sugar and tobacco for the United States to sell on 
the international market. This, it is argued, prevented the emergence of a native 
bourgeoisie that could diversify agricultural production to enable Cuba to become 
self-sufficient and establish its own export markets. It was this chain of events that 
provided the background to the Veterans’ organisations, and it was the failure of this 
type of nationalism to which they frequently alluded. It was the Liberals (both the 
official parties and their factions) that most closely expressed the nationalist ideals 
of ordinary Cubans and the petit bourgeoisie at least until 1909-11 (Viñalis 2002: 
102-3). Only after the ascension to power of the Liberal factions in 1906, and the 
continuation of political corruption under them, was this brand of nationalism seen 
to have failed, and, hence, the Veterans’ organisation of 1911-12 was established to 
create popular support for its protest.   
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The ‘Centre of Veterans’ and the 1902 strike 
 
The Veterans’ organisations were somewhat amorphous institutions. It is 
difficult to tell how many local patriotic clubs there were and when they became 
subordinate to a national leadership. What is clear, however, is that this national 
leadership, principally based in Havana, dominated the Veterans’ organisations’ 
interventions in national life. Perhaps the first example of this is during the 1902 
strike. This is important because, as was seen during the general strike in Havana of 
1899, many supposedly radical organisations failed to act as a vanguard of the 
working class, encourage militancy, or even satisfy workers’ demands. Diego 
Vicente Tejera’s Cuban Socialist Party failed to convince workers either that its 
ideology was the true heir to Martí’s Manifesto of Montecristi, or that socialism 
could be brought about without conflict, whether that was between classes or 
through political violence more generally. Similarly, Enrique Messonier was 
actually blamed by members of his own General League of Cuban Workers for the 
failure of the struggle for the eight-hour day. Members of the Veterans’ 
organisations, specifically the younger men of the generation of 1895 like Carlos 
García Vélez, could then invoke either themselves and their patronage networks, or 
the various Veterans’ organisations, as the true heirs of Cuban nationalism. Here it 
can be seen again how a supposedly civil society organisation would take on a 
political role for specific purposes: by implicitly supporting workers (though 
perhaps not their exact demands or tactics), and political reforms that would gain 
their allegiance to the Veterans’ organisations through nationalist sympathies.  
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As has been illustrated earlier, the wars for independence had taken their toll 
on the Cuban economy and society. According to Pérez, for both rural and urban 
Cuban workers: 
 
the transition from colony to republic had meant a descent into 
destitution…The problem for workers, however, was not primarily a 
depressed postwar economy, but competition from cheap labor in the form of 
immigration (Pérez 1986: 77).  
 
These immigrants were predominantly Spanish but also Chinese, largely 
unskilled and illiterate. The Spaniards arriving would “work…for almost any 
number of hours…and they overwhelmed the local labor market”. Pérez quotes 
contemporary commentator Victor S. Clark, from the US Department of Labour, to 
the effect that Spaniards:  
 
[u]nlike the Cuban,…are frugal, seldom gamble, and often allow their 
savings to accumulate in the hands of their employers. They are not 
quarrelsome, and do not usually carry concealed weapons (Pérez 1986: 78).  
 
Pérez quotes a US Colonel who noted in 1900 that “[t]he Cubans learn early 
the power of combination and when they believe that their labor is indispensable, 
strikes are very likely to follow”. Trade unions at the time showed their protectionist 
colours, no matter which nationality, as “plumbers contracted in the Unites Sates 
organized a local trade union in Havana, and proceeded to exclude Cubans”. As 
Pérez notes, this “[i]mmigration served primarily the interests of foreign capital” and 
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there was no trade free of this phenomenon as “workers competed with Cuban labor 
in all occupations in the fields and factories, in mines and manufacturing, as artisans 
and apprentices” (Pérez 1986: 79). Cubans dominated the skilled trades as 
carpenters, masons, cigar workers, mechanics, tailors and barbers, while they proved 
almost totally averse to mining and less dominant as servants or railroad workers 
(Pérez 1986: 81). Apprenticeships were almost totally dominated by Cubans, and, 
perhaps not surprisingly, they were to lead the strike of 1902.  
A general strike was voted for on 17 November 1902 (Viñalis 2002: 36), and 
the strike began with cigar workers in Havana on 25 November, gaining widespread 
support in the city and becoming known as the ‘apprentices’ strike’. It began with 
workers at the Cabañas plant, that was part of the American Trust, and the purpose 
was to seek free and equal entry, between white and black Cubans, into these 
apprenticeships, when strikers felt that employers were beginning to favour foreign 
workers (presumably because Cubans at this point so dominated the trade). The 
strike was supported by doctors, dentists, students and intellectuals, and in 
Cienfuegos, Cruces and Lajas (Viñalis 2002: 35).  
The strike was again supported by the General League of Cuban Workers (as 
the bricklayers’ strike of 1899 had been). The League, however, displayed its 
reformist tone when it stated that the aim of the strike was merely to gain, the right 
to earn bread by means of work (IHMCRSC 1981: 193-4). As was seen earlier, the 
leadership of the General League of Cuban Workers failed to take a militant position 
in the bricklayers’ strike of 1899 and in 1902 their position had not changed.  
The Cuban Secretary of State, Diego Tamayo, and the Mayor of Havana, 
Juan Ramón O’Farril, implicitly supported the strike, as they were annexationists 
and the United States had earlier suggested that it might have to intervene to end the 
 137
strike under the terms of the third Article of the Platt Amendment, regarding the 
protection of life and property. Estrada Palma relieved the two of power, and 
ordered the Chief of Police in Havana, Rafael de Cárdenas, and the head of the 
Rural Guard, Alejandro Rodríguez, to crush the strike. An ad hoc committee of 
veterans, led by Máximo Gómez, and Manuel Sanguily, urged workers to return to 
work to avoid intervention, and this they did over the course of 27 and 28 
November, with their demands not being met and with many strikers having lost 
their jobs or been imprisoned (Viñalis 2002: 37).  
The position of the Centre of Veterans, while equally reformist, tied the issue 
of the 1902 strike to its self-styled role as the authentic repository of Cuban 
nationalism, as will be seen. The role of the Centre of Veterans in the strike of 1902 
in fact appears to be one of the first interventions of a Veterans’ organisation into 
national life after the establishment of the Cuban republic.  
The Centre of Veterans, while no doubt supported by workers, was not an 
explicitly social-revolutionary institution. During the apprentices’ strike, the 
organisation negotiated with the government and described its role in its ‘Question 
of Principles’ in the following terms:  
 
The Centre of Veterans, which keeps within its heart, as something sacred, 
the doctrine of revolution in its entirety, does not as a collective body form, 
nor can it form, part of any of the present political groupings, nor will it form 
part of any that might be constituted in the future, because it understands that 
the mission which it is called on to fulfil within the Republic is higher than 
that; and that if, in the recent sad events that disturbed the normality of our 
life, it intervened in politics, it did so - authorised by the government -  in 
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order to maintain public order and defend the Republic, defending justice 
and acting as an intermediary between social classes that were, accidently 
separated by a secondary question of interests. In this intervention, there was 
no question of anything but principles and no question of acting in party 
politics (El Mundo 27 December 1902). 
 
This was principally the role which various Veterans’ organisations sought to 
play throughout the period 1902-12: as ‘intermediary’ between a corrupt 
government and a population still beholden to the mambí ideal. While US unions 
may have seen their interests as opposed to Cuban workers and Spanish workers 
may have seen any quality of life in the new republic as preferable to their 
homeland, the Centre of Veterans sought to bring the potentially internationalist and 
revolutionary interests of Cuban workers in line with their own nationalist interests 
and with their own claim to an heroic past. Their claim that Cuba was ‘accidentally 
separated by a secondary question of interests’ illustrates the kind of republic they 
hoped to inaugurate: one with a Cubanised administration, where the middle-class 
leaders who had led the independence movement would be guaranteed a secure 
economic position.  Indeed, the aforementioned Chief of Havana Police, Rafael de 
Cárdenas, was at the time responsible for harsh repressions against strikers (Le 
Riverend 1971: 56), yet he was to go on to become active in the Veterans’ 
organisations. While it is doubtful that supporters of annexation had led the strike, 
some Cuban companies took advantage of the strike to suggest that the Cuban 
government could not guarantee the protection of life and property (Le Riverend 
1971: 58).  
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The Veterans’ role as ‘intermediary’ meant that the commission designated 
by the ‘General Assembly of Veterans’, named in the same El Mundo article, 
claimed that when strikers: 
 
return to their work they will not be persecuted in any way, and this is the 
condition under which the workers will concede and the strike will end. 
                                                                                                                                                    
Despite claiming to be acting over a ‘Question of Principles’ the Centre of 
Veterans did not miss an opportunity to again emphasise some of their main 
concerns in the same article: that of judicial power and amnesty, although they tried 
to tie this in with the question of the strike. When the government moved to repress 
the strike, the Centre of Veterans asserted that: 
 
The Centre, is so obligated to demand immediate compliance with the 
process that the commission, in the name of the general assembly of 
veterans, has formulated, and by this means, it must demand an amnesty, 
without occupying itself with whom will be given amnesty,…[as] they were 
dedicated, in the majority of cases, before the defence of the sacred interests 
of the nation. The affirmation that the Centre of Veterans must not continue 
intervening in the definitive course of the strike, because its statues prohibit 
political activity, is a true sophism neither the acts realised by this 
Commission, nor those which are now realised by the commission or by the 
Centre, are antithetical to the article which is invoked…The Centre of 
Veterans recognises the indisputable right of those sons of labour, and in 
order for the conflict to end,…[the] Executive Power…has contracted to 
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oppose itself to the liberty of action which MUST be recognised by the 
Tribunals of Justice. 
 
It is of course, very interesting to see a Centre of Veterans, claiming to be an 
explicitly ‘non-political’ association, acting in such ways. It is difficult to establish 
whether the General Assembly of Veterans was a Commission acting as 
intermediary, and had been appointed as a delegation by the Centre of Veterans, or 
whether this was the other way round. What is clear is that this is very much like the 
delegation the Cuban Constitutional Convention sent to the United States in 1901, 
and, as will be seen later, the delegation of the Veterans of Independence negotiating 
over the Liberal Party uprising of 1906 with the United States and the Cuban 
President. What it certainly highlights is that these organisations were by no means a 
mugwump, for what kind of act after all, if not a political one, is acting as an 
intermediary with the executive power?  
This then was one of the first manifestations of the Veterans’ organisation 
seeking to portray itself as the authentic voice of Cuban nationalism in a corrupt 
republic betrayed by the traditional patronage networks of party politics. Usually 
veterans’ organisations are thought of as inherently conservative institutions, averse 
to intervening in either political life or workers’ struggles. Yet this supposedly civil 
organisation chose to on the verge of a general strike, seeking to gain the allegiance 
of the working-class constituency while at the same time expressing itself as the true 
heir of the Cuban nationalist heritage of the years 1868-98. 
What is also clearly interesting is that the Centre of Veterans, while claiming 
to be a ‘non-political’ association acting merely as ‘intermediary’, even at this early 
stage sought to promote one of its own, openly political, goals: the reorganisation of 
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the judiciary. Moreover, they sought to connect this to the arbitrary imprisonments 
of political enemies and working-class militants by the President and his patronage 
network of judicial appointees. Of course amnesty, the abuse of judicial power, and 
the imprisonment of working-class militants are not issues naturally connected. 
Indeed, the latter was just as likely to happen under a republic as under a colony, as 
the Haymarket affair with which the earlier strike in Cuba of 1899 was intimately 
connected, graphically illustrated. What the various issues did allow the Centre of 
Veterans to do, however, was to capitalise on the struggles of workers and ally 
themselves to these, as the true voice of Cuban nationalism. This is perhaps why 
Marxist students in the Federacion Estudiantil Universitatrio [Federation of 
University Students – FEU] would later see the Veterans’ association of 1923-24 as 
a potentially radical force, though it clearly also failed to fulfil this role at that later 
date.  
At the root of this problem regarding the Courts, according to the Centre of 
Veterans, was that they were not constitutionally organised (i.e., subject to suffrage 
as many had proposed at the Constitutional Convention in 1901), and therefore in 
the same El Mundo article they noted: 
 
It is not a secret to anyone – the major role of the Judicial Power, which still 
is not constitutionally organised, is to impose proceedings of dismissal to the 
Tribunals, we understand - and we continue to understand - that the 
concession of an amnesty will be the complete and definitive solution to all 
of these problems. 
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The Senators who were members of the Centre of Veterans recognised that 
the proposal suggested by the Commission of the General Assembly of Veterans 
about the 1902 strike must be presented to the Senate to pass a law in order to 
resolve the fundamental problem of the judiciary. 
Therefore, with their role in the strike of 1902, the Veterans’ organisations 
(in this instance the Centre of Veterans and the General Assembly of Veterans) had 
constructed themselves as the true heir to authentic Cuban nationalism. They sought 
to conserve the republic, unite the interests of native Cuban classes against Spanish 
and US domination, while at the same time connecting this with their specific aims 
for a general amnesty and the reorganisation of judiciary.  
 
 
Continuity between the Liberal revolt of 1906 and the Veterans’ protest of 
1911-12 
 
An understanding of the Liberal uprising of 1906 is instrumental to 
furthering an understanding of the role and place of the Veterans’ organisations in 
the Cuban republic. Many members of the Central Revolutionary Committee of the 
Liberal Party of 1906 were among the membership of the Veterans of Independence 
of 1911-12. Likewise, many of their concerns were the same. These included the 
suspension of constitutional guarantees by presidential decree, presidential 
appointment of the judiciary, presidential appointment and designation of the 
powers of public administration appointees, and amnesty for common crimes. In fact 
as will be seen, the concerns of the Liberal revolutionaries in 1906 were due to a 
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vast and open manipulation of political power by the whole incumbent 
administration. 
In many ways the demands of the Central Revolutionary Committee of the 
Liberals represented the feelings, grievances and hopes of the generation of 1895: 
military men who had been deprived of political power (which they had perhaps 
hoped for under the Republic) by políticos wary of them gaining such, and likewise, 
prevented from doing so by the United States. They had a large body of support for 
their revolt: the rank-and-file, working-class soldiers, who, with the repeated delay 
in the payment of the Liberation Army, were economically destitute. 
Estrada Palma’s rule of three and a half years was generally perceived to 
have fallen short of what was seen in the period as ‘national rehabilitation’. Much of 
Cuba’s agriculture lay in ruins, not much better than immediately after the war, and 
60,000 veterans sought payment or employment by the state, turning to banditry 
when this demand was not met (Yglesia Martínez 1988: 46).40 As was seen, ‘parties’ 
were somewhat amorphous entities coalescing around people as much as principles. 
Gaunaurd states that there were three political parties: Republican, Democratic, and 
Populist. According to him, the first was protectionist, the second for free-enterprise, 
and the third frankly socialist (Gaunaurd 1954: 136). While, until then, Estrada 
Palma had observed strict neutrality between these factions, with the end of his first 
term there appeared a radical change in his conduct (Gaunaurd 1954: 137). 
 Admittedly attempts at direct military revolt against Estrada Palma’s 
government had begun after barely a year in power. There were plots in July 1903 at 
Guanabacoa, and later at Manzanillo on an “immediate pay of the army” platform, 
as well as one in September at Sevilla, again on the grounds of payment for the 
                                                          
40 Note the even higher figure of 60,000, as opposed to the 33,390 who had been 
offered payment, most of whom, as was seen, refused. 
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Liberation Army (Chapman 1927: 179). In order to better understand the protest of 
the Institution of the Veterans of Independence in 1911, it will be useful to look at 
the continuity between their organisation and that of the rebels of 1906. While there 
is some scholarship on both the 1906 uprising and the 1911 protest, there is no 
sustained analysis of the connections between the two. Upon closer inspection there 
are many such connections which will be looked at in turn in terms of the following: 





According to Pichardo: 
 
in the cabinet of Estrada Palma there has not been a single veteran of the 
war, nor a single one of the revolutionaries in exile, nor a single one of the 
men who had suffered incarceration or deportation for defending Cuba 
(Pichardo 1973: 357). 
  
It was not surprising, then, that just these men would dominate the uprising. 
Often, they were also members of the Veterans’ National Council in 1911-12 and/or 
the Association of 1923-24.  
Carlos García Vélez is perhaps the most significant example of continuity 
between 1906 and 1911. He was a member of the Institution of the Veterans of 
Independence in 1911, and was later an Ambassador in Mexico, Argentina, the 
United States, England and Spain (Figarola 1974: 326-7). He helped form the 
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Central Revolutionary Committee in 1906, being the, “titular head of the movement 
in the province of Havana” (Chapman 1927: 195). Later, he was on the committee 
which US Governor Charles Magoon set up to advise him on the allocation of 
governmental positions in the new administration (Hernández 1993: 149). He would 
go on to be President of the Veterans and Patriots Association in 1923-24. His father 
was Calixto García, who had been Chief of the Eastern Forces during the Ten Years 
War of 1868-78, founder of the Cuban Revolutionary Committee in New York, and 
Military Chief of Oriente Province in the uprising of 1895 (Suchlicki 1988: 114). 
Another important person linking the revolt of 1906 to the Veterans’ 
organisations was Mario García Menocal. The lack of a quorum during the Congress 
of 1904 had meant that, “the veterans were clamouring for legislation to enable them 
to get their bonus, of which some details had still to be arranged” (Chapman 1927: 
171). According to the same source, during the revolt “[t]he veterans of the War of 
Independence had retained their organization intact, and they now authorized some 
of their leaders to take steps to effect a compromise between the two parties” 
(Chapman 1927: 198). While Chapman’s claim that the Veterans’ organisations had 
remained intact since 1898 is somewhat dubious, in the light of observations about 
the disbandment of the Liberation Army, their role in the events of 1906 is 
confirmed by others (Figarola 1974: 141). Standing between the pole represented by 
the revolutionaries who sought the annulment of the 1905 elections, and that 
represented by the government which refused any compromise, Menocal had 
suggested to Estrada Palma the retention of the President and Vice-president, while 
re-staging the 1905 municipal vote. Menocal invoked the authority of the veterans, 
as they were “neither in revolt nor in power” and hence represented the true heir of 
separatism if their suggested compromise was to save the nation from a second 
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intervention (Figarola 1974: 140). According to the same source, Menocal 
controlled the Veterans’ organisations from this point until just before 1920 
(Figarola 1974: 141). No less a figure than Salvador Cisneros Betancourt apparently 
confirms the fact that Menocal had formed a ‘veterans’ society’, when he stated that 
the title of its journal would be La Estrella Solitaria, the same as that of Rafael 
Morales’s journal during the Ten Years War (Secades Japón 1912: 18). 
Menocal was educated in the United States. He fought in the War of 1895 
under Máximo Gómez, Maceo and Calixto García, achieving the rank of Major 
General. He was Chief of Police in Havana during the US Military Government of 
1899-1901, would be president of the republic for two terms (1913-1921), including 
during the First World War, the uprising of 1917 and the ‘Dance of the Millions’. 
He then stood for the presidency in 1924 and 1936 but was defeated both times, and 
participated in the attempted uprising against Machado’s extension of his 
presidential term in August 1931. He later helped draft the 1940 Constitution 
(Suchlicki 1988: 116-7).  
General Demetrio Castillo Duany was among the first group of rebel leaders 
arrested after 16 August 1906 (Thomas 2001: 278). He was a signatory to the letter 
of ‘The Veterans of Independence to the people of Cuba’ on 28 October 1911 
(Pichardo 1973: 361), and was Chief of Prisons under President Menocal and 
Secretary of War under President Zayas (Figarola 1974: 321).   
Manuel Lazo was a member of the Central Revolutionary Committee of 
1906 and was also a Vice-president of the Institution of Veterans in 1911 
(Hernández 1993: 124, Pichardo 1973: 361).  He was also one of the Senators for 
the Liberal Party who resigned in September 1906 (for Pinar del Río, Gaunaurd 
1954: 165), one of the few veterans in revolt who had a position of power in the 
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patronage networks. This was possibly due, however, to the fact that constitutional 
guarantees were only suspended in Havana, Santa Clara and Pinar del Río by Decree 
380, the places of Liberal strength and also resignations. 
Enrique Loynaz del Castillo was likewise a signatory to the letter of the 
Veterans and also a participant in the rebellion of 1906, as he had launched an attack 
in Havana (Hernández 124-5). He is a figure who could appear to represent some 
continuity not only between the revolt of 1906 and the protest of 1911, but also with 
the Association of Veterans and Patriots in 1923, and indeed the ‘new’ politics of 
the Machado era and beyond. He was an Honorary President in the Veterans and 
Patriots Association of 1923 (Cairo Ballester 1976: 100). He was a member of the 
opposition, Unión Nacionalista [Nationalist Union], during the government of 
Machado, and later a participant in the rebellion against his regime on 12 August 
1933. Later still he was Ambassador for Mexico and Venezuela (Figarola 1974: 
327-8). 
A fellow rebel, and also a fellow signatory of the declaration in 1911 was 
Manuel Alfonso Seijas, who interestingly was also the founder of the Moderate 
Party and later active in the formation of Joven Cuba [Young Cuba] (Figarola 1974: 
325).  
When the Liberals partially achieved some of their demands following the 
1906 rebellion, Agustín Cebreco was one of the spokesmen for the Liberals’ peace 
plan (Hernández 1993: 128). He was a general in the Institution of the Veterans of 
Independence in 1911-12 and a member of the Association of Veterans and Patriots 
in 1923-24.  
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Finally, José J. Sánchez was a participant in the rebellion of 1906, was a 
general of the Association of Veterans and Patriots in 1923-24, and he was also 





 The revolt of 1906 grew out of the fissiparous nature of Cuban politics. The 
elections of February 1904 for a National Congress resulted in a realignment of 
political tendencies. The two principal parties were the Conservative Republican 
Party, of Senator Ricardo Dolz of Havana and José Miguel Gómez (at the time the 
governor of Santa Clara), while the National Party reformed as the National Liberal 
Party (Chapman 1927: 169). Figarola notes that, likewise, the alliance between ‘left 
independents’ (the masoístas) and the ex-autonomists of the Democratic Union was 
opposed to the attempt by Estrada Palma at re-election and they split, with members 
joining either the Conservative Republicans or the National Liberals as they saw fit.  
 Both factions attempted to exclude the minority from representation at the 
local level through fraud, specifically the situation of more votes being cast than 
registered voters, and often dual electoral boards functioning together, with neither 
recognising the other. When the Conservative Republicans appeared to be winning, 
the National Liberals refused to attend Congress when it opened in April, making it 
unable to gain a quorum as the presence of two-thirds of the membership was 
required by the Constitution (Chapman 1927: 169-70, Thomas 2001: 276-7). Given 
that one of most important matters for Congress was passing a bill to increase 
payment to veterans, this led to a compromise, as “neither party wished to offend 
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this powerful electoral element” (Chapman 1927: 171). The compromise consisted 
of the House being constituted purely for the purpose of approving the bonus, with 
half the membership from the previous elections (not those of 1904), together with 
as many new elected members as were veterans, even though these positions had not 
been approved, as the aforementioned fraud had disrupted this process. Still, this 
strange political event indicated the influence of veterans and the urgent requirement 
to pay them. In September the suggestion of Ricardo Dolz was adopted, namely that 
since: 
 
the constitutional requirement meant two-thirds attendance at the beginning 
of a legislative term…thereafter regular meetings might be held, with or 
without two-thirds of the membership. Over the protest of the National 
Liberals this view was adopted for the time being, and as two-thirds of the 
members had been present for the bonus legislation, Congress for a brief 
time resumed its sessions, until the recess in October (Chapman 1927: 171). 
 
With the appeasement of the veterans, “the dominant question in Cuban 
politics was the next presidential elections of 1905” (Thomas 2001: 277), given that 
the majority agreed with Máximo Gómez that presidential “reelección es un crimen” 
[re-election is a crime] (Figarola 1974: 133).  
Factions formed around the three groups: those in favour of Estrada Palma 
and the Moderate Party, those who sought compromise - the Conservative 
Republicans-, and those who sought to physically oust the government, the National 
Liberals. The division among these factions however, was complex. Those who had 
been young, rank-and-file soldiers in 1895 and had supported Máximo Gómez for 
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president were likely to be directly involved in the revolt. Those who were old 
generals or major-generals by 1895 and may also have supported Máximo Gómez in 
1898 sought most of all to avoid US intervention, and so joined either the Moderates 
or the Conservative Republicans and supported the compromise. The Central 
Revolutionary Committee of the Liberals consisted of: José Miguel Gómez, José de 
Jesús Monteagudo, Demetrio Castillo Duany, Carlos García Vélez, Juan Gualberto 
Gómez, Pelayo García, Alfredo Zayas and Manuel Lazo. The first rising was that on 
17 August by Faustino (Pino) Guerra followed by Orestes Ferrara and Eduardo 
Guzmán in Las Villas (Viñalis 2002: 48-49).  
There was also a further incidence of the civilian-military split in forming 
factions. Many of the old generals and major-generals, though they may not have 
been in government by 1906, were powerful local governors, and did not wish to 
upset what they hoped to be their progression to the top, whether that hindrance 
came from the United States or from young veterans.  
Among those in rebellion, Demetrio Castillo Duany was the Provisional 
Governor of Oriente (Figarola 1974: 321), while Agustín Cebreco was a 
representative in Oriente (Figarola 1974: 319). As mentioned earlier, Menocal was 
Havana’s Chief of Police and he proposed the peace plan. Emilio Núñez was at the 
time Governor of Havana and aspired to a future presidency of the republic, a role 
for which he had, “the favor of General Máximo Gómez, who had become 
somewhat cool in his relations with Estrada Palma and was in any event opposed to 
his plans for reelection” (Chapman 1927: 172). He was a member of the 
Conservative Republicans and supported Menocal’s suggestions. Clearly then, 
veterans were divided at the highest level over the question of revolt or compromise.  
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The Role of the Veterans of Independence in the 1906 Revolt  
 
 As was seen earlier, Mario García Menocal mediated between the Liberal 
Revolutionary Committee, the US government, Estrada Palma’s Moderates, and the 
Veterans of Independence. According to one source Bartolomé Masó and Augustín 
Cebreco were leaders of the Veterans of Independence in Oriente and the latter met 
Estrada Palma on 1 September, though Palma refused to cede to revolutionary 
demands. Then the Junta de Veteranos [Assembly of Veterans] composed of 
Menocal, as well as Eugenio Sánchez Agramonte, Agustín Cebreco, Tomás Padro 
Griñán, Lope Recio Loynaz, Alberto Nodarse, Eugenio Molinet and Manuel Lazo, 
united so that: 
 
For the first time since the dissolution of the Cuban Revolutionary Party the 
veterans of independence organised themselves and combined forces around 
the struggle for a common objective (Yglesia Martínez 1988: 72). 
 
On 8 September Menocal and Sánchez Agramonte met Estrada Palma, who 
at first seemed to agree to the pact, but then said he would have to consult his 
secretaries and Méndez Capote (Collazo 1910: 60-4). A tone of conciliatory 
nationalism was expressed on 10 September, when tobacco workers in Santiago de 
Cuba, who had been on strike for four months, “inspired by patriotic 
feelings…adhered to the calls of the veterans to maintain order with the aim of 
avoiding a second intervention” and decided to return to work (Yglesia Martínez 
1988: 72). The peace proposal which the Veterans suggested, that the Liberals also 
supported, included retaining the presidential and vice-presidential positions and re-
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staging the municipal vote of 1905, but the Moderate leaders refused to accede to 
these terms. The Veterans of Independence then submitted their proclamation, ‘To 
Cubans in Arms’, which exhorted, in the words of that “great citizen of the 20th 
Century” Theodore Roosevelt, who had stated days before that intervention would 
be necessary to “to rescue the Isle from anarchy and civil war” (Gaunaurd 1954: 
173), it was in Cuban hands to make peace and preserve the independence of the 
republic. The Veterans pointed out that the incumbent regime had ceased hostilities 
and called on the revolutionaries to respond honourably (Gaunaurd 1954: 174).  
 In response Estrada Palma and his Moderate-dominated Congress sanctioned 
an increase in the numbers of Rural Guard and Artillery, using the funds of the 
Treasury and postponing other public spending for this purpose. This was because at 
the time the police “were in sympathy with the revolution, [and] the government had 
only some six hundred artillery men and three thousand rural guards with which to 
combat its enemy” while the rebels totalled “eight or ten thousand in the province of 
Havana, [and]…six or eight thousand more in Santa Clara” (Chapman 1927: 197). 
One author puts the total number of rebels at 25,000 and states that, as during the 
war of 1895, they were “overwhelmingly Afro-Cuban” (Helg 1995: 137-8). On the 
governmental side, members of the armed forces totalled only 2,856, and when 
Estrada Palma attempted to recruit volunteers, many switched sides to the Liberals 
in order to guarantee arms (Viñalis 2002: 49-50).  
 By September 1906 General Montalvo had reiterated the demands of 
Menocal for new elections, while the Moderate Party President and the Vice-
president of the republic, Méndez Capote, again called on the Liberals to first lay 
down arms. After this, the Liberals’ same demands were reiterated for a third time 
by Alfredo Zayas, President of the Revolutionary Committee (Pichardo 1973: 301), 
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who called for a revision of “electoral, municipal, and judiciary laws and a civil 
service law covering government employees in general” (Chapman 1927: 207). 
Estrada Palma and Méndez Capote refused to go along with the peace plans, 
resigning their positions, while their Moderate supporters refused to attend Congress 
and elect successors, thus instigating the establishment of another US Provisional 
Government. The Liberals then dealt directly with the US Secretary of War, William 
H. Taft, as their letter to him shows, calling for amnesty for political crimes, signed 
as it was by those who in 1911 would become prominent members of the Veterans’ 
organisations’ leadership: Carlos García Veléz, General Demetrio Castillo Duany 
and Manuel Lazo (Gaurnaurd 1954: 183). 
 
 
Consequences of the Revolt and issues left unresolved 
 
 On 10 October 1906 ‘Provisional Governor’ Taft issued a proclamation that 
decreed: 
 
a complete amnesty…for all persons who directly or indirectly participated 
in the recent insurrection in Cuba or who supported or helped to sustain 
persons who did participate, for crimes of a political nature, committed 
during the course of said insurrection and before the dissolution of these 
forces (Gaurnaurd 1954: 201). 
 
 The proclamation went on to say that the amnesty did not include ‘common 
crimes’ and that anyone found after this date with arms or disturbing the public 
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peace would be held “as if they had been committed in normal conditions of the 
country” (Gaunaurd 1954: 202-3). However, this was later to result in the release of 
what many felt were ‘common criminals’.  
 In its negotiations with Taft, the ‘Commission of Peace’ of the Liberals also 
proposed: 
 
A Municipal Law, in agreement with the precepts of the Constitution. 
An Electoral Law, which would guarantee the representation of the minority 
and stipulate that the work of the election would be verified under the 
direction of a neutral Electoral Board that would have at its service the 
Police who would regulate registration, scrutinise and declare the result of 
the elections. 
A Law of Employees, that would be regulated by the civil service law, and 
A Law reorganising and granting total independence to the Judicial Power 
(Gaunaurd 1954: 206). 
 
As has been seen, these issues had plagued Cuban political culture since the 
Constitutional Convention of 1900. They were a constant source of civil strife in 
1904-6, and were later the central concerns of the Institution of Veterans of 
Independence of 1911-12, as will be shown. Interestingly, the proposals of Emilio 
Núñez’s newly founded National Party included all of the above, but also suggested 
that those who had taken part in the rebellion should be replaced, with the exception 
of those in the armed forces (de Arce 1943: 314).  
In many ways, the personnel of the 1906 revolt represented generally the 
younger, and more militant members of the 1895-98 struggle and hence this 
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indicates a split in the Veterans’ organisation: many of the older veterans, Emilio 
Núñez, Manuel Sanguily etc., though they may have had many problems with the 
actions of Estrada Palma and electoral fraud, did not actively engage in physical 
revolt (apart from being too old of course). As mentioned, Manuel Alfonso Seijas 
was a member of the Institution of 1911-12, and yet he was founder of the Moderate 
Party that coalesced around Estrada Palma. Likewise, while Manuel Despaigne was 
a member of Estrada Palma’s ‘Fighting Cabinet’ at the time of the revolt and though 
he is not listed as a member of the Institution of 1911-12, he was Treasurer of the 
Association in 1923 (Cairo Ballester 1976: 102). Despaigne was one of those 
interviewed in March of 1924 by the New York Times as a representative of the 
Association. Later he was Assistant Secretary of State and Government under US 
occupation and headed the Cuban economic mission in Washington during the First 
World War (Pérez 1986: 210). He had also been Treaurer in US Ambassador 
Crowder’s ‘Honest Cabinet’ of 1922, as he was again under Ramón Grau San 
Martin in 1933  (Thomas 2001: 407). The revolt of 1906 was inspired by the 
younger group’s desire for patronage while the older veterans sought compromise 
and peace.  
One commentator observes: 
 
Taft thought that the stability of the neo-colonial system would depend upon 
the connections that must be established between property owners and 
politicians (Ibarra 1992: 69). 
 
However, a more important factor was probably how to occupy the veterans 
of the Liberation Army. US Governor Magoon’s public works programmes eased 
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some of this, but as has been seen, in many ways his actions legitimated and gave 
birth to new corruptions. Hence, all the major concerns of the revolutionaries of 
1906 remained unresolved, being reiterated again by the Institution of the Veterans 
of Independence of 1911-12.  
 
 
The Role of the Veterans’ organisations under the US Provisional Government 
 
 Despite the feeling of the Moderates that the US government was 
recognising the legitimacy of armed rebellion, in fact, Taft had expressed his 
feelings earlier that “nobody in the Liberals is fit to be President”, and, in a letter to 
US President Roosevelt, that the idea of recognising the Liberal revolutionaries as a 
government “makes me shiver…it is not a government…only an undisciplined 
horde of men under partisan leaders” (Thomas 2001: 280). The United States had 
little option but to grant the Liberals patronage, however, for fear more property 
would be destroyed, and this they did with the Liberal-dominated committee on 
governmental allocations and the placing of Pino Guerra as head of the new army.  
On 3 December 1906 US Governor Magoon issued Decree 206, which 
removed those Cubans elected to the Congress on 1 December 1905, and Senators 
elected on 16 March 1906, while those elected to the Senate on 24 February 1902 
and those elected to the Congress in 1904 would stay in their posts. Hence, it was 
only the actions of the Moderates and the President during 1905-06 that were 
deemed illegal. New elections to replace these politicians were set for 29 September 
1906 (Gaunaurd 1954: 212-13). 
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On 24 December 1906 Magoon issued Decree 284, which established the 
Consultative Commission (Viñalis 2002: 58). For the next two years from 3 January 
1907, the Consultative Commission would cooperate with the US Provisional 
Government in formulating laws prescribing the powers of the Executive, the 
judiciary, municipalities and provinces as well as a Civil Service Law, an Electoral 
Code and a Military Penal Code (Pichardo 1973: 294). It was presided over by US 
Colonel Enoch H. Crowder, and featured the Cubans Juan Gualberto Gómez, 
Erasmo Regüeiferos Boudet, Manual García Kohly, Rafael Montoro Valdés, Felipe 
González Serraín, Alfredo Zayas, Manual F. Viondi and the Americans Blanton P. 
Winship and Otto Schoenrich (Yglesia Martínez 1988: 81). A census was begun on 
29 April 1907 with Victor H. Olmstead as director (Gaunaurd 1954: 221). The main 
problem for the Commission however was that: 
 
the law of Cuba consisted of an immense rabbit warren of Spanish statues 
and customs, modified by various royal decrees in the nineteenth century, by 
various acts of the first US occupation and by some of Estrada Palma’s 
(Thomas 2001: 287).  
 
Also confusing was the ‘quotient’ that they proposed to adopt, whereby: 
 
[v]oters chose several candidates, numbering them in order of preference. 
The total of all valid votes cast would be divided by the number of places to 
be filled…Candidates with votes equal to or above the quotient were 
declared elected (Thomas 2001: 288).  
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According to Thomas, “Magoon did attempt in 1908 to establish a permanent 
civil service, though he could not create any tradition of behaviour for it.” However, 
a Civil Service Law was founded giving security of tenure, though it did apparently 
give preference to veterans. This law was promulgated on 11 January 1909 (Thomas 
2001: 285).  
Magoon’s Provisional Government is generally held to have been extremely 
corrupt and the initiator of new corruptions. According to Le Riverend, in Cuba “it 
is said that this regime began the botella”, (that is the allocation of public sinecure), 
because of the Provisional Government’s acceptance of the nominations of the 
Liberal Committee, but he points out, as does Thomas, that this practice existed 
under the Spanish colonial government (Le Riverend 1971: 93, Thomas 2001: 284-
5).  
In April 1908 there were arguments over recommendations for Civil 
Governorships, because they would have electoral control at the local level against 
the Executive power. The newly formed Conservative Party and the two Liberal 
factions each had their own favourites, selected from magistrates of local courts. 
Magoon assured the Cubans that all three parties were equally respected (Gaunaurd 
1954: 243-4).  
There were other sources of discord in the years of the Provisional 
Government. In January 1907 leading Liberals were arrested over funds made from 
illegal cock-fighting, namely: José Miguel Gómez, Pino Guerra, and the veterans 
José de J. Monteagudo and Carlos Mendieta (Ibarra 1992: 307).                        
In 1907 there was the ‘money strike’ by cigarworkers.  Oddly, the US Provisional 
Governor Magoon declared his support for the strike when he stated that their 
refusal to work was “a right which every free man possesses” (Thomas 2001: 290), 
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though this support no doubt came because the workers sought payment in US 
dollars, and the United States wished to see the dominance of this over the Spanish 
and French currencies then circulating (IHMCRSC 1981: 267). Indeed, the 
‘Presidents and Secretaries of the associations of workers in the whole island’, 
including those in construction, bakers, restaurant workers and metal workers wrote 
to Magoon during a strike by railroad workers calling on him to remedy: 
 
the anomalies which warn of, and which disturb the path of the good life and 
the relations of men in society. 
 
The letter went on to refer to precisely, the “legitimate right of free men” of 
the cigar workers for whom Magoon had proclaimed support, and further called for 
the amnesty of 33 workers illegally detained for meeting peacefully in the Workers’ 
Centre. An exorbitant bail of 2,000 Cuban pesos had been demanded for each 
incarcerated worker, which had been borrowed from the Cuban Bail Company. The 
authors of the letter felt that this set a dangerous precedent, as it meant that the 
courts did not give workers a fair hearing, as they were illegally imprisoning 
anybody against whom any accusations were made (IHMCRSC 1981: 275). As will 
be seen, the Veterans’ organisations were again to make political capital, for their 
own aim to reform the judiciary, out of the workers’ struggles against the courts. 
The United States’ authorities showed their true colours when, only a few months 
later in early 1908, strike breakers were employed against those seeking an eight-
hour day (Viñalis 2002: 62-63).  
On 2 August 1907 Salvador Cisneros Betancourt called a public meeting for 
all those interested in the destinies of the Cuban nation to discuss the fate of Cuba, 
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and on 10 October founded Junta Patriótica [Patriotic Assembly] and its journal La 
Estrella Solitaria, - the latter being the name of the journal of the liberation forces 
during the Ten Years War (Viñalis 2002: 63). Political factionalism continued in 
1907 with the formation of the Conservative Party, led by Menocal, that, “insisted it 
had no relation with the old Moderates” (Thomas 2001: 288). Others state that, 
while there was a small ‘Palmista’ element:  
 
those in favour of the replacement of the president in turn gathered 
themselves around Enrique José Varona, a figure little tainted by political 
activities, and with the element that had acted as mediator between the 
government and the liberals in 1906, largely that of Menocal, in order to 
form a party capable of rescuing what appeared to have been lost with the 
revolt of August: the capacity for a peaceful and respectful dialogue 
(Figarola 1974: 147). 
 
Varona had been Secretary of Finance under the US Provisional Governor 
Wood, and would later become Vice-president under Menocal and a fundamental 
influence upon Julio Antonio Mella at the University of Havana (Suchlicki 1988: 
290). The founders of the Conservative Party also included Rafael Montoro, an old 
Autonomist, Cuba’s foremost Hegelian philosopher, and a member of the 
Consultative Commission, as well as Emilio Núñez, who, until the Liberal revolt, 
had been Governor of Havana, merging his National Independent Party with the new 
Conservative Party (Gaunaurd 1954: 217). Núñez would be President of the 
Institution of Veterans of Independence in 1911-12. The Party also featured José 
 161
Antonio González Lanuza (de Arce 1943: 323) who had been Secretary of Justice 
and Education under US General Brooke (Thomas 2001: 245). The Party was: 
 
drawing together reactionaries, annexationists, pro-americans, old 
autonomists, integrationists, right-wing intellectuals, etc.,…whose roots were 
buried in the disintegration of the Moderates, converting itself into an 
oppositional party to the Liberals projecting itself as the party of order and 
culture (Viñalis 2002: 82). 
 
For their part, the Liberals had split again, between the followers of José 
Miguel Gómez, and those of Alfredo Zayas. The miguelista faction coalesced 
around a new Republican Party (Gaunaurd 1954: 217). In this context: 
 
The principal obstacle with which the administration battled, was the 
distribution of public positions; because, for each place, there were a 
hundred hopefuls, who each put forward an identical right to claim them 
(Gaunaurd 1954: 221). 
 
The Liberal factions of José Miguel Gómez and Alfredo Zayas fared poorly 
in the elections of August 1908, so they united before the elections proposed for 14 
November that year. Gómez was to win the leadership battle, because he had the 
support of the military veterans Piedra, Loynaz and Guerra (Figarola 1974: 155). A 
third faction led by Eusebio Hernández represented the old masoísta radicalism and 
had support amongst the working class because of his anarchist sympathies but less 
among the urban middle class (Ibarra 1992: 301). The miguelistas and zayistas  
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triumphed when their factions united with Gómez as President and Zayas as Vice-
president respectively, and power was granted to them on 28 January 1909. The 
Liberals had 51 Senators elected while the Conservatives had only 32.  
During the period 1909-11, it was the Conservative Party and its associates 
who were most closely linked to the Veterans’ organisations. This was largely 
because, while Gómez and Zayas had both been de facto veterans, they had taken 
their patronage networks with them to form the Republican Party and the Historical 
National Liberals respectively. According to Gaunaurd the zayista party called itself 
Liberal Nacional Histórico [Historic National Liberal] (Gaunaurd 1954: 243) while 
the miguelistas were the Partido Republicano [Republican Party] (Gaunaurd 1954: 
217). Strangely, Viñalis asserts that the miguelistas were known as Partdio Liberal 
Histórico [Historic Liberal Party] and the zayistas were the Partido Liberal Nacional 
[National Liberal Party] (Viñalis 2002: 84). What seems most likely is, that the 
miguelistas represented the federalist faction of Las Villas, while the network behind 
Zayas represented a more centralist tendency, perhaps many of them the old 
followers of Máximo Gómez. Not surprisingly, both factions sought to portray 
themselves as the ‘historic’ Liberal tendency.  
Patrimonial practices plagued Cuban politics, as these factions, once they 
united and took power, were to award places in both the national government and to 
public positions at the local level to their own clients, thus denying the Conservative 
faction power. Not surprisingly, with the triumph of Menocal’s Conservative Party, 
in 1913, many of the prominent Conservatives in the Veterans’ organisations, such 
as Emilio Núñez were temporarily appeased, and hence the movement declined as a 
force until the crisis of 1921 gave resurgence to nationalist ideals. Likewise, it is not 
surprising that prominent Liberals such as Ernesto Asbert, denied power due to 
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patrimonial networks after 1913 were to become involved with the Veterans’ 
organisations. In this way it appears that the Veterans’ organisations acted as a kind 
of dual patronage network and pressure group. While ostensibly ‘non-political’ the 
organisations were composed of personnel denied power in one way or another by 
incumbent administrations and represented an alternative patronage network 
offering hope to these individuals.  
 It was in this context of continued political factionalism and patrimonial 
practices that: 
 
A truly important meeting,…has taken place in the halls of the periodical La 
Discusión. Those present are trying to bring about the consolidation of the 
nascent and already strong Association of Veterans, established at the 
initiative of Mario Menocal and supported by the most honourable elements 
in Cienfuegos, Oriente and the capital. A great number of veterans, already 
organised and arriving from different areas of the Island, came to this place 
with the object of exchanging ideas and to try to bring about the realisation 
of this patriotic project (Secades Japón 1912: 26). 
  
 Present at this meeting, amongst others, were: 
 
Generals Carlos García Vélez, Rafael de Cárdenas, Manuel Alfonso, 
Colonels Antolín Martínez, Orencio Nodarse, Ignacio Almagro, Mario Díaz, Aurelio 
Hevia, Manuel María Coronado, José Clemente Vivanco, Luis de Cárdenas, Eulogio 
Sardiñas y Roig, and also “other numerous chiefs, officials,…and soldiers”, such as 
Alberto de Cárdenas, Colonel Manuel Piedra, Captain Antonio Bolet, General 
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Armando Sánchez Agramonte, Colonel Lucás Alvarez Cerice, Commander Cruz 
Muñoz, and Manuel Secades Japón. Those in attendance then democratically 
appointed a provisional committee composed of Carlos García Vélez, Rafael de 
Cárdenas and Orencio Nodarse (Secades Japón 1912: 27). During the War of 
Independence Rafael de Cárdenas was a Division General while Armando Sánchez 
Agramonte and García Vélez himself had been Brigadier Generals 
(www.cubagenweb.org/mil/mambi/corps.htm).  
This then, was the first instance of the ‘Association of Veterans’. It declared 
itself to be a direct descendant of both the Junta de Veteranos of Menocal, which 
acted as a mediator during the 1906 revolt, as well as of local veterans’ clubs. The 
most interesting aspect, however, is the personnel. Clearly García Vélez and 
Menocal were the most prominent políticos of the movement (though also 
themselves authentic military veterans). Sánchez Agramonte was present with 
Menocal during the mediation with Estrada Palma and he would later become Chief 
of Police in Havana. Manuel María Coronado was later to be the director of the 
periodical La Discusión (Roig de Leuchsenring 1974: 104), which would be a 
mouthpiece for the Veterans’ movement, and he was also a member of the 
Institution of 1911-12, as were Aurelio Hevia, Eulogio Sardiñas and Manuel 
Secades Japón. Hevia was to become a Conservative politician, and his son Carlos 
participated in the Gibara uprising of 1931 (Thomas 2001: 415), and was briefly 
president in 1934. Orencio Nodarse had been a member of the Council of 
Government (Ibarra 1992: 423).  
In terms of personnel what is more conspicuous was those who were absent: 
General Demetrio Castillo Duany, Manuel Lazo, Enrique Loynaz del Castillo, 
Manuel Alfonso Seijas, Agustín Cebreco and José J. Sánchez. These were all 
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prominent military rebels in 1906 and also of the members of the Institution of 
1911-12. Clearly however, these men were happy enough with their positions after 
the revolt not to attend this meeting. Manuel Alfonso Seijas was the founder of the 
Moderates, who supported Estrada Palma, and no doubt returned to politics as usual. 
Castillo Duany was to achieve prominence in the Liberal Party under Menocal and 
Zayas and was perhaps busy working towards this goal, while Manuel Lazo had 
been a Liberal who had resigned in 1906 and returned to his post.  
What is clear is that those personnel present at the meeting were veterans 
who had failed to achieve patronage in the new regime. García Vélez and Castillo 
Duany obviously consolidated their Liberal careers with the intervention of 1906-9, 
when they became part of the Committee advising Magoon on the allocation of 
governmental positions, which also featured other políticos who flirted with the 
Veterans’ organisations: notably Zayas and Ernesto Asbert. While políticos such as 
García Vélez and Menocal maintained their connections with the Veterans’ 
organisations even while they exercised real positions of power (though this was no 
doubt to maintain their own patronage networks), others obviously felt no need to be 
active in the movement when they were given a place in the administration 
somewhere. This perhaps explains why many of the personnel present at this 
foundational meeting of the Association of Veterans are largely unknown to Cuban 
historiography. It is clear that access to political power usually flowed hierarchically 
downward in line with past military rank, and those with a higher rank were more 
likely to have participated in the rebellion, or had been granted patronage in the 
Liberal Party, or the administration established by Magoon. Also clear is that this 
Association of Veterans did not successfully achieve the hoped for consolidation 
into a ‘patriotic project’ at this time. 
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The Veterans’ organisations in the years 1909-11 
 
The inauguration of the miguelista-zayista coalition did not put an end to the 
role of the Veterans’ organisations as a patriotic pressure group and patronage 
network. In early 1909, the Association of Cuban Revolutionary Emigrés published 
a pamphlet calling for Cubans to fight political corruption, and adherence to the 
platform of the Cuban Revolutionary Party and the Manifesto of Montecristi 
(Viñalis 2002: 65). On 14 February 1909 at the Hotel Telégrafo in Havana, a “unión 
de los Veteranos en toda la isla, como Institución Patriótica y Benéfica” [union of 
the Veterans in all of the island as a Patriotic and Benevolent Institution], was 
proposed with the following present: Generals Salvador Cisneros, Enrique Collazo 
and Enrique Loynaz del Castillo, Colonels Cosme de la Torriente, Manual Aranda, 
José D’Estrampes and Nazario R. Feo, Lieutenant Colonels Miguel Zaldivar, and 
Avelino Sanjenís, Commanders Benjamín Sánchez Agramonte, Caspar N. 
Betancourt and Ramón Cordovés and Captain Felipe Alberty (Secades Japón 1912: 
33). Also present were Lieutenant Colonel Alfredo Nodarse and Sublieutenant José 
M. Carbonell  (de Arce 1943: 338). 
Manuel Aranda presented a motion that suggested: 
 
First: That an opportunity has arisen to bring together various comrades in 
this place in order that they may exchange ideas. 
Second: That those gathered here will discuss firstly if it will be convenient 
to establish a formal nationwide union of all the Veterans. 
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Third: Given that political life is divided between those veterans who are 
content and those who are not, we will search for a means to reconcile their 
differences so that a union will be possible. 
Fourth: We present the warm welcome that we have always offered previous 
governments, asking of the new President that he does not commit the same 
errors as them, and hope that he will offer us his support, that he will 
recognise the constitution of the Centres of Veterans as a necessary patriotic 
institution. 
Fifth: That a commission will be named to ask President Gómez if it will be 
possible that those Veterans who have been removed will be returned to their 
posts or to similar positions.  
…Seventh: While it is a certain that the Constitution does not establish 
personal privileges, no one can deny the necessity of the Government to 
support those men who knew how to make this country free, because they 
will know how to sustain peace and defend the Republic (de Arce 1943: 338-
9). 
 
Here then, in 1909, was another attempt to establish a national Veterans’ 
body. Also alluded to was a ‘division’ between veterans who are ‘content’ and those 
who are not. More interesting is the change in personnel. Salvador Cisneros 
Betancourt (the Marquis de Santa Lucía) was linked to the rebellion of 1851 and had 
been imprisoned in Spain for this. He was a leader of the 1868 rebellion in Yara, 
becoming President of the Chamber of Representatives during the War and 
succeeding Carlos Manuel de Céspedes as President of the rebel government in 
1873-5. After José Martí’s death he was voted President of the same body until the 
 168
end of the independence struggle. After 1898 he was in the Constitutional Assembly 
at Guaímaro and participated in the national Constitutional Convention of 1901 
(Suchlicki 1988: 62). His government during the Ten Years War was, “composed 
exclusively of planters” (Thomas 2001: 155) and he was very much a político, not a 
military man.  
Enrique Collazo fought in the Ten Years War as an aide to Máximo Gómez 
and in the War of Independence with Calixto García. After 1902 he was elected to 
the House of Representatives (Suchlicki 1988: 66). He was also the founder of the 
Democratic Union (Figarola 1974: 325-6).  
As mentioned earlier Enrique Loynaz del Castillo was a rebel of 1906 and a 
member of the Institution of 1911-12 and the Association of 1923-24. 
 Cosme de la Torriente was perhaps the most significant member of the 
movement. During the War of Independence he served under Calixto García and 
Máximo Gómez. During the US occupation he was Magistrate of the Provincial 
Courts, and later a diplomat in Spain. He held the positions of General Secretary, 
Vice-president, and eventually President of the Conservative Party. In 1918 he 
became a Senator and, under President Menocal, he was the first Cuban Secretary of 
State. He was, along with Carlos Mendieta, a founder member of the Unión 
Nacionalista [Nationalist Union] that opposed Machado’s monopoly of political 
power. He was later to go on to oppose Batista (Pérez 1991: 294, Suchlicki 1988: 
276).  
While Sánchez Agramonte had been a Brigade General, Aranda, 
D’Estrampes, Feo, Zaldivar, Sanjenís, Caspar N. Betancourt, Cordovés and Alberty 
are largely absent from the historiography mentioning the Veterans’ movement as 
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they were below the Division General or Brigade General level.41 No doubt they 
were the veterans who felt discontent.  It can be seen that the políticos of the higher 
levels were beginning to manipulate this nationalist discontent of the rank-and-file 
veterans as a means of gaining a political following for those otherwise, or 
temporarily, unaligned in the patronage networks of the political parties after 1906. 
While the main concern of the veterans in 1906, as with all complainants, had been 
re-election, in 1909 the veterans began to concern themselves with public 
administration appointees.   
In 1909 the Junta Patriótica [Patriotic Assembly] of Havana was formed by 
Salvador Cisneros Betancourt. He declared the organisation to be in search of 
‘absolute independence or death’ and sought to resurrect the content of the PRC 
programme of the years 1895-98, as the Junta Patriótica felt that none of the political 
parties represented the principles of the institution created by Martí. The other major 
concern of the Junta Patriótica was US economic penetration of Cuba (Viñalis 2002: 
121). At the same time, the veteran Manuel Piedra criticised the corruption of the 
Arsenal lands and Cuban Ports Company contracts, (which involved lucrative 
contracts being awarded to private firms with members of the government as share-
holders), in La Discusión (Viñalis 2002: 122). The Junta Patriótica proposed a 
“Great Cuban Revolutionary Party”, which would inaugurate a “vast plan of 
reform”, claiming that the government of Gómez had resulted in a “circle with the 
same problems” (Secades Japón 1912: 42). At this time however, these reforms were 
not forthcoming. 
                                                          
41 For Liberation Army ranks, see www.cubagenweb.org/mil/mambi/corps.htm 
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On 29 January 1910, Salvador Cisneros Betancourt and Cosme de la 
Torriente addressed a letter from ‘The Veterans of Independence to the People of 
Cuba’. This stated that: 
 
It is true that the Constitution establishes that all Cubans are equal before the 
Law and that the Republic does not recognise personal privileges or 
positions, but equally subject to the law is the fact that Congress cannot be 
prevented from its power to legislate with a sense of exclusion certain 
Cubans from the exercise of certain rights or that the Government and the 
Courts can recognise some rights and privileges that they will not be able to 
grant to other Cubans (Secades Japón 1912: 52). 
 
This was the first example of the Veterans of Independence explicitly 
expressing the desire that the government use its power as a vehicle of 
‘Cubanisation’: to grant patronage to native Cubans by privileging them over 
Spanish public employees.  Or at least, over those Cubans who had sympathised, 
sided with, or fought for the Spanish during the War of Independence. In any case, 
there is no doubt that these people were the ‘certain Cubans’ alluded to.42  
On 2 July 1910 a statement from the Veterans of Independence signed by 
Salvador Cisneros Betancourt and Cosme de la Torriente criticised the government 
over the Arsenal lands and Villanueva railway projects for giving these contracts to 
US interests (Secades Japón 1912b: 85). On 25 July 1910 Manuel Aranda addressed 
an open letter to President Gómez rhetorically asking: 
                                                          
42 Apparently many native Cubans had served as “irregular gangs” and “guerrillas” 
for the Spanish Army (Collazo 1967: vi).  
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 How can you govern well, if in your government, the majority of those 
employed are traitors to the nation? How can you govern well, if the only 
Cuban newspaper that defends and applauds you is directed and administered 
by traitors? How can you govern well, if there is not a single guerrilla in this 
Republic who is not content…? (Secades Japón 1912b: 86). 
 
By the middle of 1910 then, with continued political corruption under the 
new regime, calls for Cubanisation of the administration were growing. Clearly 
associations, institutions, and groupings of veterans consisted of different factions 
themselves. Salvador Cisneros Betancourt had always been a político: very much 
involved in the civil aspects of the revolutionary struggle and revolutionary 
government. Enrique José Varona, Mario García Menocal, and even Emilio Núñez 
were all Conservatives and held important positions of power in the national 
government, at least would do after Menocal’s election as president in 1913. On the 
other hand, Enrique Loynaz Castillo, José J. Monteagudo, Carlos García Vélez 
himself, Manual Aranda, Manual Lazo and others were not only military veterans, 
but also 1906 revolutionaries. Others, few in number, such as Demetrio Castillo 
Duany (Chief of Prisons under Menocal), were veterans, revolutionaries and 
politicos at the same time. 
The Veterans’ organisations openly sought to portray themselves as the 
authentic voice of Cuban nationalism, highlighting grievances and political 
corruptions in the republic and acting as a supposedly politically neutral mediator. 
However, the various organisations were dominated by different individuals and 
leaders (despite their assertions to the contrary), sometimes políticos, sometimes 
military men, sometimes Conservatives, sometimes Liberals, sometimes those who 
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already held important positions in local or national government, sometimes those 
who did not. These groupings at times played on workers’ grievances also, but 
purely for their own ends, as a means of pressing their political agenda.  
These aims revolved chiefly around the Cubanisation of public positions, 
with the hope of establishing a civil service that was permanently selective in 
nominations of veterans. While this element of their nationalism was certainly 
authentic (the organisations were composed, after all, of native or naturalised 
Cubans who had served honourably in the Liberation Army), their vision of a 
politically ideal republic was biased very much in favour of certain political goals: 
the reform of the judiciary (specifically the ending of presidential appointments), 
amnesty for the rebels of 1906, and the establishment of the aforementioned bias in 
public appointees. The Veterans’ organisations, however, were dominated by the 
Cuban-born bourgeoisie, those who had lost property and holdings with the end of 
slavery and the destruction of large parts of the economy during war-time, and they 
therefore sought positions of wealth in the only institution left open to them: the 
Cuban state.  
Clearly each new crisis in Cuban affairs brought the Veterans further 
disillusionment, whether that was the strikes in 1902 and 1907, the revolt of 1906, 
the US Provisional Government, or the continuing corruptions under José Miguel 
Gómez. Indeed, apart from Zayas himself, no important members of the Veterans’ 
organisations gained patronage at the level of national government.43  
                                                          
43 The cabinet under José Miguel Gómez consisted of: Marcelino Díaz de Villegas, 
Luis Octavio Diviñó, Matías Duque Perdomo, Nicolás Alberdi Golzarri, Benito 
Lagueruela Rubio, Justo García Vélez, Ortelio Foyo Portal, Ramón Meza and 
Suárez Inclán (Viñalis 2002: 102). None of these names appear in the Veterans’ 
organisations. 
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In 1913, with the election of Menocal, many members of the Veterans’ 
organisations achieved real power and patronage as the faction that coalesced 
around him contained many of the same individuals. However, even this was not to 
satisfy many of the personnel involved in the Veterans’ organisations who carried on 
using the movement as a vehicle of nationalism and patronage. This will be looked 
at in the next chapter. For now, the protest of 1911-12 must be looked at in detail, 
both to see how the Veterans’ organisations were partly appeased in the years 1911-
13, but also the continuity of their protest and the grievances left unresolved.  
  
 
The Institution of Veterans of Independence of 1911-12 
 
Clearly, the various Veterans’ organisations remained closely tied to political 
parties at both the local and national level throughout the republican period. It is also 
clear that these organisations were very much a kind of ‘front’, utilised, and even 
manipulated, to pressurise those in power to grant power to those without it. 
However, many of the personnel were in fact previously members of, or later to gain 
positions of prominence in, both regional and national government. Moreover it is 
clear that within the Veterans’ organisations themselves there were varying factions: 
those close to Menocal, Núñez and the Conservatives, those close to the Liberal 
revolutionaries of 1906, and those close to Salvador Cisneros Betancourt and his 
followers.  
Two factors gave rise to the prominence of the Institution of Veterans in 
1911-12. The failure of the Gómez government to either end political corruption or 
Cubanise the civil service meant that the aims of the various Veterans’ organisations 
(as well as a large percentage of the Cuban population) continued to be frustrated. 
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Two years after the end of the US occupation nationalist feelings ran as high as they 
did in 1906, as the second republic established after US interventions failed to 
deliver. Frustration with the Liberals’ brand of nationalism meant that the Veterans’ 
organisations were again to acquire, and indeed change, personnel based on who 
achieved patronage and who did not.  
Linked to this political corruption, but in truth a factor in the resurgence of 
nationalism itself, was the continued neo-colonial role of US corporate interests in 
the Cuban economy. The scandals of the Arsenal lands and the Cuban Ports 
Company, the muzzling of the press by Orestes Ferrara’s ‘national defence’ law, the 
death of Rural Guard Captain Manuel Lavastida and the planned rebellion by 
General Vicente Miniet all played a part in the resurgence of nationalist revolt.  
In their opening statement ‘To the people of Cuba’, the Veterans spoke of a 
“great movement of national consciousness agitating Cuban society” (Pichardo 
1973: 358). In the light of the corrupt politics of the era, and the failure of a real 
independence to emerge under the tutelage of the United States and the Platt 
Amendment, the Veterans claimed to be the legitimate heirs of this consciousness. 
They invoked José Martí’s promise of a ‘Republic with all and for the good of all’.  
In this context, from the inauguration of the Republic in 1902, until the 
beginnings of dictatorship with the election of Machado in 1924, there was a 
considerable convergence of anti- US feeling between políticos, students, radicals, 
militant workers, and Liberation Army veterans, which coalesced around the 
Veterans’ organisations. All had united around the banner of national liberation, and 






The National Council of Veterans was a democratic, constitutional 
organisation, structured much like a political party. Chapter 1, Article 1, of the 
Regulations of the Institution of Veterans of Independence declared that:  
 
The object of this institution, to be called, The Veterans of Independence, 
will be to work in peace for the realisation and consolidation of the Republic 
of Cuba, to preserve the memory of the glorious martyrs and great 
achievements of the Independence movement, to ensure help for those who 
personally took part in the struggle, and for their widows and orphans, and to 
promote the instruction and progress of the Cuban people (Secades Japón 
1912: 2). 
 
The term ‘realisation’ perhaps hints at the disgruntlement of the Veterans 
with the contemporary political background.  
The Council consisted of a General Assembly which met on 12 August every 
three years, a Territorial Assembly which met every two years on 24 February, and a 
Local Assembly that came together once a year on 10 October.44 Its avowed aim, 
according to Article 5, was to protect all those who had taken part in the Revolution, 
with emphasis upon the families who had lost lives and their orphans (Secades 
Japón 1912: 1-12) 
                                                          
44 The dates are significant: the first being the date of the official ceasefire in 1898, 
the second being the launching by Martí of the final successful campaign against 
Spanish rule, and the last being the anniversary of the Grita de Baire which began 
the independence struggle.  
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The Council had a top-down, hierarchical structure. The “supreme authority 
of the Institution” resided in the General Assembly, whose agreements would be 
executed by the General Council. Below the General Assembly, the, “superior 
authority in the territory will reside in a Territorial Assembly” whose Territorial 
Council “will resolve with executive force all issues related to the Institution in the 
territory”. Below the Territorial Assembly was the Local Council which “will also 
resolve with executive force, all issues which effect the Institution in the locality and 
its jurisdiction”. 
 The General Assembly was composed of a delegate from each Local 
Council, and, if the membership of a local assembly exceeded 500, then it would be 
split and each half would vote upon a delegate to the council. The Territorial 
Assembly was formed in the same way. The Assemblies were presided over by the 
Presidents of the Councils. If these individuals were also delegates, they would have 
the right to vote in both Assemblies. The Secretaries of the Assemblies however, 
could only vote as delegates. In order for the General Assembly to enact an 
agreement, it would be necessary for more than half of the delegates or ‘long-
standing and honourable members’ to be present. If they were not, the President 
would convoke a second meeting that would deliberate for 60 days in the case of a 
General meeting, 30 for a Territorial one and 15 for a local one.  
 The ‘long-standing and honourable members’ could only vote in the local 
assemblies, but they were eligible to be Honorary President of the Local Councils, 
directors of Territorial Assemblies and delegates of the General Assembly. Although 
they need not have been members of the Veterans’ organisation, they had to have 
fought for the revolutionary camp. The General Council would reside in the same 
city as the national government, and it would be composed of delegates elected by 
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each Territorial Council. The General Council would direct the Institution and the 
positions of delegate would last for three years, from 15 December. The Council 
would be responsible for the Territorial elections. The President, Secretary and 
Treasurer of the General Council would be designated by secret ballot. Councillors 
would be replaced upon death, resignation, absence, or disagreement with the 
judgements of the Council. Replacements would come from the appropriate 
Territorial or Local Councils, but those empowered in this way would serve only 
briefly until new elections could be held (Articles 10-24, Secades Japón 1912: 2-17). 
 The Presidents of the Council would sign and authorise documents given by 
the Council, and lead the discussions and execute the resolutions of the Council. The 
Secretaries kept the minutes book during the meetings of the Councillors in session, 
recorded the votes that they made, as well as keeping a record of all the payments 
made by the President. The Local Council Secretaries kept a record of all members 
of the organisation and the military or civilian status they had held in the 
revolutionary camp. 
 After the General and provincial Councils were formed, only they could vote 
for the delegates to the Assemblies corresponding to these Councils, with the 
exception of the Local Assemblies, where the Local Council had more than one year 
of office. When voting for more than one Councillor or more than one delegate of a 
Council, in an Assembly, each elector would vote for both in the same ballot. Until 
the election of Territorial Councils, the Local Council based in the capital of that 
territory would carry out territorial functions, and when there was sufficient number 
the Territorial Councils would be elected. When the majority of the Territorial 
Councils were formed they would elect the General Council. The first meeting of the 
Local Councils was on 10 October 1899, the first meeting of the Territorial Councils 
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on 10 April 1900, and the first meeting of the General Council was on 15 December 





The most concise list of the personnel of the National Council of Veterans is 
given in La Ultima Hora on 7 December 1911 (Appendix I). Núñez had been 
Governor of Havana, and founder of the Conservative Party by merging his National 
Independent Party with it as noted previously. He became Secretary of Agriculture 
during Menocal’s first presidency and Vice-president during his second. His relative 
success politically, was mainly because of his position within the Conservative 
Party.  
Manuel Lazo was a revolutionary in 1906. Manuel Secades Japón had been 
present at the meeting in the halls of La Discusión when an ‘association’ of veterans 
had been proposed. Manual Aranda had been present at the meeting of 14 February 
1909 at the Hotel Telégrafo, and it was he who had dictated the proposal to 
Cubanise the administration.  
As noted earlier, Enrique Loynaz del Castillo was likewise a participant in 
the rebellion of 1906 and during the government of Machado a participant in the 
rebellion against his regime on 12 August 1933. As noted earlier he was present at 
the meeting at the Hotel Telégrafo in 1909. 
Juan E. Ducassi attempted a minor uprising during 1907 (Chapman 1927: 
257). José Miró Argenter was Antonio Maceo’s Chief of Staff during the War of 
Independence, and afterwards the Director of the Archives of the Army of 
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Liberation. He founded the periodicals La Doctrina, El Liberal and Vida Militar 
(Suchlicki 1988: 190). Agustín Cebreco was a rebel of 1906, and was a founder of 
the Partido Nacional Cubano [Cuban National Party] a representative for Oriente, 
and a prominent Conservative (Figarola 1974: 319).45 
Pedro Díaz Molina was a delegate for Pinar del Río (Figarola 1974: 319). 
Hugo Robert was Chief of Sanitation for the Rural Guard (Figarola 1974: 330). 
Francisco Carrilo Morales was a provincial Governor of Oriente and would go on to 
become Vice-president of the republic in 1921 and 1925 (Figarola 1974: 319). José 
Fernández de Castro was three times representative for Oriente, twice Vice-
president of the House and also Mayor of Bayamo (Figarola 1974: 326). Francisco 
de P. Valienete was Official of the Rural Guard and later President of the National 
Council of Veterans (Figarola 1974: 331). Carlos González Clavel was a 
Congressman and Senator (Figarola 974: 327). José Manuel Capote was Mayor of 
Las Villas (Figarola 1974: 319). Javier de la Vega was President of the Council of 
Veterans in Camgüey (Figarola 1974: 324). Pedro E. Betancourt was a physician 
trained in the United States and was imprisoned in Spain for his part in the 1895 
uprsising in Manatanzas. He escaped and joined another expedition to Cuba in 1896. 
He represented Mantanzas in the Santa Cruz Assembly and in the Constituent 
Assembly of 1901 and was later a Senator and Minister of Agriculture (Suchlicki 
1988: 27). General Remigio Marrero was a representative and inspector of 
woodlands and mines (Figarola 1974: 328). Alejandro Rodríguez was a Mayor of 
Havana and Head of the Rural Guard (Figarola 1974: 323). Clearly all of these men 
were powerful políticos who already held positions of power in the regime, or would 
go on to do so.  
                                                          
45 He was one of the few non-white Conservatives.  
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 Lopez Recio Loynaz was Governor of Camagüey and a businessman 
(Figarola 1974: 323), Marianao Torres was a land owner (Figarola 1974: 324), 
Pedro A. Pérez was a Mayor of Guantánamo and a land owner (Figarola 1974: 320). 
Francisco Estrada was a Customs Inspector for Manzanillo and a farm owner 
(Figarola 1974: 322), Luis de Feria was an inspector of woodlands and mines and a 
farm owner (Figarola 1974: 322), José Rogelio Castillo was to become Inspector 
General of prisons (Figarola 1974: 321), Maximiliano Ramos was an inspector of 
woodlands and mines, and a co-founder of three parties: the Republican Party, the 
Moderates, and the Conservatives (Figarola 1974: 329), Vicente Miniet was an 
administrator of the postal service in Santiago de Cuba and a shrewd businessman 
(Figarola 1974: 328), as well as leader of a potential conspiracy in July 1912 
(Thomas 2001: 305). Pedro Vásquez was a representative of the House and on a 
commission as inspector of the countryside (Figarola 1974: 324), Francisco Leyte 
Vidal was a Mayor of Marianao and President of the House of Representatives 
(Figarola 1974: 322), Víctor Ramos was a landowner (Figarola 1974: 329), Tomás 
Padró Griñán was a mayor of Santiago de Cuba and director of the National 
Laboratory (Figarola: 329), Pedro Ivonet was active with Evaristo Estenoz in the 
foundation of the Independent Party of Colour and was arrested for this in April 
1910 (Thomas 2001: 308). Alberto Nodarse was a Representative and a Senator and 
was a tobacco and agricultural business owner (Figarola 1974: 323); Daniel Gispert 
was a doctor and became Secretary of Health (Figarola 1974: 327). Clearly then, the 
Institution of Veterans also included many members of the criollo bourgeoisie, who 
no doubt hoped to use the movement as a means to ensure economic dominance for 
native born Cubans by utilising the state as a means of Cubanisation.  
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  Manuel María Coronado and Aurelio Hevia had both been present at the 
meeting in the halls of La Discusión that announced the emergence of the 
Association of Veterans. Manuel Sanguily fought in the Ten Years War, and he later 
wrote for Varona’s magazine Revista Cubana. He was a General with his brother 
Julio in the Western provinces in the War of Independence (Thomas 2001: 173). 
Later he became a member of the Assembly of Santa Cruz, a member of the 
Constitutional Convention for Havana in 1901, Director of the Institute of Havana, 
President of the Senate, Secretary of State under José Miguel Gómez and Inspector-
General of the Armed Forces under Menocal (Suchlicki 1988: 254-5).  
Carlos Mendieta was Inspector of Health under the Provisional Government 
of 1902. He was a representative in the House of Congress in 1908, 1912 and 1916. 
He was Zayas’s Vice-president in 1916 (Thomas 2001: 418), participated in the 
rebellion of 1917 (Thomas 2001: 318), in 1927 he helped found the Nationalist 
Union (Pérez: 269), and in 1931 he was Menocal’s second in command in his 
uprising against Machado (Thomas 2001: 360). In 1934 he became Batista’s first 
‘puppet’ President, suspending constitutional guarantees (Thomas 2001: 427), and 
resigned in 1936 “an honest man among thieves” (Thomas 2001: 435).  
José Clemento Vivanco and Manuel Piedra had been present at the meeting 
at La Discusión. Ernesto Asbert was a Governor of Havana at one time a miguelista 
and later a follower of Menocal (Thomas 2001: 305).  Captain Oscar Soto y 
Calderón was to become Secretary General of the Association of Veterans in 1923.  
In some sense, then, the Veterans’ claims to be ‘non-political’ were true. 
Featuring Conservatives, Liberals and Moderates, it is easy to accept this claim on 
the surface, that the Institution was simply a ‘benevolent’ and ‘patriotic’ association. 
Clearly, however, any organisation that contained such a broad cross-section of the 
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upper-echelons of the Cuban political class, provincial governors and economic 
advisors, figures close to actual and future presidents, is unlikely, in fact, to be ‘non-
political’. Internally, the Veterans’ organisations, like the political parties 
mentioned, were mired in factionalism, and, as discussed earlier, these factions 
could easily re-emerge: that of the young men of 1895 and the Liberal 
revolutionaries of 1906, those of Menocal, Núñez and the Conservatives, and those 
of civilian políticos seeking to utilise the organisation as a constituency of political 
support (though figures such as Salvador Cisneros are absent from this list of 1911). 
Locally and nationally these factions may have sub-divided and merged, 
based on the patronage networks linked to, or even formally elaborated in, the 
political parties. In the background however, the Veterans’ organisations retained 
the claim to a detached and non-political expression of authentic nationalism 
periodically ‘betrayed’ by these political parties, and hence, individuals could return 
to these organisations and reject their party connections as they saw fit, if new 
allegiances were necessary to gain patronage in the administrative networks.  
 
 
The Veterans’ protest of 1911-12 
 
 The most notable of the Veterans’ protests contained in current 
historiography is that of late 1911. On 5 September “the veterans launched a full-
scale attack on the Spanish sympathizers and Spaniards who had remained in the 
civil service since before 1895” (Thomas 2001: 305). On 10 October the Association 
of Veterans and the Junta Patriótica joined forces, writing to the press to criticise the 
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administration (Viñalis 2002: 129). On 28 October they submitted their letter ‘To 
the People of Cuba’ (Pichardo 1973: 358).  
 On 11 November the Government complied with the Veterans’ demands, at 
least on the issue of the Civil Service Law. The ‘presentations of the Government 
and of the Veterans’ declared the following:  
 
FIRST When it is accepted that it is convenient, there will be an immediate 
and effective purge of personnel who serve in the public positions of the 
Nation, in order to assure, once and for all, that these same posts are 
occupied by Cubans of honest history. 
SECOND In order to attain this end, all legal means will be employed to 
remove from important positions in the Central Administration, those 
functionaries whom, it can demonstrated took up arms against the cause of 
Independence, in whichever of the separatist wars, who would not have been 
reinstated if the revolution had triumphed… 
SIXTH Wage-earning and day-labourer public employees will be excluded 
from the previous clauses, as will be those employees of the National 
Executive whose salary does not exceeded $1,000-00 per annum in Havana 
or $6,00-00 in the provinces; instead, preference will be given, in order to 
cover these posts, in equality of circumstances, to those Cubans referred to in 
the first clause (Secades Japón 1912: 71). 
 
The signatories to these presentations were F. López Leúva, Ignacio 
Ramirez, Jesús M. Barraqué, Manuel Sanguily, and Gerardo Machado.  
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What is most interesting is the sixth clause: while the Institution of Veterans 
declared themselves ‘non-political’ and were supposedly a democratic organisation, 
responsible to its rank and file, clearly there was a firm control for definite aims at 
the top of the organisation, the number of veterans earning $1,000 per annum in 
Havana or $600 in the provinces, no doubt being a very small fraction. It must have 
been purely coincidental that ‘Cubans of honest history’ were those on the higher 
end of the public payroll. In fact this is symptomatic of the personnel and purpose of 
the Institution of Veterans: a patronage network of high-level políticos, provincial 
governors, even shadow cabinet ministers and presidents and vice-presidents of the 
parties in opposition.  
While the government did comply with the Veterans’ demands, the major 
concern of those who questioned this was the ‘retroactive’ effect of suspension of 
the Civil Service Law and of any new law that would take its place. The Civil 
Service Law itself related to the protection of public appointees and guaranteed their 
‘immovability’ (presumably excepting gross misconduct and corruption, at least 
theoretically). Many did not oppose the principle of Cubanisation of the civil service 
when the demand for it inevitably came, though they hoped that the temporary 
suspension of the Civil Service Law that protected these workers would only apply 
to new appointees to public positions.  
This was not the hope of the Veterans however. For them the Republic had 
been corrupt since its inception because of the US intervention that had protected 
Spaniards due to the liquidation of the forces of Cuba Libre. They sought to oust 
those who had remained in power since before 1895, attempting a wholesale 
redistribution of public positions to Cubans of ‘honest history’, which would be 
made possible by the removal of all Spanish or pro-Spanish sympathisers. Indeed, 
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this was the explicit aim of their campaign. The problem here was that Article 12 of 
the Cuban Constitution stated that ‘no law shall have retroactive effect’, with the 
certain exception of creating amnesty laws for prisoners.  
The first Civil Service Law had been implemented in 1909 as a product of 
Magoon’s attempts to establish stable government. According to this: 
 
The Civil Service Law, in the second of its provisional regulations 
establishes that, the functionaries and employees at that date, the first of July 
1909 who find themselves in possession of these posts, will be considered 
immovable and they can only be removed from these same positions by the 
methods and in the form established in said law (Administrative Gazette 15 
December 1911, Secades Japón 1912: 145). 
 
This law applied to public employees who had been in place since before 
1895, including those who had fought for or collaborated with Spanish forces and 
volunteers. Not only did the Veterans seek the suspension of this law, but they also 
wanted this suspension to have retroactive effect, i.e., in order to enable the removal 
of those who had been in their positions since before 1895.  
When the demands of the Veterans were debated in the House of 
Representatives, Orestes Ferrara and the Conservatives suggested suspending the 
Civil Service Law for only six months in a proposed amendment. For their part, ‘the 
amendment of the zayistas’ including Cuellar del Rio and Campos Marquetti also 
proposed a suspension for only six months. Suspension of the Civil Service Law was 
approved, by a vote of 36 to 22. However, the Senate modified it so that Article I 
declared:  
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 For a period of 18 months, all the laws which guarantee the immovability of 
public functionaries and employees will be suspended, with reference to the 
part of said law which guarantees this immovability (Regulation for the 
execution of the Law of 13 December 1911, Secades Japón 1912: 145). 
 
The implementation of this process of Cubanisation was granted to the 
President of Cuba with Article II that stated: 
 
The Executive will dictate the regulations necessary for compliance with this 
Law (Secades Japón 1912: 145). 
 
 The same Regulation recognised the partisan nature of Cuban politics and 
the potential for patrimonial abuses when it went on to state:  
 
It is not the wish of the Executive that this Law will allow itself to be used in 
its hands as a weapon against the political parties, authorised as it is in order 
to remove liberally from public positions, those employees to whom the Law 
today offers no protection. It is hoped that, on the contrary, it will assure the 
most absolute guarantee to the political parties and give the functionaries of 
all classes the most complete security, whose posts will be respected 




It is not surprising, in light of the practices of patronage and patrimonialism 
in the political parties studied in the preceding chapters, that the President felt the 
need to give these assurances to the parties. After all, this was an historic moment: 
the government and the Veterans’ organisation collaborating to inaugurate an 
authentic Cubanisation of the state. Given the failure of the first four years of Cuban 
government (of 1902-6), itself pre-dated by a compromised independence, any 
governmental proposals had to be held up to the light for fear of corruption. All 
those public appointees, to whom the new Law did not refer, namely those who had 
not fought against independence and who did not earn the salaries stated, would 
remain in place.  
Article IV of the new legislation proposed: 
 
A Commission will be named that will be composed of an individual from 
the Conservative Party, another from the Liberal Party, and two members of 
the Council of Veterans, with a President assigned by the Executive, and this 
Commission will familiarise itself with charges, investigate all the evidence, 
and definitively resolve these cases (Secades Japón 1912: 145) 
 
This then, was a significant grant of power to the Veterans’ organisation that 
previously had evaded them. Moreover, it was an eminently political role: acting as 
lawyer, judge and juror over those accused of not being faithful to Cuba Libre. 
While a member of each political party had a place in this Commission, there was an 
equal number of veterans, and hence due to the nature of partisan politics in Cuba, 
perhaps an unequal balance of interest in favour of the veterans as they investigated 
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these cases as they would no doubt steer the investigation into the direction they saw 
fit, if in fact they were not actively supported by the party members.  
It was not long however, before the President began to withdraw the scope of 
these concessions granted to the Veterans. In January 1912 the President announced 
in the press that: 
 
First: All those individuals belonging to the forces of sea and land of the 
Republic, regardless of their rank, remain prohibited from assisting the 
meetings of the Centre of Veterans, or taking part in their deliberations, and 
they must limit their activities with respect to the same to taking part as 
simple partners or members,… 
Second: All the individuals serving in the various police bodies of the 
Republic are likewise prohibited, as well as from making propaganda or 
engaging in activities of any kind that could be deemed political, they must 
absolutely abstain from taking part in the struggles of militant parties, as they 
must from assisting the Centre of Veterans in their meetings or taking part in 
their deliberations, rightly limiting their action in the first instance to casting 
freely their votes in an opportune moment, and taking part only as simple 
partners or affiliates, if they so desire (La Discusión, 11 Januuary 1912).  
 
There is nothing unusual about a president exercising his right to prohibit his 
armed forces and police from participating in the activities of political organisations. 
However, this statement illustrates two things: firstly, that the Centre of Veterans 
was seen by the President (and no doubt others), as a distinctly political 
organisation, but also he clearly feared the threat that participation in the ranks of 
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this organisation by members of the armed forces and the police posed. While Pino 
Guerra had been replaced by José J. Monteagudo as head of the armed forces, this 
represented no change in influence, as both were rebels of 1906 and military 
veterans of 1895. The ‘men of 1895’ (and indeed 1906), were still clearly 
dominating the armed apparatus of the state and represented an ever presernt threat 
of revolt. No doubt the personnel of the police, the armed forces and indeed the 
Centre of Veterans, were closely aligned patronage networks.  
Also on 11 January 1912, a correspondence from Senator Ambrosio Borges 
to the Editor of El Triunfo, Senator Modesto Morales Díaz, was reported in its 
pages, in which Borges stated that: 
 
I opposed, and continue to oppose the constitution of new political 
commitees, even if they are termed “patriotic” because I believe that these 
organisations will contribute to an alarming rise in the deep and evident 
political turmoil in the country, and will disrupt even more the moral peace 
which we need so much for the preservation and stability of republican 
institutions and for the development of our commercial and proletarian 
agricultural property (El Triunfo 11 January 1912). 
 
 
The Veterans’ protest solicits threat of US intervention 
 
Of course, as usual in nationalist politics, this struggle for self-interest was 
clothed in the most noble of moral overtones. The government declared with a 
rhetorical flourish that they could not support the role of those hostile to the 
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revolutionary idea and spirit of 1895-8. However, the President was clearly in fear 
of the influence of the Centre of Veterans. His prohibition of activity in the Centre 
by the armed forces and the police was to lead to further protest. General Díaz of the 
Centre of Veterans for Oriente defended the army and police stating that: 
 
The Veterans of Oriente know that we have not engaged in politics; that we 
do not wish to bring ourselves to constitute the veterans as a political 
party…They have as much right as we do to frequent the Centre of Veterans; 
they may help to constitute the Republic as we do, and inside of this 
Republic they have the same patriotic rights as we do (Secades Japón 1912: 
177). 
 
The Veterans felt that it was the President himself who was ‘politicising’ 
their organisation by claiming they were active in politics and seeking political ends 
(though he did have a point). The President’s prohibitions regarding the armes 
forces had further potentially upheld the precedent of revolt, as the veterans felt they 
were “exercising the right of petition recognised by Article twenty seven of the 
Constitution”, and, that it was in fact the government which “put in danger the 
Cuban Nation” if it did not comply with this Article. The Veterans addressed to the 
President their claim that: 
 
There is not a single precept, neither in the Legal Codes, nor in 
jurisprudence, which prohibits members of the military from assisting – as 
active members or as simple spectators – to patriotic meetings, nor from 
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forming part of lawful associations of whatever nature, independent of 
political activity (Secades Japón: 189). 
 
Indeed, the presidential decree prohibiting the ‘activity’ of members of the 
military in a centre of ‘veterans’ does seem a bit unusual: after all, veterans and 
military men tend to mix in the same circles. It seems likely that the President’s aim 
was to curtail the political influence of the Veterans’ organisations, even if they were 
not a formally constituted political party. The Centre of Veterans no doubt brought 
up memories of the ‘Committee’ of 1906, though it must be stated that the former 
was in fact of much wider and diverse political support, featuring even more 
prominent Conservatives than Liberals.  
This disagreement over the role of civil society institutions and the state was 
complicated by Cuba’s international position. Increasingly, Cuba was dependent 
upon the sale of sugar and tobacco on international markets, and hence, on loans 
from US banks to provide the capital for this increasingly mechanised production. In 
reaction to the President’s suspension of the Civil Service Law, and hence his partly 
complying with the Institution of Veterans’ demands, the United States government 
sent its note of ‘grave concern’, on 16 January 1912, which pointed out the necessity 
for “maintaining the legality, order and stability” of the “national life of the 
Republic of Cuba” which meant that the: 
 
President and Government of Cuba have provoked a situation that would 
oblige the government of the US to consider very seriously the actions it 
must take in order to comply with its obligations imposed by its relation with 
Cuba (Chapman 1927: 306-8). 
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 Emilio Núñez, President of the National Council of Veterans, outlined the 
position of his organisation when he declared that: 
 
without a perfect and moral political system, in a country such as ours, 
…nationality is a myth because the Republic does not have the power to 
combat future eventualities (Declaration of Emilio Núñez to La Discusión, 
Secades Japón 1912: 252). 
 
This nationalism was to take the form of “moralisation and Cubanisation” 
(Secades Japón 1912: 254), phrases and themes that were to constantly recur in the 
debate between civil society institutions and the state in the Cuban press. However, 
the Cuban President submitted to the threats of US intervention, and with Decree 20, 
he revoked the resolution of 11 November 1911 (Secades Japón 1912b: 194).  
With this the Veterans’ agreed to act only as a non-political association, 
stating:  
 
the Association of Veterans of Independence, without intervening in the 
organs of political parties will offer its support in general elections to those 
candidates who are unarguably patriotic and who meet the requirements of 
honourablility and aptitude, trying to prevent by all means which the law 
allows, the election to public posts of those who have profited from their 
official positions, by selling out the interests of the Nation.  
Second: That it agrees also to make public the intentions of the Association 
and not to constitute itself as a Political Party, endeavouring to realise the 
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patriotic aims which it will pursue in agreement with its own statutes and 
with strict subjection to the existing Laws (La Discusión 14 March 1912). 
 
This was somewhat of a fall from grace for the Veterans’ organisations then: 
from acting as judge and jury of traitors in collaboration with the President, to a firm 
assurance that it would act only as a benevolent association. Again this curtailment 
of protest came about as a direct result of US hegemony, and hence, hardly 
constituted a series of events likely to quell Cuban nationalist feeling. After 1912 
various members of the Veterans’ organisation would go on to support any 
candidate with a truly independent stance, while many like Núñez would seek to 
exploit their role in the movement to gain political capital on their road to power 
(Viñalis 2002: 132). With the elections of 1913 Menocal’s Conservative faction took 
power, and hence, some of the Veterans’ desire for power was achieved on an 
individual and patrimonial basis. However, corruption continued, as did that 
perpetual instigator of revolt: planned presidential re-election. Ultimately however, 
the Veterans’ organisations were not active on the scene until after the economic 
crisis of 1921 and the resurgence of nationalist feeling in 1923, which will be looked 
at in detail in the next chapter.  
 
 
The Veterans’ organisations and the Independent Party of Colour 
 
 The first association addressing directly the political problem of black and 
mulato  Cubans was established in alliance with the veterans Campos Marquetti and 
Bartolomé Masó on 25 May 1902, calling itself the Comité de Acción de los 
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Veteranos y Asociaciones de Color [Committee of Action of the Veterans and 
Associations of Colour] (Helg 1995: 125). Indeed, the role of blacks and mulatos in 
the struggle for independence was so important that it was no doubt natural at this 
time for societies combining white and black veterans to be formed. After all, it was 
Céspedes’s manumission of his slaves that had begun the independence struggle in 
1868 and the Liberation Army had always been intrinsically radical because of the 
prominent position of black leaders within it. On 29 June 1902 the Veteranos de 
Color [Veterans of Colour] had demanded that José Martí’s ideal of racial equality 
be enforced in the new Republic. They ultimately failed to be a continuing influence 
in the Republic, however, because of the “sectoral narrowness of their demands - 
more jobs for black veterans in the security forces-and on their political 
sectarianism-almost all were pro- Masó” (Helg 1995: 127).   
In 1910 Evaristo Estenoz, a rebel of 1906, and Pedro Ivonet, a member of the 
Institution of Veterans of 1911, were arrested for disturbing the peace (Thomas 
2001: 308). On 11 February 1910 the mulato leader Martín Morúa Delgado 
proposed Amendment 17 to the Electoral Law, banning political parties being 
formed along racial lines, though admittedly it also prohibited association 
exclusively by birth or with relation to profession (Viñalis 2002: 133). This was a 
calculated move on Morúa Delgado’s part as the majority of the supporters of 
Estenoz belonged to the Liberal Party and they did not wish to lose this support 
(Ferrer 2002: 210). Moreover, “it was applied conveniently to repress the 
anarchists” (Dumoulin 1981: 44). 
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On 20 May 1912, the tenth anniversary of the republic, the PIC launched an 
initially successful revolt.46 On 25 May the United States warned that they would 
land marines to protect US property interests, and this they did six days later, with 
Gómez’s ‘consent’ which was never officially requested by the United States, 
despite his calls for this (Chapman 1927: 311).47  
Vasconcelos had suggested that the uprising was a conspiracy between 
Gómez and the PIC leader Evaristo Estenoz48 to guarantee the former’s re-election 
when he crushed the rebellion: however, it seems that the black rebel Isidoro Santos 
Carrera burned La Maya mill on 2 June, unaware of the plot.49 Helg claims that “by 
targeting the Partido Independiente de Color as a racist black movement, miguelista 
Liberals secured cross-party support for its elimination” (Helg 1995: 182). What is 
abundantly clear is that surviving black and mulato veterans of the independence 
struggle, and blacks and non-whites generally, were very unlikely to be members of 
the Conservative Party.50 If there was to be an ‘independent’ party representing this 
group, it would forever hinder the Liberals’ struggle for political power.  
General Monteagudo suspended constitutional guarantees on 4 June and 
martial law was declared the next day (Chapman 1927: 312). On 8 June the 
‘Association of Veterans of Independence’ published an article in the press 
claiming: 
                                                          
46 In March some of the leaders had invoked Article Three of the Platt Amendment 
on the basis that the government was repressing their movement (Munro 1964: 477-
8).  
47 The United States insisted however, that this was not ‘intervention’ (Munro 1964: 
478).  
48 Evaristo Estenoz had been a leading working-class militant, as well as a veteran of 
the Liberation Army and the revolt of 1906 (Viñalis 2002: 96, n. 125). 
49 Viñalis suggests Gómez’s deputy Zayas, had conspired, hoping for US 
intervention to support his faction (Viñalis 200: 133). 
50 With certain exceptions, such as José J. Monteagudo, and as mentioned erlier, 
Augustín Cebreco.  
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 all those associates who, in violation of its statutes, gravely disrupt public 
peace and put in danger the Cuban republic, have provoked with Evaristo 
Estenoz and Pedro Ivonet the wretched rebellion that now threatens the 
foundations of the social order and the nation, they are traitors to the aims of 
the association and to the principles that it defended in armed struggle (La 
Discusión 8 June 1912). 
 
The ‘association’ put its members at the President’s disposal and described 
the movement as racist (Helg 1995: 203). The black colonel José Gálvez proposed 
that the National Council demand the repeal of the Morúa amendment (Helg 1995: 
206). José Gálvez was arrested, along with a black general of the Veterans’ 
organisations, Juan E. Ducasse, for allegedly amassing arms (Helf 1995: 226). 
Clearly then, there was to be no common cause between the políticos of the 
Veterans’ organisations and the black and mulato veterans. After all, as noted, the 
Veterans’ organisations were dominated by mainstream politicians temporarily 
disgruntled, and not by those seeking to implement the radical goal of racial 
equality, even if some of their aims had initially coincided in 1902.  
By 18 July the rebels were defeated with Monteagudo claiming 3000 of them 
had been killed (Thomas 2002: 314). These events had shown that: 
 
the independientes would not be permitted to use the same tactics as the 
veterans…Whereas the Consejo Nacional de Veteranos had members in 
every faction of the mainstream parties and represented an important 
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constituency that congressmen could not ignore, the Partido…was a threat to 
established politicians (Helg 1995: 200).  
 
While they may have been a constituency of support then, blacks and 
mulatos were also considered a threat by the Veterans’ movement, representing, as 
they did, one político faction.  
 
 
The Veterans’ organisations as a repository of Cuban nationalism 
 
 Throughout the period from US intervention in the War of Independence 
until the protest of the Association of Veterans in 1923-24, various Veterans’ 
organisations claimed to represent the authentic voice of Cuban nationalism. As has 
been seen however, while they may have been an implicitly radical organisation by 
calling for racial equality and featuring many black and mulato Cubans in their 
ranks, with regard to radical socialist ideology generally, and the demands of Cuban 
workers in particular, they were not social-revolutionary. Indeed, they sought to 
divert the potentially internationalist current of Cuban radical thought into more 
conservative nationalist ends.  
 How did the various Veterans’ organisations aim to represent themselves as 
the authentic repository of Cuban nationalism then? According to one member of the 
Veterans of Independence, their role was the logical extension of the: 
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modest cry of protest of the year 1823, until the attempts of 1851; from the 
great uprising of 1868, until the outbreak of 1895 that culminated in our 
independence  (Letter of ‘M. Brindis’, Secades Japón 1912: 22) 
 
The dates chosen by Brindis are interesting. Those of 1868 and 1895 are 
obvious: the struggles of the multi-racial Liberation Army for national 
independence. The conspiracy led by José Francisco Lemus in 1823, according to 
Thomas, featured a lieutenant from Haiti, was inspired by Bolivar and organised by 
Masons, “appealing primarily to students and to the poorer white Cubans, urging 
them to unite with the Negroes, slave and free.” According to its proclamations the 
group sought to “get rid of ridiculous ranks and hierarchies that foster ignorance and 
stultify the virtuous character of free men. We do not acknowledge any distinction 
other than that owed to true merit” (Thomas 2001: 66).  
If an appeal to racial equality was the prerequisite for the Veterans’ 
organisations to identify with a previous Cuban national liberation movement, then 
why did they not identify with the “[n]egro conspiracy of 1795, led by…Nicolás 
Morales” (Thomas 2001: 53), or the “first movement for outright independence in 
Cuba – led by Román de la Luz” (Thomas 2001: 57) in 1809? No doubt this was 
because the conspiracy of 1795 sought not only “equality between black and white”, 
but also, “the abolition of taxes and the distribution of plantations to slaves: that is a 
radical agrarian revolution” (Thomas 2001: 53), the latter being something Cubans 
had to wait for until after the revolution of 1959, and the former being something for 
which the whole world unfortunately still awaits. Likewise, the uprising of 1809 
might have been supported by the Cuban upper class “had it not been for anxiety 
about their slaves, and the spectre of Haiti” (Thomas 2001: 58).  
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It was not until the conspiracy of 1823 that “the leaders of the lower middle 
class,…were attempting radical, even multi-racial policies, to gather support of the 
slave masses” (Thomas 2001: 67). Perhaps the identification was because this 
conspiracy was thwarted by bribery and treachery and it was felt that an authentic 
voice of Cuban nationhood had been crushed at this point. More likely it is because 
the white leaders of the Veterans’ organisations had much the same attitude towards 
blacks and mulatos as that of the white leaders of the Liberation Army and the PRC: 
they were seen as an instrumental constituency of potential armed support, rather 
than genuine equals. However, because of the role they had played in the 
independence struggles, they could clearly influence these organisations in some 
way.  
No doubt the reference to 1851 was not that of Joaquín Agüero who had 
founded a free school, freed his slaves and “became president of the Liberation 
Society in Camagüey, working closely with exiles in new York” (Suchlicki 1988: 9-
10), but rather, the rising by Francisco de Frías whose father held a title and who 
was the brother-in-law of the filibusterer Narciso Lopéz (Thomas 2001: 133). 
Throughout the period the Veterans’ organisations acted as a repository of 
Cuban nationalism and attempted to define what this should consist of. They acted 
as a pressure group, and at times themselves as a patronage network. Clearly, as can 
be seen from their structure and personnel, they were closely related to all the 
political parties and factions of the early republican period, certainly until 1911. This 
is clearly the case despite their claims that: 
 
we had to unite in a neutral camp, and we are motivated only by a single 
idea: the love of Cuba…without distinction nor allegiance to differing 
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political parties – conservatives or liberals…only aiming to represent the 
Cuban Nation (Secades Japón 1912: 40). 
 
Despite this colourful rhetoric, in other places the Veterans’ organisations 
made statements that more clearly elaborated their raison d’être. In their 
‘Indispensable Explanations’ the Veterans put it thus:  
 
One of the causes of general disorder, which motivated the veterans’ 
movement, was the division of the Liberal Party, to which it belonged, into 
three or four factions, and not because of differences in opinion,…rather 
because of personal antagonisms and aggressive ambitions which, 
disgracefully, have been put above the sacred interests of the Nation 
(Secades Japón 1912: III). 
 
Here the spokesman for the Veterans had been more honest than usual. As 
seen above, many of the personnel of the Veterans’ organisations were prominent 
and influential Conservatives. However, they coalesced around the Veterans’ 
organisations perhaps for the same reason as they had around the Conservative Party 
itself: not because of genuine unchanging political convictions, but because of the 
failure of nationalist politics. If the Liberals had not been so riven with factionalism, 
then they would easily have dominated the politics of the post-1902 period. 
However, the revolt of 1906, and the corruption of 1909-11, illustrated that the 
Liberal faction in power failed in its nationalist efforts. This failure was the main 
motivation of the Veterans and also of their supporters.  
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The Veterans’ attempts to Cubanise the civil service were similarly held to 
be authentically nationalistic in intent. As has been noted, they highlighted the 
history of other revolutionary wars that formed a national republic. Sometimes they 
compared their patriotism explicitly with the Spanish, such as with the following:  
 
The Penal Code of Cuba, formulated in the revolutionary epoch, understands 
the crime of treason, punishable by death, to be applicable to spies, 
guerrillas, and to all Cubans that, under the Spanish flag, fight against 
Cuba…or directly support the armed struggle of the enemy. And even the 
same Spanish Penal Code, already existent in Cuba, defines the traitor as, 
with admirable conciseness: “He who will take up arms against the nation 
under an enemy flag.” And if the Penal Code already existing here 
determines the universal concept of treason to the Nation, as a crime so 
horrendous that all the people of the earth will imprison without mercy and 
raise the gallows for it, How can we allow ourselves to tolerate these traitors 
cautiously taking control of the administration of the Republic, so that they 
can continue to betray it, and bring down their sword on the neck of Cuba? 
(Secades Japon 1912b: 113). 
 
Here then, the Veterans’ organisation held the concept of treason to be 
universally a heinous crime, and it was not unusual, in this context, that it should be 
quite normal and proper to remove these traitors from office.  
After the United States sent its letter of ‘grave concern’, appeals to US 
patriotism were made. In ‘The Declarations of Carlos García Vélez’ the author: 
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Asks the North Americans to treat Cuba with benevolence, and to recognise 
that after its war of liberation the ‘guerrillas’ and ‘traitors’ over there were 
the object of cruel reprisals (La Discusión, 18 January 1912). 
 
 Here García Vélez used the same technique as in the preceding quotation: by 
emphasising the ‘universal’ role of vengeance, and indeed executions, in a situation 
of revolutionary war, he sought to portray the Veterans’ desires for Cubanisation as 




Chapter V – The role of the Veterans’ movement until the emergence of radical 
nationalism in Cuba 
 
 
The role of Veterans organisations after 1913 
 
As has been noted elsewhere, the Association of Veterans and Patriots of 
1923-24 has been the subject of historical enquiry. This is usually in relation to the 
movements of civic opposition in the years 1923-25, culminating in the formation of 
the Confederación Nacional Obrera de Cuba [National Confederation of Cuban 
Workers - CNOC] and the Partido Comunista de Cuba [Cuban Communist Party – 
PCC] in 1925. With the establishment of these groups, political opposition in the 
republic was dominated by youth organisations, and women’s and workers’ 
struggles, opposed to the dictatorship of President Gerardo Machado. While Julio 
Antonio Mella and Juan Marinello had been members of the Association of Veterans 
and Patriots in 1923-24, and went on to be founders of the PCC, in fact they 
probably joined the former group simply as they did many other groups at the time: 
as a pragmatic move typical of Marxist tactics, and hence, when they realised that 
the Association represented little but the ‘old-guard’ of veteran políticos (albeit 
clothed in the most noble nationalist rhetoric), they abandoned this movement in 
favour of more radical forms of opposition to the Machadato. 
Young radicals, students, and women’s groups were no doubt attracted to the 
Association in 1923-24 because they thought that it represented a radical nationalist 
challenge to US hegemony. However, the Association, as has been seen, and will be 
seen in this chapter, was little more than a collection of disaffected políticos, often 
of the populist Liberal variety, yet also including many Conservatives (mainly 
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menocalistas), and anyone else contingently deprived of political power, depending 
on the year under study. The year 1911 was of particular importance: two years after 
the end of US occupation and after frustration with the ascension to power of 
Gómez’s Liberal faction as they had shown themselves no less corrupt than the 
palmistas. Further dissatisfaction was shown with the unpopularity of the Civil 
Service Law of 1908 and the reorganisation of the army in 1909 that failed to 
provide jobs for many veterans.  
This likewise explains why the movement was resurrected after 1920: the 
chaos brought about by the banking crisis, the ensuing scandals over government 
contracts, the Crowder intervention and the imposition and subsequent dismissal of 
the ‘honest cabinet’. The Association of Veterans and Patriots, however, was not an 
explicitly radical organisation, rather it was implicitly radical in representing one of 
the final calls for adherence to the principles of the Montecristi Manifesto and the 
ideals of the Liberation Army. However, not only was the Association of 1923-24 
supported by Enoch Crowder, there were already many even within the student 
groups pointing out that adherence to the Montecristi Manifesto meant government 
of Cubans by Cubans.  
By this time however, many of the veterans of the independence struggles 
were dead, and more important factors influenced Cuban political life by this point: 
US corporate control of a large part of the economy from banking interests to the 
sugar industry, and the blatant collaboration of the Cuban political class with the 
interests of this US hegemony. In this context the Association of 1923-24 was to 
decline as a nationalist force, giving way to the younger radical movements. This 
chapter will only touch upon this radicalism, however, as its main concern is to 
explain this decline and hence, that of the Veterans’ movement. In order to elucidate 
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this more fully it will be again necessary to look at the specifics of Cuban political 
factionalism, as well as the economic background to events. A lot had changed since 
the National Council of Veterans had been active in 1911-12, and it is necessary to 




Factionalism under the Menocal administration 
 
 On 20 May 1913 Menocal, the Conservative candidate, became president of 
the Republic. Menocal had been educated in the United States, for a time was the 
Havana Chief of Police, and had also managed the largest sugar plantation of its 
kind in Cuba at Chaparra (Chapman 1927: 320-1). His election to the executive 
meant the aggrandisement not only of the Conservative Party, but also of a powerful 
and influential faction of the Veterans’ organisation of 1911-12. Indeed, the military 
stature of candidates was a decisive element in the 1913 election. According to 
Ibarra, one of the main reasons Menocal’s main rival, Zayas, was defeated was 
because the Veterans’ organisations accused him of being one of the: 
 
principal promoters of administrative corruption and to have unleashed a 
fervent struggle for positions inside the Government. On the other hand the 
most conservative sectors of the country and the officers of the Army, 
thought that a ‘doctor’ was not the most suitable person to oversee the 
military element of the revolution (Ibarra: 1992: 337). 
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Menocal was also seen to be above political corruption because of his 
relationship with the Veterans and because of his role as mediator for them in 1906. 
Núñez had written an open letter to Francisco Cabrera stating that: 
 
the Dr.,…does not have sufficient authority to impose the great rectifications 
that are indispensable for the salvation of the Republic,…Zayas and General 
José Miguel Gómez are the same political entity…In my opinion a vote for 
Zayas is for the relection of General Gómez…Menocal is not the candidate 
of a party: he is, in these important times for Cuba, a national candidate 
(Rodríguez Altunaga 1958: 384-85). 
 
Here it can be seen that the Menocal-Núñez faction sought to portray its 
assumption of power as in the best interests of the ‘nation’, being led by men 
untainted by political corruption, unlike Zayas and the civilian element of the Cuban 
political class. Another commentator noted the same point about Menocal’s role in 
the mediation between Liberals and Moderates and also stated that he had 
sympathies: 
 
among the ranks of the army, due to his position as general of the Liberation 
Army – in comparison to the civilian figure embodied by Alfredo Zayas 
(García Alvarez 1998: 102). 
 
 Although Zayas had been a member of the Autonomist Party, he did join the 
Cuban Revolutionary Party and he was imprisoned in 1896 and exiled in 1897. He 
had been acting Mayor of Havana in 1901, a Senator for Havana in 1905 and later 
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President of the Senate (Suchlicki 1988: 303). As seen earlier, he was a member of 
the Liberal Revolutionary Committee in 1906 that had called for revision of 
electoral, municipal and civil service laws and was part of the Consultative 
Commission under Magoon assigned to do so. While no doubt a powerful man in 
politics, Zayas was seen as a civilian político, while many within the voting 
population no doubt felt that the mambí ideal of the Liberation Army must be 
implemented by members of the mabisado: military leaders such as Menocal.  
Menocal had achieved the rank of Major General in the Liberation Army 
serving under Máximo Gómez, Maceo and Calixto García. While Menocal was 
certainly more respected by the military than Zayas, no doubt by both the officers 
and the rank and file, in fact the issue more than likely came down to political 
patronage. As seen earlier, the suffrage requirements of the Cuban Constitution had 
narrowed the total electorate down to a small minority of the population, even if it 
did include veterans. It is not surprising, therefore, that given the choice of a rich 
civilian or a rich Major General, they would vote for the latter, as he would perhaps 
be more likely to assure the payment of pensions to them. Critically, Menocal was 
also popular amongst US politicians: he had been educated in the United States, and 
he was one of the most important figures in the sugar industry, something that was 
to become increasingly important economically in the period 1913-20, as will be 
seen.  
According to Ibarra, while the defeat of the miguelistas had been due to a 
combination of forces between the land-owning bourgeoisie and leaders of the 
Veterans’ organisations, within the latter group “the Plattist element prevailed over 
the patriotic forces by two to one” (Ibarra 1992: 340). While the followers of 
Menocal were indeed military men then, they were often favourable also with the 
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United States, and this no doubt made them the ideal candidates for both them and 
Cuban veterans. 
Menocal’s Vice-president was Enrique José Varona. Varona had been 
associated formally with Menocal’s politics at least since 1907 with the foundation 
of the Conservative Party. Cosme de la Torriente was Foreign Secretary. According 
to Ibarra, Torriente was the Cuban agent for various English and American 
companies and worth $40 million (Ibarra 1992: 341). As seen earlier, he was present 
at the meeting of Veterans in the Hotel Telégrafo in February 1909, and in 1910 he 
had authored the letter of the ‘Veterans of Independence to the People of Cuba’, that 
called for a selective interpretation of the Constitution in favour of Cubanisation of 
the Civil Service. He was clearly an important representative of the Veterans’ 
political ambitions, and the aggrandisement of these with the election of Menocal. 
Leopoldo Cancio was Finance Minister. He had been a member of the 
Autonomist party, Secretary of the Treasury during the first US intervention and 
also present in Estrada Palma’s cabinet (García Alvarez 1998: 103). José Ramón 
Villalón was Secretary of Public Works, administrator of the Spanish-American Iron 
Company, chief engineer of the railroad from Nuevitas to Camagüey, head of the 
Railway Commission of Cuba and a “known Plattist element” (Ibarra 1992: 341). 
Cancio and Ramón Villalón represented little more than friendly US-Cuban business 
interests within the administration of Menocal, something the man himself was no 
doubt keen to foster. 
Rafael Montoro was Secretary to the President and, as seen earlier, was a 
founder of the Conservative Party. He had also been a member of the Consultative 
Commission along with Zayas, though presumably he was untainted by this.  
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Aurelio Hevia was Interior Minister as well as being a representative of the 
Cuban American Sugar Company (Ibarra 1992: 341). He had been present at the 
meeting at the offices of the periodical La Discusión that had attempted to establish 
an ‘Association’ of veterans, and he had been a Colonel in the Institution of 1911.  
Pablo Desvernine was another secretary to the President and a representative 
of the Van Horne railroad, Raimundo García Menocal and Ezequiel García Enseñat 
were Education Ministers, the latter having opposed the sale of land to foreigners in 
Congress, while Emilio Núñez was Minister for Agriculture (García Alvarez 1998: 
103, Ibarra 1992: 341 and 398, n. 106).  
As can be seen again then, the menocalistas represented Conservatives, 
businessmen favourable to the United States, and even políticos, however; they also 
represented men popular among veteran soldiers and prominent in the Veterans’ 
organisations up until 1913. It was still necessary to claim some connection with the 
mambisado in order to play an important role in Cuban politics, due to the 
constituency empowered by the veterans’ clause in voting rights. As will be seen 
however, these leaders were to prove themselves no more ‘nationalist’ in power than 
the Liberals and no more so even within the formal Veterans movement of 1923-24.  
Some prominent Liberals remained in the administration, including Demetrio 
Castillo Duany, Juan Gualberto Gómez, and Zayas himself, as the State Historian of 
Cuba, on a salary of $6000 (Ibarra 1992: 342). As soon as he was in office, Menocal 
vetoed the proposed new Civil Service Law, in order to maintain the same level of 
control over political patronage as Estrada Palma and Gómez, showing himself little 
better than them (Ibarra 1992: 339).  
On 7 July 1913 three men in public affairs, Governor of Havana Ernesto 
Asbert, Representative Eugenio Arias, and Senator Vidal Morales, in a dispute over 
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the group’s running of illegal gambling halls, killed the Chief of Police of Havana, 
General Armando de la Riva. There were various theories in the press over the 
causes of this affair, from the fact that Asbert was a rival for presidential leadership, 
suggesting that Menocal had ordered the initial police harassment. However, Riva 
was himself a Liberal. On the other hand, Asbert had temporarily switched his 
allegiance from the Liberals to Menocal during the latter’s election campaign. The 
United States expressed their concern that this incident signalled the inability of the 
regime to protect life and property. On 12 July Menocal suspended Asbert’s 
Governorship. When Menocal ordered Congress to address congressional immunity, 
representatives refused to attend, meaning that no quorum could be formed 
(Chapman 1927: 340-43). Menocal then vetoed the new Amnesty Law in order to 
try to protect Asbert, for earlier helping his campaign; however, Congress ratified it 
(Gaunaurd 1954: 330).  
In June 1914 the lottery was a topic of debate. The Senate sought to re-
establish a legal lottery, but Menocal wrote an open letter to the same body 
deploring the corruption of this institution and its connections to the botella. In 
response, Senator Maza y Artola pointed out that while they argued over this the 
government failed to approve a more pressing law: that of payment of pensions. 
Maza y Artola suggested that if a lottery was established the sellers should be 
distributed among the families of veterans (Gaunaurd 1954: 335).  
In 1914 another major event was to affect Cuba: World War I. Although 
Cuba played no direct part in the hostilities, it was to have an enormous impact upon 
Cuba, due to the latter’s supply of sugar to an increasingly large part of the world. 
This in turn revolutionised Cuban society and politics. Again, the factionalist 
struggles within the Cuban political class re-emerged in 1917 when the Liberals 
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incited another rebellion against presidential re-election. It is necessary look at these 
events to understand the political scene after 1920.  
 
 
World War I and the Liberal Revolt of 1917 
 
Even by the outbreak of the First World War, Britain still had greater capital 
investment in Cuba than the United States (Pino Santos 1984: 338), but this conflict 
led to massive profits for sugar interests and a vastly increased expansion of US 
capital in this sector, as Cuba became the greatest source of sugar for the United 
States while its old trading partners were temporarily hostile. The establishment of 
an official Cuban currency in 1914, and the suppression of all currency except the 
Cuban peso and the US dollar, further consolidated US financial control (Wallich 
1960: 32-4). In 1914 the Cuban sugar harvest was worth $163m, in 1915 $202m and 
in 1916 $308m (Thomas 2001: 317). In a sense, however, reciprocity was in conflict 
with this vast increase as the:  
 
closer Cuba got to satisfying the entire sugar demand in the US, the more it 
had to accept what were in effect world prices, since the world price with the 
Cuban duty added became the usual New York price (Thomas 2001: 323).  
 
Thus, the preference set the conditions for the increase in production, but the 
increase led to world competition and thus a general lowering of that price. 
According to Thomas the war delayed and made worse an inevitable crisis. An 
international committee had been set up in 1918 to sell sugar to the Allies at the 
fixed price of 4.6 cents per pound (Thomas 2001: 324) and, during the war, any 
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labour militancy had been deemed as “hostile acts” against the war effort by the 
United States (Jenks 1970: 193). The Sugar Equalisation Board had used the fixed 
price to compensate for previous losses (Jenks 1970: 203).  
The economic changes brought about by the war predictably led to a radical 
change within the social structure in Cuba. As Pérez puts it, the: 
 
war years stimulated economic development and released new social forces 
that changed the character of Cuban society, revealing…more clearly defined 
class structures, and more distinctly articulated social conflict. New social 
groups emerged as aggressive political contenders,…they…challenged the 
premises of North American hegemony and denounced U.S. influence over 
the political system and the national economy (Pérez 1997: 171). 
  
To put it more simply: 
 
the First World War defined the characteristics of an increasing 
subordination, which determined the definitive degeneration of the Cuban 
economy towards forms of more concrete exploitation and dependency 
(Alavez 1979: 86). 
 
With the end of the war, the United States emerged as the new global power, 
and, as it’s US National Bank of Commerce noted, “[w]e have surplus to sell.” The 
logic of this was that “finance capital, in the form of credit, foreign loans, and 
investments abroad, occupied a strategic place in promoting foreign trade and 
facilitating U.S. economic expansion” and this expansion was “necessary for U.S. 
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industry and manufacturing and markets for surplus production, whether in the form 
of capital or goods themselves” (Pérez 1986: 182-83).  
This change in the international structure of capitalism affected the Cuban 
working class in immediate ways, mainly by raising the prices of commodities in 
real terms, and hence labour agitation grew. In 1914 “anarcho-syndicalism was on 
the rise, and calls for revolutionary violence escalated” (Shaffer 1985: 59), and in 
the same year the government launched a Secretariat of Labour (Stubbs 1985: 118). 
According to Fuller, “striking dock workers in Havana demanded an end to the 
draft” (Fuller 1987: 246). In the United States the president of the American 
Federation of Labour, Samuel Gompers, referred to the conflict as “a glorious and 
righteous one” (Foner 1988: 21), perhaps indicating an early instance of union 
collaboration with the US political elite, while in Cuba the working class was 
generally more internationalist and revolutionary in its views, being the heir to 
Spanish anarchism.  
In 1915 there was an “islandwide crackdown aimed particularly at 
anarchists” (Shaffer 1985: 59), and Juan Tenorio, Vicente Lípiz, and Román 
Delgado were all deported under new laws instituted by the Menocal administration 
(Fernández 2001: 50). On 14 September 1915 Menocal prohibited the circulation of 
any money except the Cuban peso or the US dollar. Despite this, however, Cuban 
inflation levels remained high and it was only the United States that benefited from 
the emerging domination of the US dollar (Ibarra 1992: 344, García Alvarez 1998: 
118).  
Also in 1915, Menocal reorganised the armed forces, uniting the Permanent 
Army and the Rural Guard into the single institution of the National Army, directly 
responsible to the President, as well as establishing an Air Force (García Alvarez 
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1998: 117). This was not the first time that the armed forces had been reorganised. 
In 1908 the US Provisional Government had established the Permanent Army, the 
Rural Guard and the militias (Chang 1981: 91). However, this reorganisation had 
meant that these institutions became increasingly professional and had as their 
primary role, according to one commentator, the protection of private property and 
maintenance of the capitalist political order (Chang 1981: 9).  Also in 1915, 
Menocal introduced compulsory workers’ insurance and provision for state 
mediation in labour disputes, increasing the role of corporatist solutions to labour 
disputes in the economy (Thomas 2002: 316).  
Menocal had shown early on in his presidency that he was no friend of the 
Cuban working class and indeed their members among the Veterans’ organisations. 
While marginally privileged by their voting rights, voting was not popular as a 
means of social change among the organisations of the working class in Cuba in any 
case, and increasingly the Veterans’ organisations represented little more than a 
faction of the political class. This political class continued with its corruptions and 
internal divisions and re-alignments. 
With Menocal’s attempt at re-election, new problems emerged. Menocal had 
at first backed Emilio Núñez to succeed himself (Chapman 1927: 346). The Liberals 
were divided into several factions: those of Zayas and his Vice-president Carlos 
Mendieta, the Unionist wing of General Gerardo Machado, the followers of Ernesto 
Asbert, and finally the faction of Eusebio Hernández (Ferrer 2002: 215). On the eve 
of his attempt at re-election, Menocal sent military supervisors to secure a 
Conservative victory through a “combination of fraud, coercion, and violence” 
(Pérez 1986: 167). On 1 November 1916, 800,000 people voted even though only 
500,000 were registered, and three Conservative presidents of electoral boards were 
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shot (Thomas 2003: 317). As a result, Raimundo Cabrera, founder of the Liberal 
Autonomist Party (of 1878), wrote to Menocal claiming that he was overriding the 
judicial power of the courts by ordering the police to abandon their positions 
protecting the Electoral Board of Las Villas, the traditional Liberal stronghold 
(Gaunaurd 1954: 345). By the end of January 1917, Cosme de la Torriente, Enrique 
Jose Varona, and Freyre Andrade had all written letters to the Conservative paper 
Heraldo de Cuba, criticising Menocal and, as a result, the President’s re-electionist 
clique dismissed them all from the Party as traitors, despite all three being prominent 
long-time Conservatives (Gaunaurd 1954: 348-60).  
The Liberals knew that the United States favoured Menocal, he was educated 
there, and significantly he was a large property owner, more specifically in sugar 
interests, owning the largest mill in Cuba. The Liberals, however, felt as in 1906, 
that they were democratically the most popular party. They felt that they could use 
the threat of destroying property once again to ensure US intervention in their 
favour. On 4 February 1917 Orestes Ferrara and Raimundo Cabrera went to the 
United States to put their case before rebellion broke out (Thomas 2002: 318).51 On 
10 February insurrection began when José Miguel Gómez pretended to embark on a 
fishing expedition, instead leading the rebellion. Ferrara and Raimundo Cabrera 
asked for intervention from the United States and wrote to Menocal demanding his 
resignation (Thomas 2002: 318-9).  
New elections took place in Santa Clara on 14 February, but the Liberals 
made no attempt to participate (Chapman 1927: 372). On 16 February the Las Villas 
Electoral Board declared the Conservatives victorious and the Liberals refused to 
accept this. The United States came out in support of “the constitutional government 
                                                          
51  Chapman says they left on 5  February (Chapman 1927: 363). 
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of the Republic of Cuba” (Pérez 1986: 169) on 19 February (Thomas 2002: 319), 
and distributed thousands of copies of this message throughout the island. On 5 
March the Senate attempted to implement Menocal’s suspension of constitutional 
guarantees but Liberals refused to attend, making the necessary two-thirds quorum 
impossible (Gaunaurd 1954: 371). On 8 March the temporary Liberal Governor of 
Oriente, García Muñoz, asked for US soldiers to land, which they later did, 
protecting mines, sugar plantations, and railways (Thomas 2001: 319). 
On 6 April 1917 the United States declared war against Germany and the 
following day Cuba followed suit (Fitzgibbon 1935: 162). By August the Liberals 
were being blamed for disrupting the peace when this was necessary for the conduct 
of war. Cuba could have done little else except support the United States during 
war-time. The United States depended on Cuba for the increased need for sugar due 
to the loss of trade with enemy nations. As a result, the United States was to set 
price controls for Cuban sugar in 1918 (Smith 1960: 20-1).  
On 21 April Liberal rebel Gustavo Caballero was captured (Chapman 1927: 
376), and this, along with US rifles, machine guns, and cartridges, allowed the 
Menocal administration to survive. According to Ferrer, Menocal recruited militias 
from the organisations of the Veterans of Independence (Ferrer 2002: 226), so 
clearly again, members of the Veterans’ organisations were represented on both 
sides of the struggle. On 7 May Congress proclaimed Menocal elected, and Núñez 
had returned to his position as Vice-president (Gaunaurd 1954: 375). On 9 May 
there was apparently an attempt on Menocal’s life, but on 20 May he began his 
second term (Chapman 1927: 384). 
Constitutional guarantees were suspended on 13 July based on the legal 
precedent of the Law of Public Order, that oppressive Spanish law of 1870. The 
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articles suspended were 15, 16, 19, 22, 23, 24, and 27 (Gaunaurd 1954: 376). These 
articles stated that no one could be imprisoned other than in accordance with the 
law, that they may not be held for more than 24 hours without being put before a 
judge or tribunal, that correspondence could not be confiscated, that houses could 
not be searched, that persons could not be forced from their homes except in 
accordance with the laws, and that all had freedom of thought, speech and written 
word, even if this went against social order, or public peace (Pichardo 1973: 78-9).  
Pérez notes that by warning the Liberals to uphold constitutional authority 
but not similarly: 
 
exhorting constituted authority to uphold the constitution, the United States 
may…well have relieved Havana of the need to concern itself with the 
diplomatic consequences of a fraudulent election protested by arms (Pérez 
1997: 19).  
 
Menocal then “reigned for another four years, more or less as a dictator, 
governing largely by decree, drawing huge private profits for himself and his 
family” (Thomas 2001: 320), resulting in Enoch Crowder coming to the island again 
as early as March 1919 to revise the Electoral Code and supervise the elections. 
Cuban Secretary of State Pablo Desvernine protested, but a pledge from Menocal to 
maintain honest elections was made (Pérez 1986: 172). Núñez had led the Supreme 
Council of the National Association of Veterans to approve new statutes and 
regulations in February of 1917, and in July of 1918 the veterans were somewhat 
appeased again when a new law regulating the payment of their pensions was passed 
(Cairo Ballester 1976: 84).  
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The US threatened intervention not only in the case of armed insurrection, 
but also in the case of labour unrest, as “Havana was held directly responsible for 
the actions of Cuban workers” (Pérez 1997: 161). Strikes began again in 1917 and in 
1918-19 these were “on an unprecedented scale” (Stubbs 1985: 120), when “four 
general strikes broke out in Havana alone” and leading anarchist organisers were 
condemned to death: Marcelo Salinas, Antonio Penichet, Alfredo López, Alejandro 
Barreiro, and Pablo Guerra. Robustiano Fernández and Luis Díaz Blanco were killed 
in confrontations with police. Washington sent three cruisers to Havana and the 
Cuban government suspended constitutional guarantees, closed the Centro Obrero 
[Worker Centre], and prohibited anarchist publications (Fernández 2001: 51). 
Workers knew, like the Liberals, that threats to US property were a key 
weapon in their battles against the government and employers. In early 1919 the 
United States landed gunboats when a strike broke out in Havana (Smith 1960: 83), 
and later in the same year 6000 marines landed when a general strike began (Pérez 
1997: 163). Elsewhere Pérez states that in 1919 the marines’ ‘practice marches’ 
were redirected to areas of labour unrest (Pérez 1978: 101), and it would seem that 
the United States intervened to end worker agitation as much as the Liberal 
rebellion. The United States opposed not only direct threats to US property, but also 
pro-labour legislation, including a minimum wage increase proposed in 1910 (Pérez 
1997: 164).  
The war and the revolt were to have widespread consequences for the whole 
of Cuban society. These events had shown that the menocalistas were no friend of 
the Cuban working class, or the radical aims of its organisations. While individual 
working-class members of the Veterans’ organisations may have seen these 
institutions initially as a useful patronage network towards the goal of the prompt 
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payment of pensions, they were clearly linked with both the Conservative and 
Liberal factions of the Cuban political elite, and hence, inextricably tied up with 
their internecine struggles for power and their shifting political allegiances.  
 
 
The Economic Crisis of 1920-21  
 
In 1918-1919 Cuba was supplying 25 per cent of the world’s sugar (Jenks 
1970: 204). The value of total sugar production increased from $455 million in 1919 
to $1 billion in 1920 (Pérez 1986: 186-7); indeed 1920 had been the most 
tumultuous year in Cuban financial history. Sugar rose from 9.125 cents per pound 
on 18 February 1920 to the peak of 22 .5 cents on 19 May and then dramatically, 
back to only 3.75 on 13 December (Jenks 1970: 218-9). Similarly, US beet 
production had expanded due to price rises, from 700,000 tons in 1919 to over one 
million in 1920 and 1921. US protection, however, merely stimulated international 
competition from Puerto Rico, Hawaii and the Philippines (Pollitt 1984: 9). The 
United States saw its chance to ensure “integration”, that is “[a]t every stage in the 
process of sugar manufacture…an attempt to secure control of other stages” (Pollitt 
1984: 219) the result being “a new form of American political tutelage…[which] 
vested in Wall Street effective economic control over the island” (Pollitt 1984: 229).  
Problems arose however, because, at the end of World War I, the banks 
“operated practically without legal controls…Cuba was also without effective 
banking legislation”, and in any case ‘Cuban’ banks were usually actually foreign 
institutions in fact controlled by the United States or Britain (Wallich 1960: 50-1). 
During this increase in sugar prices “an orgy of prosperity and speculation” took 
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over as banks gave credit and “established branches without regard to permanent 
profitability and lent money with more enthusiasm than discretion”, with the 
consequence that “each class of assets was dependent upon the sugar boom which 
could last only as long as the price of the commodity remained at previously 
unheard-of levels” (Wallich 1960: 53-4). 
The inevitable collapse of Cuban credit institutions meant further US 
investment. With the dramatic drop in price of sugar, produce remained unsold 
congesting Havana docks (Thomas 2001: 328). This situation “threatened all aspects 
of American business interests in Cuba” (Smith 1960: 85). President Menocal 
declared a moratorium on 11 October (Wallich 1960: 55, Pérez 1986: 188),52 but 
this, by “permitting the traffic in certified checks, helped holders of large accounts 
legally to loot the banks to the disadvantage of small depositors” (Jenks 1970: 232). 
Similarly, the “clause permitting withdrawals for payments of dues to the 
government” meant that clients “immediately took advantage of this clause to 
salvage part of their balances” (Wallich 1960: 59).  
These abuses, along with the failure of sugar prices to recover, meant the 
extension of the moratorium until 1921. Proposals were made to solve the crisis: the 
establishment of a central bank, the issue of legal tender certificates, a US loan to 
the banks, or a new control of sugar prices by the United States. In the end the 
Cuban Congress enacted the Torriente Laws, which planned to lift the moratorium, 
reorganise or liquidate the banks, and create proposals for a banking law. Gradually 
debts were paid, but again certified checks meant further losses (Wallich 1960: 61-
3). Shortly thereafter, there was established “a central bank, a banking law, and the 
framework for agricultural banks” and the Cuban banks quickly collapsed which 
                                                          
52 Thomas gives the date 10 October (Thomas 2001: 328). 
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“left the foreign banks in a dominant position” (Wallich 1960: 68). The US was 
quick to exploit its opportunities as the crisis came. US investments increased “536 
percent between 1913 and 1928, from $220 million to $1.5 billion” (Pérez 1986: 
188). This was the era of finance capital as the “National City Bank and the Chase 
National Bank received the titles of many mills in return for settlement of debts” 
(Thomas 2001: 332).  
While the United States did not take up the plan of bailing out the banks, 
without healthy sugar prices, the Cuban government had no means of taxation, and 
had itself become insolvent. The Treasury had been operating on the basis that there 
was $120 million a year to spend, when in fact taxes only brought in about $70 
million (Jenks 1970: 249), as a result, salaries went unpaid and public works 
programmes ceased. Again, by linking Articles Two and Three of the Platt 
Amendment, on intervention and indebtedness, the United States “held the Cuban 
government to the brink of insolvency in exchange for reform” (Pérez 1986: 198). 
Enoch Crowder arrived as ‘special representative’ of the President. The US 
financers J. P. Morgan and company worked with the US government to demand 
fiscal reform before granting a $5 million loan (Pérez 1986: 203-5), and it was only 
with Crowder’s ‘fifteen memoranda’ and President Zayas’s ‘honest cabinet’ that a 
further $50 million loan was approved (Jenks 1970: 253). Of course, this further 
increased US hegemony, as “supervision over revenues was effectively supervision 
over virtually every aspect of Cuban administration” (Pérez 1986: 199). Indeed, 
Crowder “recommended that an ultimatum threatening intervention accompany the 
two memoranda on budget reform” and this was a “clear statement…that the 
protection of American investments in Cuba was a part of the foreign policy of the 
United States” (Smith 1960: 92-4). It seems odd then that the United States, “sought 
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to assist in their solution through a man entirely without business experience and 
otherwise untrained in the processes of economic analysis” (Jenks 1970: 264), but in 
any case: 
 
[b]y appropriating control over the state apparatus and asserting authority 
over the principal levers of resource allocation, the State Department exacted 
Cuban acquiescence to the reorganization of national administration in 
conformity with U.S. needs (Pérez 1986: 225).  
 
The crisis of 1920-1 also bolstered Cuban dependency on state revenues. In 
1907 there were only 25,599 public employees (Ibarra 1998: 54), by 1914-15 the 
public payroll carried 32,000 employees and in 1924 42,000, which at this point 
“functioned like a social welfare system” (Pérez 1995: 220). The crisis also “served 
to accelerate labor organizing” with the formation of the National Labor Congress in 
1920 (Pérez 1995: 242).  
This all took place within the context of Cuba's changing social structure: a 
native bureaucratic governmental class divided into factions with no means of 
existence except public office, a proletariat and its leaders who increasingly took on 
a radical internationalist analysis, and a rising petit bourgeoisie who sought 
protectionism for Cuban businesses, often collaborating with the proletarian 
organisations in order to achieve social democratic concessions from the 
government. Similarly, US financial investment in Cuba increased as the 
government sought capital for its grand public works programmes, roads, and 
railways. This economic dominance by the United States furthered its concomitant 
imperative to intervene, whilst simultaneously nurturing the remnants of Cuban 
 223
nationalism left over from the independence conflict that became a more radical 
phenomenon challenging not just US dominance in international affairs, but also the 
dominance of employers, and the corruption of politicians, subservient to US power. 
 The increasing dominance of the United States as a world power after World 
War I, the transition to finance capital and hence, the dependency of Third World 
nations on the production of primary products for export to the First World, meant 
that Cuban nationalism was to have to struggle against this need for forms of neo-
imperial rule demanded by the changing structure of capitalism. The leaders of the 
Veterans’ organisations, however, showed themselves aloof from the struggles of 
the working class and the petit bourgeoisie, remaining simply a faction of the Cuban 
political elite, unable to detach itself from factional struggles for power in order to 
authentically support the emerging radical forms of nationalism of 1923-25. This 
factionalism continued under Zayas.  
 
 
Factionalism and corruption under the Zayas administration 
 
 Party reorganisation resulted in the formation of a new Republican Party in 
July 1919 under the leadership of Guillermo López Rovirosa. Their programme 
called for reform of existing laws and an end to the use of the Platt Amendment for 
interventionist purposes. Perhaps most interestingly, they called for the 
incorporation into the Constitution of ‘Delegates of the People’ who would be 
elected, one for each municipality, during regular elections, and would form a 
national body that would inspect public services. The party also had such radical 
proposals as implementing the eight-hour day, special protection for women and 
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children in work, recognition of the right to strike, the establishment of night-time 
schools for workers, and suffrage for women. The party called for the financing of 
monuments in the capital of each province to veterans of the War for Independence, 
the appointing of a commission to reform the Civil Service Law, and the 
establishment of juries: all concerns of the Veterans’ organisations and Cuban 
society at large (Gaunaurd 1954: 390-96). Although none of the prominent leaders 
of the Veterans’ organisations featured in the party, their programme received the 
endorsement of Enrique José Varona (Gaunaurd 1954: 398-99). Shortly thereafter, 
the party’s official mouthpiece, Cuba Nueva, had their post interfered with and one 
Party member was expelled from the civil service in violation of the Civil Service 
Law (Gaunaurd 1954: 402).  
In 1920 the Partido Socialista Radical [Radical Socialst Party] was formed 
but they were “collaborationist…they had supported Zayas” (Thomas 2001: 348). In 
March 1920 Núñez broke with Menocal, founding a new independent Partido 
Demócrata Nacionalista [Democratic Nationalist Party], with the support of Rafael 
Montalvo. Menocal was not happy with the prospect of Núñez or Montalvo 
succeeding him as President, while Zayas was expelled from the Liberal Party by 
Gómez and the latter formed the Partido Popular Nacional [Popular National Party]. 
Conservative menocalistas joined forces with Liberal zayistas to create the Liga 
Nacional [National League] (Gaunaurd 1954: 389). The National League initially 
proposed Montalvo, who had now joined them, for President and Zayas for Vice-
president (Cairo Ballester 1976: 148). Menocal then suspended the part of the 
electoral code prohibiting presidential nominees on a two-party ticket so that Zayas 
could run on both, much to the annoyance of the United States (Pérez 1986: 175). 
 225
Menocal’s National League planned to appoint Zayas in 1920 and as a result 
Gómez’s Liberals were considering property destruction and attacks on US citizens. 
In August they withdrew from the elections, signalling rebellion, but later agreed to 
remain, after the United States pledged to observe the process (Pérez 1986: 177-9). 
When the elections took place there were menocalista ‘military advisors’ 
intimidating voters and the burning of Liberal votes, and in many places where a 
Liberal victory was suspected, voting booths remained closed (Thomas 2001: 329). 
Liberals made accusations of fraud, and, when both parties claimed victory on 1 
November 1920 (Pérez 1986: 189), the United States again invoked the Platt 
Amendment to send Crowder back to the region, in January 1921, symbolically 
aboard the battleship Minnesota  (Thomas 2001: 330). On 9 March 1921 sporadic 
fighting broke out and the Liberals refused to take part in the local elections on 15 
March, meaning that Zayas was declared, or at least proclaimed himself, victorious 
(Thomas 2001: 330).  
In June 1921 Gómez died in the United States, leaving a power vacuum 
(Cairo Ballester 1976: 154). In September 1921 a ‘Pro-Zayas’ club was formed, 
including, as a President of Honor, Carlos González Clavel, who it was seen in the 
previous chapter was a member of the National Council of Veterans. 
At the beginning of 1922 the Republican Party split, leaving it under the 
leadership of Aurelio Hevia, while Senator Maza y Artola founded another group: 
Partido Oriental Nacionalista [Nationalist Party of Oriente]. The Party’s programme 
included abolition of the Platt Amendment, a plan for administrative 
decentralisation, extension of the independence of the judiciary, limiting of 
parliamentary immunity and constitutional control over the use of amnesty 
(Gaunaurd 1954: 431). Clearly, then, it was not only the various Veterans’ 
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organisations who had these issues as part of their central platform during these 
years; the Nationalist Party of Oriente also included several progressive proposals in 
their programme, including the reform of prisons to give them an educational 
character aimed at moral regeneration, reform of educational boards so that teachers 
could elect their directors, and the obligatory teaching of the history of Cuba and its 
republican constitution in all schools, public and private.  
They also proposed the establishment of consultative boards in the 
headquarters of the Boards of Public Works, so that representatives of professional, 
economic and employment associations would supervise these programmes, propose 
the budgets and make sure they complied with all laws and regulations (Gaunaurd 
1954: 432-33). This was a radical proposal to completely revise a system that had 
allowed political graft under Gómez. Although similar complaints were always a 
platform of all of the Veterans’ organisations they seldom offered such all-
encompassing solutions. While the National Party of Oriente was seemingly almost 
as progressive as the early socialist parties when it claimed that it wanted tribunals 
“for the resolution of the conflicts that arise between capital and labour”, the Party’s 
call for selective immigration showed that it was by no means an internationalist 
organisation (Gaunaurd 1954: 433).  
 The labour movement was also increasingly organising during the Zayas 
period. In 1920 the National Labour Congress called for public housing, an eight-
hour day, and price controls, and denounced US imperialism. Later that year 
eighteen unions formed the anarcho-syndicalist Federación Obrera de La Habana 
[Worker Federation of Havana – FOH], and in 1924 railroad workers formed the 
Hermandad Ferroviaria de Cuba [Brotherhood of Railroad Workers of Cuba]. This 
led to the formation of a national union, the Confederación Nacional Obrera de Cuba 
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[National Confederation of Cuban Workers – CNOC] and the Partido Comunista de 
Cuba [Cuban Communist Party - PCC] in 1925. The founding members of the PCC 
were Pena Vilabod, Alejandro Barreiro, Venancio Rodríguez, Alfredo López, 
Emilio Rodríguez, Carlos Baliño and Mella, after the last two of this group had 
formed the Agrupación Comunista de La Habana [Communist Group of Havana] 
(Pérez 1986 239-40).  
In February 1922 ‘la Asociación Nacional de Emigrados Revolucionarios 
Cubanos’ [the National Association of Cuban Revolutionary Emigrés] petitioned 
Zayas to veto the ‘Pensión Especial’ [Special Pension] that had just been passed by 
the House and was due before the Senate. This law established pensions of 6000 
pesos annually for the following people: Emilio Núñez, Fernando Freyre Andrade, 
Fernando Méndez Capote, Juan I. Guiteras and Rafael Montoro. While the Cuban 
exiles did not doubt the patriotism of figures like Núñez, the problem for them was 
that the law fell foul of Article 11 of the Cuban Constitution that did not allow 
special privileges (Gaunaurd 1954: 437).  
In March 1922 Crowder dictated his fifteen memoranda to the Cuban 
Congress – key reforms in virtually every aspect of national, provincial, and 
municipal administration, and the dismissal of corrupt members of Zayas’s cabinet. 
In May of 1922 the army and naval forces were reorganised and the much-hated 
Rural Guard was re-established. In June the Veterans made protests in the press over 
the failure of pension payments (Cairo Ballester 1976: 158).  
On 10 June 1922 leading members of the National Association of Veterans 
met Zayas namely, Enrique Jose Varona, Manuel Sanguily and Pedro Betancourt, 
the last having replaced Núñez as President of the Association upon his death (Cairo 
Ballester 1976: 89). On 14 June Sanguily informed the National Assembly of 
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Veterans of the memoranda of Crowder and of the proposals which they had 
presented to Zayas, that had included: revision of the Reciprocity Treaty, the 
reduction of public expenses, constitutional reforms in relation to municipal 
government, reform of the electoral registry, condemnation of the scandals of the 
Minister of Public Works, reduction of the budget, denunciation of administrative 
frauds and reform of the national lottery law so that the funds it raises would be used 
for the treasury (Cairo Ballester 1976: 90). This was not 1911 however. As Cairo 
Ballester notes, the factions calling for total abrogation of the Platt Amendment of 
1902 had lost their strength, as had the Conservatives who had called for ‘domestic 
virtue’ to avoid US intervention: now all were prepared to compromise internally to 
avoid the new US policy machinations of ‘preventive intervention’. Zayas also 
partly appeased the Veterans with the offer of the position of Minister of Agriculture 
being given to Pedro Betancourt (Cairo Ballester 1976: 93).  
Zayas and Crowder disagreed over who should succeed those dismissed until 
it was settled, and they were appointed on 15 June: Secretary of State Carlos Manuel 
de Céspedes, Secretary of Public Works Demetrio Castillo, Secretary of the 
Treasury Manuel Despaigne, along with Arístides Agramonte (Pérez 1986: 210), 
and Ricardo Lancís Castillo (Thomas 2002: 334). The United States sought to 
thoroughly destroy Cuban corruption: botellas, the lottery, and the funnelling of 
public works program money and government loans into private accounts. However 
they failed to realise that “[i]n depriving Zayas of the power of patronage, the 
United States undermined his power to govern” as the suppression of collecturías 
and botellas led to large increases in unemployment. This, along with the imposition 
of the ‘honest cabinet’ meant Zayas lost power of patronage over the judiciary, 
Congress, the military and the press (Pérez 1986: 223-5). 
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At the end of 1922 there were violent demonstrations amongst students in 
Havana. The Federación de Estudiantil de la Habana [Federation of University 
Students’ of Havana - FEU] was formed on 10 January 1923 (Thomas 2001: 340), 
with Julio Antonio Mella as Secretary. They demanded student participation in 
university governance, professional standards for academic staff, as well as the 
abrogation of the Platt Amendment, and the ending of US interventions and Cuban 
political corruption (Pérez 1986: 236, Thomas 2001: 340-1). Anthropology 
professor, Liberal Party member and historian Fernando Ortiz, prepared a draft law 
for university autonomy. Ortiz also directed the Junta Cubana de Renovación 
Nacional [Cuban Assembly of National Renovation], which denounced the current 
government on 2 March 1923 (Chapman 1927: 466). Mella later organised a 
Revolutionary Students’ Congress (Thomas 2001: 342), as well as the Anti-
Imperialist League and the Anti-Clerical League. He also became a member of the 
Mexican Communist Party’s Central Committee while in exile (Whitney 2001: 42). 
Similarly, Rubén Martínez Villena led a protest of writers known as the ‘Protest of 
the Thirteen’ in March 1923 against the government, when one of Zayas’s cabinet 
ministers participated in a literary function. Martínez Villena was later to organise 
the Falange de Acción Cubana. Also in 1923 the Grupo Minorista [Minority Group] 
united intellectuals around educational reform and university autonomy (Pérez 1986: 
236).  
In March 1923 the Veterans’ protests were rising as payment of pensions had 
fallen behind with the last trimester of 1922 remaining unpaid. On 3 April 1923 
Zayas caused further dismay by dismissing Agramonte, Castillo, Despaigne, and 
Ricardo Lancís from his cabinet, for “high reasons of state”, claiming this was part 
of a Cubanisation measure, as they had been the United States’ recommendations 
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(Chapman 1927: 443). This was clearly however, a shrewd move on Zayas’s part to 
remove ‘honest’ members. While initially members of the Veterans’ organisations 
had been in support of Zayas’s ‘honest cabinet’, it featuring one of their members 
Pedro Betancourt, their dismissal led to growing protest. The fact that Pedro 
Betancourt was one of those that Zayas retained meant that he was deposed as 
President of the National Association of Veterans. The National Association held a 
banquet in solidarity with those dismissed, and this led to the first steps towards 
unification with the student protest movement, when the Falange de Acción de 
Cubana and other intellectuals held a mass meeting in the Teatro Nacional [National 
Theatre], which was the “first meeting of opposition organised outside of the 
activities of legal political parties” (Cairo Ballester 1976: 94). 
 The organisational strategies of these groups were to challenge much more 
of the values of the Cuban republic than the Association of Veterans and Patriots, 
however. The former groups were concerned not only with US hegemony, but also 
with imperialism, economic dependency, and much broader participation on the 
political scene than the patronage networks of power of the Veterans’ Association, 
and its membership of disaffected Liberals and Conservatives. While this thesis will 
not be focussing on the youth and radical movements of 1923-25, it is a salient point 





Formation of the Association of Veterans and Patriots of 1923-24 
 
The central focus of the thesis is the forms of nationalism within the 
Veterans’ organisations of 1911-12 and 1923-4. In Cuban historiography, these 
Veterans’ movements are normally seen, in the case of the 1911-12 Council, as a 
somewhat marginal organisation of disaffected members of the old político class 
(and hence often tarred with the same brush over ‘corruption’), or in the case of the 
1923-24 Association, a potentially revolutionary group which was abandoned by the 
emerging radical leaders of the new generation of 1925-33 politics, namely the 
Communist Party intellectuals Mella and Martínez Villena. 
While such a viewpoint may be useful for Cuban Communist historians, it 
does not give us the full picture of the relevance of the Veterans’ organisations to 
this period, and the then marginal role of these radicals. It was only after 1925 and 
the formation of the CNOC, the PCC and the struggle against Machado (and later 
alliance with him against the anarchists), that these leaders took on a role of 
historical importance for Cuba. While Communist historians may argue that Mella 
and Martínez Villena left the Veterans’ organisation because they felt it to be an 
ineffective means of socialist transformation, in fact the leadership of the 1923-24 
Association may have marginalised them because their politics did not agree with 
that of the bulk of the membership.  
In many ways, the conflicts and dilemmas of the 1923-24 organisation were 
a repeat of those of the 1911-12 Council, namely a debate with elements of the 
government over the interpretation and implementation of constitutional, liberal, 
political praxis, and not over broader social and economic matters. Certainly, social 
and economic issues were more pronounced in the discourse of the 1923-24 
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organisation (most notably over race and sex rather than class, something not 
inconsistent with Liberal ideology), no doubt in part due to the impact of the failed 
uprising of the Party of Colour in 1912 and the economic crisis of 1921, but the 
dominating matter of contention was still access to, and exercise of, political power. 
The políticos of the movement were so situated in the class structure that they saw 
political positions as a means to gain economic power rather than their economic 
position as a means to political power. This was due to the consequences of the Ten 
Years War and the War of Independence, which had prevented the emergence of a 
strong native capitalist class, and hence, the reliance on the state as a form of 
patronage, something that the Marxist intellectuals perhaps should have realised 
more rapidly.  
As early as 18 June 1923, in the offices of the periodical La Discusión, there 
was established a ‘Conjunción Nacional de Veteranos de la República de Cuba’ 
[National Convention of the Veterans of the Republic of Cuba] (Caja 61, p.19). On 
12 August 1923 the Veterans’ and Patriots’ Association met in Havana (Thomas 
2001: 342). They declared themselves in permanent session until the Zayas 
government ended political corruption. Leaders included Carlos García Vélez and 
Manuel Despaigne, the latter previously a member of Zayas’s ‘honest cabinet’. The 
Supreme Council of the National Association met again and set about establishing 
regulations to govern the organisation as a national movement and elect leaders 
(Cairo Ballester 1976: 96-98). They then met on 31 August and established a 
twelve-point resolution calling for, amongst other things: repeal of the lottery law, 
the abolition of botellas, honest elections, free competition for government 
contracts, an independent judiciary, limitations of congressional immunity, laws 
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favouring domestic over foreign labour, the abolition of presidential re-election, and 





 The National Association was an organisation with an ‘indefinite end’, 
namely, to be an: 
 
authorised organ of national sentiment and a contributing factor in the 
ordered development of its democratic government, and having as its main 
aim to attain compliance with the programme of legislative reforms and 
rectifications agreed to in Martí’s Assembly, contained in the petitions 
directed at the Public Powers of the Republic…and to all those other means 
of legislation and administration, so that they might contribute to the moral 
and material regeneration of the Republic of Cuba (Statutes of the National 
Association of Veterans and Patriots, Article 1, Caja 61, p.14).  
 
Unlike the organisation of 1911-12, that of 1923-24 was composed of four 
levels rather than three. Each of these four levels consisted of a three-tier structure. 
At the top was the National Assembly that elected a Supreme Council and issued its 
orders through the Executive of the Supreme Council. Below this was the Provincial 
Assembly that also elected a Supreme Council and issued its orders through the 
Executive of the Supreme Council for the provincial level. Below this was the 
Municipal Assembly that also elected a Supreme Council and issued its orders 
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through the Executive of the Supreme Council for the municipal level. Below this 
was the Neighbourhood Assembly that also elected a Supreme Council and issued 
its orders through the Executive of the Supreme Council for the neighbourhood 
level. Each Council was made up of a President, six Vice-presidents, a General 
Secretary, a Secretary of Records, a Treasurer, Vice-treasurer, and twelve 
‘Spokesmen’. 
Article five of the statues, not surprisingly called for: 
 
a law that reforms the organ of the Judicial Power, defining the absolute 
independence of that power in the form established by the constitution…and 
that the naming of its functionaries will not be dependent on the President of 
the Republic (Statues of the National Association of Veterans and Patriots, 





 On 14 October 1923 the Supreme Council of the National Association of 
Veterans was constituted. President of the Supreme Council at the national level in 
1923-24 was Carlos García Vélez. As seen earlier, his father had been Calixto 
García, who had been Chief of the Eastern Forces during the Ten Years War of 
1868-78, founder of the Cuban Revolutionary Committee in New York and Military 
Chief of Oriente Province in the uprising of 1895 (Suchlicki 1988: 114). As also 
seen earlier, García Vélez had been part of the Liberal Party’s Central Revolutionary 
Committee in 1906 and also part of the committee set up by US civilian judge 
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Charles Magoon to advise him on the allocation of governmental positions 
(Hernández 1993: 148). He was later in his career to become Ambassador to 
Mexico, Argentina, the United States, England and Spain (Figarola 1974: 326-7). 
 There were six Vice-presidents of the Association: Enrique José Varona, 
Manuel Sanguily, General Miguel A. Varona, Carlos Pérez Díaz, Lorenzo Nieto and 
Alejo Carreño.  
First Vice-president of the Association was Enrique José Varona. As seen 
earlier he was a founder of the Conservative party in 1907. He had been an 
Autonomist Party member before the War for Independence (Helg 1995: 46), and a 
founder of the Society of Juridical and Economic Studies in 1896 that had looked at 
socio-economic and political solutions for an independent Cuba (Helg 1995: 87).  
He had been Secretary of Finance under the US Governorship of Leonard Wood and 
later Secretary of Public Instruction. In 1912 he was Vice-president under Menocal 
and this prominent position of power was no doubt the reason for his absence from 
the National Council of Veterans in 1911-12. Later he held chairs in Psychology and 
Sociology at the University of Havana where he influenced Mella (Suchlicki 1988: 
290).  
 Second Vice-president of the Association was Manuel Sanguily. He had 
been a long-time collaborator with Varona. He had been President of the Senate, 
Secretary of State under José Miguel Gómez and Inspector General of the Armed 
Forces under Menocal (Suchlicki 1988: 254-5). These positions under Gómez and 
Menocal had no doubt appeased Sanguily’s desire for political status, as, although 
he is listed as a Colonel in the Institution of Veterans in 1911, he had not previously 
been a prominent spokesman for the movement.  
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  Third Vice-president General Miguel A. Varona had been a member of the 
Council in 1911-12 (Rodríquez Altunaga: 145), although again not a prominent one. 
Fourth and fifth Vice-presidents of the Association were Carlos Pérez Díaz and 
Lorenzo Nieto respectively (Cairo Ballester 1976: 102). Sixth Vice-president Alejo 
Carreño was president of the Asociación de Hacendados y Colonos [Association of 
Land owners and Settlers] (Pérez 1986: 242). 
Secretary General was Oscar Soto and his Vice-secretary was Juan M. 
Iznaga. The Treasurer, Manuel Despaigne was Assistant Secretary of State under the 
US occupation and headed the Cuban economic mission in Washington during 
World War I (Pérez 1986: 210).  
Secretary of Minutes was Gustavo Gutiérrez and the Vice-secretary of 
minutes was Martínez Villena. As noted earlier, the latter had led the Grupo 
Minorista, composed of, amongst others: Juan Marinello, Jorge Mañach, Francisco 
Ichaso, Félix Lizaso, Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring, José Antonio Fernández de 
Castro, José Tallet, and Alejo Carpentier. They later published the journal Social 
(Liss 1987: 66).  
Secretary of Correspondence, Carlos Alzugaray, was head of the Asociación 
de Comerciantes de La Habana [Association of Traders of Havana] (Pérez 1986: 
242). Vice-secretary of Correspondence, Juan Marinello, was part of the Protest of 
the Thirteen and also Vice-president of the Falange de Acción Cubana. He was 
Deputy of the School of Lawyers and a member of the National Code Commission, 
as well as founder of the Hispanic-American Cultural Institute.  
The Major Generals of the Association consisted of: Agustín Cebreco, José 
M. Capote, Salvador H. Ríos, Lope Recio Loinaz, and Javier de la Vega. Cebreco 
had been one of the spokesmen for the Liberals’ following the 1906 rebellion also a 
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General in the 1911 Council. He was probably the most prominent black veteran in 
the Veterans’ organisations. Lope Recio Loynaz was an officer in the Liberation 
Army of 1895 (Pérez 1986: 25), and later Governor of Camagüey (Figarola 1974: 
323). He had also been a General in the National Council of 1911-12.  
Listed as Generals of the Association are: Mariano Torres, Tomás Padró, 
Griñían, Enrique Loynaz del Castillo, Víctor Ramos, Francisco Estrada, José Reyes, 
Carlos Agüero, José J. Sánchez, Raimundo Sánchez  and Florencio Salcedo. Torres 
was a land owner and had been a member of the National Council of 1911-12.  
Enrique Loynaz del Castillo had been a participant in the rebellion of 1906 
and a General of the Council of 1911. As noted earlier, was later a member of the 
Unión Nacionalista during the government of Machado and a participant in the 
rebellion against his regime on 12 August 1933. Later he was Ambassador for 
Mexico and Venezuela (Figarola 1974: 327-8). Tomás Padró Griñían had been a 
Mayor of Santiago de Cuba and director of the National Laboratory (Figarola 1974: 
329). Estrada was Customs Administrator of Manzanillo. José Reyeshad was Mayor 
of Jiguaní (Figarola 1974: 330) and Carlos Agüero was a Civil Inspector (Figarola 
1974: 325). José J. Sánchez participated in the rebellions of 1906 and 1917 (Figarola 
1974: 331).  
Listed as Colonels of the Association are: Ciriaco Cargía, Elpidio Cossío, 
Luis Yero Miniet, Alberto Bez Peña, Amador Cervantes Miquelín, Roberto Méndez 
Peñate, Federico Laredo Bru and Carlos Mendieta.  
Laredo Bru was a Colonel in the Army of 1895-8. He led an unsuccessful 
military rising in 1923 in Las Villas (Thomas 2001: 343), and later organised 
opposition to the re-election of Machado in 1928 (Pérez 1986: 276). He was in 
Céspedes’s cabinet of 1933 (Thomas 2001: 385), was Vice-president under Miguel 
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Mariano Gómez in 1936 and later one of Batista’s puppet Presidents (Thomas 2001: 
445). Although not listed, as a member of the National Council in 1911-12, he was 
to be a very prominent member of the Veterans’ uprising in 1923-24, as will be seen 
later.  
Mendieta was likewise a Colonel of the War of Independence. He was 
Inspector of Health of the Republic under the Provisional Government of 1902. He 
was a representative in the House of Congress in 1908, 1912 and 1916. He was 
Zayas’s Vice-President in 1916 (Thomas 2001: 418), and participated in the 
rebellion of 1917 (Thomas 2001: 318). Like Laredo Bru, he was not listed among 
the Veterans’ personnel of 1911-12, but is also very important in 1923-24. In 1927 
he helped found the Unión Nacionalista [Nationalist Union] (Pérez 1986: 269) and 
in 1931 he was Menocal’s second in command in his uprising against Machado 
(Thomas 2001: 360). In 1934 he became Batista’s first ‘puppet’ President, 
suspending constitutional guarantees (Thomas 2001: 427), and resigned in 1936 “an 
honest man among thieves” (Thomas 2001: 435).  
Listed as Commanders of the Association are: Alberto Barreras and Rogelio 
Zayas Bazán. The former was Governor of Havana in 1917 (Thomas 2001: 319). 
The latter was Interior Minister in the Machado government of 1924 (Pérez 1986: 
258) and later Minister of the Interior, closing jai-alai halls, bars, and gambling dens 
(Thomas 2001: 346).  
 Listed as Doctors of the Association are: Leopoldo Cancio Luna, Enrique 
Hernández Cartya, Juan J. de Maza y Artola, and Luis Felipe Bolaños. As noted 
above, Maza y Artola had pressed for payment of veterans. 
Also listed as members are: Antonio G. de Mendoza, Vicente Soler, 
Fernando González, Porfirio Franca, Manuel Enrique Gómez, Carlos Zaldís and 
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Julio A. Mella. Mendoza was a lawyer later designated to represent the menocalistas 
during Sumner Welles’s visit in September 1933 (Thomas 2001: 402). Franca led 
the Committee of One Hundred in 1922 which “demanded an end to political 
misconduct and the adoption of a merit system in government” (Pérez 1986: 233), 
had in 1920 been the Manager of the National City Bank (Thomas 2001: 394), and 
was the member most favoured by the United States in the Pentarchy of 1933 (Pérez 
1986: 320). 
Antonio Mella was clearly an important figure in the nationalism emerging 
in 1923-25. In addition to that described above, he founded the José Martí 
University. According to Fernández, the anarchist Alfredo López managed to 
persuade Mella to work with students in the Escuela Racionalista Nocturna 
[Rationalist Night-school] a free school ran under the anarchist, Francisco Ferrer’s 
principles, and Mella apparently referred to López as “my teacher” (Fernández 
2001: 53-4).53 The José Martí University was apparently “modelled after Peruvian 
Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre's Popular University González Prada” (Liss 1984: 84-
5). The university functioned from 1923 to 1927 (Whitney 2001: 4).  
Listed as Spokesmen are: Colonel Rafael Manduley del Río, General Miguel 
Llaneras, Commander Campos Marquetti, Doctor Max Henríquez Ureña, 
Commander Mario Boza, Colonel Luis Landa, Captain Alberto Acosta, Miss 
Hortensia Lamar, Doctor Horacio Martínez Fraga, Doctor Orosmán Viamontes, and 
Colonel Enrique Thomas.  
Hortensia Lamar was the most prominent female member of the movement, 
she founded and edited La Mujer Moderna and was the Cuban delegate at the first 
                                                          
53 Fernández cites no source for this comment.  
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International Feminist Congress in Chile in 1929 where she introduced a proposal on 
female suffrage that was approved unanimously (Suchlicki 1988: 154).  
Most notable by their absence are Manuel Lazo, Manuel Aranda and Cosme 
de la Torriente. These had been prominent spokespeople of the movement at the 
meeting at the Hotel Telégrafo in 1909 and in the call for an Association to be 
formed in 1911. Manuel Lazo had also been one of the rebels of 1906 and many of 
these also were no longer present in the movement, most notably Demetrio Castillo 
Duany. However, as noted earlier Duany had been Chief of Prisons under President 
Menocal and Secretary of War under Zayas (Figarola 1974: 321) and so no longer 
sought patronage through the movement.  What this also showed was that no doubt 
many of the rebels of 1906 now held positions of power that they did not wish to 
compromise by joining the Association of Veterans or supporting any uprising. This 
is illustrative of the Association as a parallel vehicle of patronage not committed to 
the more social-revolutionary aims of many of the groups of civic opposition.  
 
 
The Twelve Demands of the Association of Veterans 
 
 The Twelve demands of the Association consisted of: 
 
1) Repeal of the lottery law. 
 
2) That the Government prevent the emergence of a railway monopoly. 
 
3) The prompt payment of veterans’ pensions. 
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 4) A law to guarantee the absolute independence of the judiciary. 
 
5) Abolition of the parts of the Electoral Code that give automatic voting 
rights in the assemblies of the political parties to all Congressmen, 
Governors etc., which makes it impossible to reform or renew those bodies. 
 
6) An accounting law to prevent the expenditure of public funds without 
attendant responsibilities. 
 
7) To fix the limits of parliamentary immunity to prevent this being used to 
protect those responsible for common crimes. 
 
8) To establish a law to harmonise the relationship between capital and 
labour, and to guarantee the preferred status of Cuban workers over foreign 
workers in the industries of the country. 
 
9) A constitutional amendment to prevent presidential re-election when the 
opportunity arises to amend the Constitution 
 
10) Another constitutional amendment to give women the vote, and to allow 
them to stand as representatives.  
 
11) An end to amnesty for common crimes.  
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12) The government must not approve legislation (the Tarafa bill) which 
would concede to the railways of the north of Cuba, exemption from their 
status as protected industries, because this would be prejudicial to the 
Treasury and the industry and commerce of Cuba (‘Proclamation to the 
Country’, in Gaunaurd 1954: 493-96, Appendix II).  
 
These were the demands of the meeting on 31 August. At the earlier meeting 
on 30 August, their demands had included abolition of the Law of Tourism, but had 
not included women’s political rights (Gaunaurd 1954: 480-89). Many of these 
demands had been made by the veterans’ groups throughout the republican period, 
by politicians in and of power and by political parties. They were all chiefly 
practices of corruption that were usually carried out by the incumbent 
administration. The lottery had been a matter of debate before: being officially re-
instated as it was held as popular among the people. However, the same problems 
plagued its re-establishment as it was used a tool of patronage. Moreover, the fact 
that Zayas himself had earlier been imprisoned for lottery-related corruption was not 
lost on Cubans. No doubt due to this fact, Campos Marquetti had invited President 
Zayas to the meetings of the Veterans’ and Patriots’ Association on 29 August, 
according to a correspondence from the Policía Secreta Nacional [National Secret 
Police], (Caja 63, p.91).  
There were also two letters by Carlos García Vélez and Oscar Soto 
specifically addressed to the judiciary, highlighting the continued importance of this 
issue to the Veterans’ organisations (Gaunaurd 1954: 489-92). A statement of a 
Judicial Police correspondent (presumably a spy) to Zayas states that it was 
Hortensia Lamar who proposed reforming the constitution to give women’s suffrage 
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(Memorandum XIX, Caja 61, Part 1, p.136). In response to the demands of 31 
August, Zayas insisted that his administration was not corrupt and called for 
concrete facts rather than insinuations (Gaunaurd 1954: 501-2).  
 
 
The Veterans’ movement attempts to achieve its demands 
 
The Association received the support of the Federación Nacional de 
Corporaciones Económicas [National Federation of Economic Corporations], the 
Asociación de Industriales [Industrial Association], the Asociación de Buen 
Gobierno [Association of Good Government], the FEU, the Falange de Acción 
Cubana, and the Federación de Asociaciones Femeninas [Federation of Women’s 
Associations]. Signatories to their subsequent pronouncements included Hortensia 
Lamar, Laredo Bru, Aníbal Escalante and Marinello. Municipal committees and 
local councils were established, and there was talk of consolidating the movement as 
a political party (Pérez 1986: 242).  
The Veterans’ platform also opposed illiteracy and the Tarafa Law, in the 
case of the latter no doubt because they resented high freight costs for transporting 
sugar to mills and ports, as many of the Association were planters. A main concern 
of the group was also the payment of pensions to Veterans. In August 1923 Celso 
Cuéllar, Zayas’s son-in-law, visited Washington and urged the State Department to 
condemn the Veterans. In Havana, Machado, the soon-to-be president, urged the 
same, arguing that, if they refused to do so, a “revolution is inevitable” and, in 
September, Despaigne visited the US Embassy representing the movement and 
urged them not to interfere with the Association (Pérez 1986: 246).  
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As current historiography suggests, the Veterans’ and Patriots’ Association 
of 1923-24 was connected to other groups of opposition to the government in these 
years. As early as 29 August, a (presumably under-cover), member of the Havana 
Judicial Police reported that during a meeting: 
 
a black veteran, protested because not a single black person appeared in the 
commission; and it was explained that here there were neither blacks nor 
whites, but that all were Veterans and Patriots…Miss Hortensia Lamar, 
President of the Feminist Club of Cuba, wished also to protest that not a 
single woman appeared in the Commission, forgetting no less than the Club 
which she represented, as she had been the first to put herself on the side of 
the Veterans and Patriots. Mr Alzugaray put his post of Vice-President at the 
disposal of this lady; and it was definitively recorded that a woman appeared 
in the Commission and that the Executive Committee of the Veterans and 
Patriots would give admission to another woman, as third Vice-President of 
the same (Judicial Police of Havana, Memorandum XVII, 29 August 1923, 
Caja 63, p.96).  
 
Here the Veterans’ and Patriots’ Association attempted to portray themselves 
as such an equitable institution that they were effectively blind to race, though this 
seems somewhat unconvincing, and indeed, very few blacks did feature in 
prominent roles in the organisation. Likewise, while Hortensia Lamar was no doubt 
instrumental in the Association adopting the demand for women’s suffgrage, the fact 
that two women featured within the movement hardly made it a radical body as far 
as women’s rights were concerned.  
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Zayas irritated the Association by harassing the movement’s meetings and 
then ordering the arrest of the leaders on 20 September 1923 (Chapman 1927: 472). 
Campos Marquetti then replaced García Vélez as president of the Association (El 
Universal 20 September 1923). A female member of the movement listed as Mari 
Blanca Sabas Alomás was one of those incarcerated (Gaunaurd 1954: 511-12). In 
response to this harassment, Oscar Soto declared in the press that the Veterans: 
 
are not preparing any revolution, nor do they want to prepare one for the 
good of government but of the Republic and its institutions (La Lucha 20 
September 1923). 
 
On 21 September 1923, Diario de la Marina reported on the detentions. This 
periodical was a Conservative mouthpiece, so not surprisingly it did not criticise the 
incarcerations, stating: 
 
The Court must examine whether the statements made by the Veterans and 
Patriots in their assemblies were insulting to the national authorities or 
incitements to the people to act against the constituted powers. (Diario de la 
Marina 21 September 1923). 
 
The same issue went on to state that: 
 
To questions from reporters about the motives for the detentions carried 
out…the Under-secretary of the Interior declared that the secret agents had 
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proceeded in compliance with the orders of Doctor Casanova, Public 
Prosecutor, who is pursuing the indictment for sedition against the assembly. 
 
Clearly this involved the most serious of political crimes. The same article 
also reported how the US Chargé d’Affaires, Williamson S. Howell, had come to 
visit the Cuban Secretary of State, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes to discuss their 
detention.  
On 24 September, Heraldo de Cuba reported that Ricardo Dolz, leader of the 
Republican Party, suggested consolidating the Veterans’ and Patriots’ Association as 
a political party, but they claimed that this allegiance would only “destroy the 
legitimate aspirations of the Liberal Party”. The same issue of the periodical 
reported that some veterans refused to enter their organisation’s meeting that day as 
a woman, namely Lamar, was chairing it. Obviously the Veterans’ Association was 
not as progressive as some of the groups of civic opposition in this period.  
By 29 September, the National Secret Police informer present in the 
Veterans’ and Patriots’ Association’s meetings was telling Zayas that they were 
intending to continue the state of alarm until US intervention was brought about, as 
they believed that this would be in their favour (National Secret Police to Zayas, 
Caja 61, Part III, p.30). The next day this plan was revealed to the press, with the 
Supreme Council of the Association accusing the judiciary of violating the 
Constitution by imprisoning its members and preventing their meetings, making the 
government no longer able to comply with its international obligation under the Platt 
Amendment and guarantee the protection of order, liberty and justice. The same 
piece spelt out exactly which articles of the Constitution the government had 
breached and how: Article 15 by imprisoning its members without charge, Article 
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22 by interfering with members’ correspondence, and Article 28 by disrupting their 
meetings (Heraldo de Cuba 30 September 1923). 
 The Association addressed their appeal ‘For the Regeneration of Cuba…to 
the People and to the Press of the United States’ on 31 September. This complained 
of: 
  
a system of detention and vice even more grave than that which existed 
before such reforms were advised…the National Association of Veterans and 
Patriots, composed of…two hundred thousand followers from all classes of 
our society (Caja 61, Part III, p.67-76). 
 
It then went on to condemn: 
 
The Presidential Decree relative to the exchange and purchase of land and 
the concession of monopolies, to enrich the government officials at the 
expense of the National Treasury, the famous Decree which imposed a 
Moratorium on the country during the conflict of the banking situation; a 
thing without precedent in any civilized country…the Decree ordering the 
purchase of the Convent of Santa Clara…which…would have placed in the 
hands of the President more than one million dollars (Caja 61, Part III, p.67-
76). 
 
The appeal also condemned the presidential use of pardons for common 
criminals, the Law of Tourism, the law of ‘Non-Reorganisation of Political Parties’ 
which would have made life-long congressional members, the collecturías, as they 
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were simply distributed among legislators, all levels of the judiciary as an 
‘instrument of the executive’ and the delayed payment of pensions. The appeal then 
listed the twelve points of 30 August and ominously asserted that this dispute must 
be resolved “either by right or by force” (Caja 61, Part III, p.67-76). 
A correspondence of the Judicial Police to Zayas on 5 October informed him 
that the Association made it clear that if the President did not accede to their 
demands they would initiate revolution (Caja 61, Part III, p.100). By this time 
groups were forming under the name ‘Milicia Patriótica Gubernamental’ [Patriotic 
Government Militia] to support Zayas in the event of an insurrection (Caja 61, Part 
III, p.123).  
An ‘open letter’ to the Veterans’ movement on 10 October 1923 by José R. 
Pascual pointed out that many members of the Veterans’ organisations had in fact 
previously been in government, and that “none of them when they had in their hands 
the reins of the government had tried to work for regeneration” (Caja 62, part IV, 
p.12). Indeed, the author no doubt had a point. In any case, correspondence from the 
Judicial Police to Zayas on 11 October indicated that the Veterans were planning a 
‘golpe de Estado’ showing that they, for their part, knew of this, perhaps indicating 
it was already doomed (Judicial Police to Zayas, 11 October 1923, Caja 62, part IV, 
p.18).  
In response to the formation of the Supreme Council of the National 
Association on 14 October 1923 and Oscar Soto’s claim that they were a 
“revolutionary assembly” (Chapman 1927: 474-5), Zayas inaugurated Decree 1572 
that prohibited the Veterans’ meetings (Cairo Ballester 1976: 103). The movement 
lost the support of farmers and land owners when the latter groups successfully 
bribed Zayas into dropping the Tarafa Bill (Cairo Ballester 1976: 109). In response 
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to Zayas’s prohibitions under Decree 1572, the Veterans claimed that their right to 
peaceful association guaranteed by Article 28 of the Constitution was being violated 
(Caja 62, Part VI, p.98).  
On 30 October 1923 members of the House of Representatives who had also 
been part of the Association of Veterans were dismissed (Heraldo de Cuba, 30 
October 23). Not surprisingly, the Council of Veterans of Santiago de las Vegas 
claimed this was “as reprisals for the campaign sustained by them principally against 
those members of Congress” (Gaunaurd 1954: 531).  
At this point, long-standing member of the Veterans’ various bodies, Cosme 
de la Torriente, came into immediate conflict with the Association of 1923-24. A 
correspondence from the Chargé d’Affaires, Williamson S. Howell, Sr., to the US 
Secretary of State, dated 3 December 1923, summarises events up to the week 
ending 1 December. Howell refers to: 
 
the accusation contained in Special Bulletin No. 6 (Nov.26th) of the Veterans 
and Patriots that President Zayas and Torriente had “knowingly violated the 
Constitution of the Republic” because Torriente had not resigned his seat in 
the Senate upon being appointed ambassador and was consequently holding 
two offices at the same time. 
 
According to Howell, Torriente responded to this with his ‘Proclamation to 
the Cuban People’. Howell documents this thus: 
 
in his manifesto- the propriety of which may well be questioned – [he] 
thought it necessary to explain that so long as he failed to see a way out of 
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the difficulties in which Cuba found herself he would not take his oath of 
office as Ambassador, and that until he did take his oath he was entitled to 
his seat in the Senate.  
 
However, according to Howell: 
 
it looks as if another diplomat were to be the cause of some embarrassment 
to the Veterans themselves: their leader, General García Vélez, not only 
never resigned his post of Cuban Minister in London but it has transpired 
that he has just been granted an extension of his leave of absence by the very 
President whom he proposes to overthrow (Williamson S. Howell, Sr., to the 
US Secretary of State, 3 December 1923). 
 
The loss of support from Torriente was in many ways symptomatic of the 
nature of the Veterans’ protest. He was a long-time Conservative Party leader and an 
authentic military veteran of 1895. However, the Veterans’ and Patriots’ movement 
of 1923-24 clearly represented nothing more radical than a disaffected faction of the 
Cuban political class. This faction, as in 1911-12, contained Conservatives, Liberals 
and independents, as well as both supporters and denigrators of the revolt of 1906. 
Their calls for an authentic nationalism were, however, little more than vaguely 
disguised pleas for the granting of positions of power to themselves. The fact that 
Torriente and García Vélez were guilty of exactly the same corruption, and that this 
very corruption meant that Torriente no longer needed the Veterans’ organisation for 
patrimonial support, likewise meant García Vélez was seen as on a par with 
governmental corruption among potential supporters of the Veterans’ movement in 
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1923. It was the fact that the movement of 1923 could not entirely disassociate itself 
from the practices of corruption that meant it that it was ultimately to be superseded 
by more radically nationalist groups in the years after this.  
On 11 December 1923 Chargé d’Affairs C. Van H. Engert again wrote to the 
US Secretary of State informing him of “the three reforms considered indispensable 
by the Veterans, viz. the suppression of the lottery, the repeal of the Tarafa Law, and 
the amendment of the Electoral Code”  (C. Van H. Engert to Secretary of State, 11 
December 1923, p.4). No doubt these reforms were important to the Veterans, but as 
has been seen, reformation of the judiciary and the laws regarding amnesty were 
also long-standing complaints. Days later the Chargé d’Affairs went on to state that 
the: 
 
[L]iberal elements in Congress,…incorporated three of the principal 
demands of the Veterans and Patriots in a Bill that they introduced in the 
House on December 10th. The Bill provides for the abolition of the Lottery, 
the repeal of the Tarafa Law, and the amendment of the Electoral Code. The 
repeal of the Lottery Laws of 1909 and 1923 is also provided for in a 
separate Bill (C. Van H. Engert to Secretary of State, 17 December 1923, 
p.2). 
 
Perhaps more important even than these three demands however, was the 
Decree of 12 December which “provides for the prompt payment of ‘gratifications’ 
or bonuses, which in practice amount to increases of salary, to most Government 
employees” (C. Van H. Engert to Secretary of State, 17 December 1923, p.2). 
Engert sheds light on the role of Torriente at this point as he states he was “Acting 
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Secretary of the Treasury” and he “informed the President that he has sufficient 
funds at his disposal to pay these bonuses in full and that their payment would put a 
stop to a traffic in bonus certificates which speculators have been indulging in” (C. 
Van H. Engert to Secretary of State, 17 December 1923, p.3). This no doubt 
indicates that Torriente was seen as one more corrupt político by the rank and file 
within the Veterans’ organisation of 1923-24. He had been the author of the law to 
end the moratorium and had clearly used this to acquire economic clients. However, 
García Vélez’s similar public malfeasance no doubt detracted support from the 
organisation as an authentic harbinger of Cuban nationalism.  
  
 
The Veterans’ planned rebellion of 1924 
 
As a result of the repression at the end of 1923, the Veterans developed an 
insurrectionary plan. Perhaps not surprisingly, it was almost exactly the same as the 
plans of 1906 and 1917, consisting of an armed expedition, simultaneous revolts in 
various provinces, along with bombardment of the presidential palace and various 
military targets in Havana. For his part, Zayas justified searching Veterans’ homes 
on evidence provided by his spies that they were in fact accumulating arms in 
certain people’s houses (in this case ‘Quinton Pino’), (Judicial Police to Zayas, 28 
January 1924, Caja 62, part IV, p.106). The fact that these ‘homes’ were in fact 
fincas (farms) indicates the bourgeois composition of the Association’s leadership.54 
This is the most glaring evidence that the movement was unlike much of the 
civic opposition and organisations such as the CNOC and the PCC. These tactics 
                                                          
54 Judicial Police to the Secretary of Justice lists the farms ‘San Pedro’ and ‘Suazo’, 
Caja 62, part IV, p.18 
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would have been completely futile for the latter, as they sought not to install their 
own small political faction after ousting the ruling one, but rather: popular 
participation at all levels of political and economic life.  
García Vélez and Despaigne travelled to the United States to arrange the 
purchase of six aeroplanes as well as seeking out wealthy American firms to 
bankroll them if they successfully assumed power. By this time, Zayas was aware of 
these plans (Cairo Ballester 1976: 109). A correspondence by the Judicial Police as 
early as 16 October 1923 reported to Zayas that the Association was planning an 
uprising. Interestingly the plan also included calling on workers to strike throughout 
the island and solicit US intervention (Caja 62, part IV, p.42). While this was no 
doubt prompted by the role of the Veterans in the 1902 strike, clearly workers had 
called strikes at that time for their own particular interests, that had only incidentally 
coincided with those of the United States and their aim to impose the dollar as the 
dominant currency, and likewise only incidentally coincided with the aims of the 
Veterans. No doubt the workers’ movement felt that they owed the Veterans 
nothing, as this plan was never discussed again and it never went further. In fact, the 
Cajas on the Association of Veterans include a correspondence from Judicial Police 
to the Secretary of Justice discussing the ‘Hermandad de Ferrocarrileros’ 
[Brotherhood of Railroad Workers] and their strike in February 1924, but there is no 
mention of the names of any of the Veterans’ leadership as being involved (Caja 62, 
part IV, p.102-5).  
On Sunday, 23 March, 1924, the New York Times contained an interview 
with “General García [Carlos García Vélez], Colonel Manuel Despaigne,…and a 
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third Cuban, internationally known, whose name cannot be given”,55 in which the 
Association set out their ideas. They asserted that: 
 
[W]e would not say now that we are planning a revolution…we are working 
for the overthrow of the Zayas Government in order to save the country. We 
do not know whether that can be accomplished without revolution, which we 
do not believe in if it can be avoided…it will not be the kind of revolution 
that is generally associated with Latin American countries. Property will be 
protected…it will be an orderly revolution and, so great will be public 
support, that it will be a bloodless revolution…The planters want a 
revolution. Commerce and business want a revolution...there can be no legal 
or moral right by which the country can be bound to continue prostituting the 
resources that belong to all the people for the benefit of private 
enterprises…From the standpoint of social life and morals…Cuba is going to 
the wall under the present administration. There is graft and thievery of all 
kinds…The courts are practically non-existent. They are appointed and 
controlled by the Executive, and exist only as an adjunct for pardoning 
criminals the Administration wants pardoned…An election in Cuba 
nowadays is a farce…Representatives got from $500 to $50,000 for their 
votes and influence to pass the Tarafa bill (Caja 63: p.1-2) 
 
Their notion of an ‘orderly revolution’ portrayed the liberal, constitutional 
heritage that they claimed, in contrast with the more radical members of the 
Association. Again the emphasis is that of a unified cultural, economic and social 
                                                          
55 This was probably José Fernández de Castro. 
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unit, temporarily betrayed by its political leadership. While they talked of the 
‘prostituting of resources’, they did not mean by capitalists or even US corporations, 
but rather practices of political corruption, peculiarly Cuban.  
Later on in the same article García Vélez states: 
 
The Veterans’ and Patriots’ Association…issued our manifesto on Aug. 30, 
1923, what you might call the Cuban Declaration of Independence… It 
embodies twelve points…Those are the reforms we demand. Until we get 
them the reign of graft will go on. It cannot be stopped except by reform or 
revolution. 
 
It seems somewhat unusual to speak of ‘overthrowing’ a government without 
a revolution, or revolting, even when one does not believe in doing so. The 
paragraph is symptomatic, however, of the reasoning of the Veterans. They felt 
themselves to be the legitimate heirs to political power in Cuba, and the thinly veiled 
threat emphasised their nationalist rhetoric of ‘saving’ the country. In this speech, 
García Vélez also made clear the opposition to the Law of Tourism, which 
according to him was “really an official subsidy for gambling places under the guise 
of encouraging tourist travel”. As elsewhere, Zayas’s practice of nepotism was again 
a subject of criticism. According to García Vélez: 
 
[t]he administrator of the lottery is a son, he won the grand prize mentioned 
above,…The Collector of Customs at Havana,…is held by another nephew. 
The major-domo of the palace, who controls the executive expenditures, is a 
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son of the President’s wife by a former marriage. The chief engineer of the 
City of Havana is a brother of the President’s son-in-law. 
 
On 24 March, El Sol stated that Oscar Soto and Gustavo Gutiérrez had been 
responsible for acquiring machine guns and hand grenades in the United States. The 
correspondence of the Secretary of State for Cuba claims that ‘Mr Green’, a pilot, 
acted as the agent of Salvador Martínez Ibor in St. Petersburg, Florida, the latter 
being the brother-in-law of García Vélez (Caja 63, p.9). Another correspondence 
from the Consulate of the Republic of Cuba to Carlos Manuel Céspedes, the Cuban 
Secretary of State, states that H. Hollingsworth, Special Agent of the Department of 
Justice of the US government revealed to him that Mexican revolutionaries had sold 
the Veterans arms in St. Petersburg (Consulate of the Republic of Cuba, p.1 in Caja 
63). Later, the same Consul states that the same agent Hollingsworth had informed 
him that Gustavo Gutiérrez had used the false identity of a judge, ‘Jaime Traumont’ 
to travel to Tampa to acquire arms (Consulate of the Republic of Cuba, p.3 in Caja 
63). 
On 27 March García Vélez stated with some duplicity that “[t]here will be a 
revolution…but not a revolution of canons and machetes, but a revolution of the 
public consciousness”. Later in the same article, García Vélez and Manuel 
Despaigne claimed that “there are six hundred professors,…but the majority are 
political agents without teaching obligations with which they must comply” 
(Heraldo de Cuba 27 March 1924). Although this was clearly an objection to an 
instance of graft, the Veterans’ statements had not raised this issue prior to this. No 
doubt this was due to the formation of the civic opposition groups and the influence 
of the FEU.  
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Upon being dismissed as Minister for Cuba in London, García Vélez 
ironically accepted this as “the most grand honour that I have received in my life”. 
García Vélez went on to warn of those who “want to make of this Association a 
partisan instrument serving petty personal interests” (El Sol 25 March 1924).  
In response to García Vélez’s published speeches, Zayas closed El Sol and 
wrote to the President of the Press Association, justifying his actions on the basis of 
the “open and agitated revolutionary propaganda, aiming at the realisation of an 
armed movement that disturbs public order” (Diario de la Marina 29 March 1924). 
Zayas founded his actions on the powers granted to him by Paragraph 17 of Article 
68 of the Constitution that made him head of the armed forces: a role that 
empowered him not only to defend the national territory but also to conserve 
‘interior order’ (Pichardo 1973: 90).  
Here again the extent of the contest between the Veterans and the 
government is shown: both claimed to be the legitimate expression of Cuban 
nationalism, and both claimed the other was illegally abusing the Constitution. 
Hence, neither were radical in the social-revolutionary sense, nor even as radical as 
the Liberation Army had been through its practice of racial equality; rather, a 
political ‘revolution’ in the sense of a change in power brought about by force was 
called for, along with the denigration of the other party as the malfeasant one, and 
the hailing of their own faction as above such partisan political venality.  
It can be seen however, that the Cuban government did try to remain within 
constitutional precepts, or at least wished to display itself as doing this to the United 
States. In response to Zayas’s censorship of the press, a statement by Oscar Soto, 
Gustavo Gutiérrez and Miguel Llaneras appeared in Heraldo de Cuba claiming that 
there was no legal precept for press censorship, and that in fact Article 25 of the 
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Constitution specifically protected the right to free expression (Caja 63, p.13). 
Meanwhile, Zayas continued his covert observation of the Veterans’ activities in 
collaboration with the US government. A correspondence of 28 March from the 
Consul for the Republic of Cuba to the Cuban Secretary of State claims that the pilot 
the Veterans were using was a ‘John Greene’. The Consul had been informed by the 
US agent Hollingsworth, and a ‘Federal Marshall’ in Tampa (‘Mr Y. O. Price’), that 
the purchase of six machine guns had been orchestrated. They had been bought from 
a place in Hartford, Connecticut and shipped to John Greene in St. Petersburg. The 
‘American Bank & Trust Company’ had funded this. The US President however, felt 
that this was related to supplying revolutionaries in Mexico, against which activity 
there were explicit prohibitions. Hollingsworth had discovered that the American 
Bank & Trust Company had itself received funds from the ‘Bank of Columbia in 
Tampa’ on the order of Salvador Martínez Ibor. Hollingsworth also discovered that 
a Havana judge, Jaime Traumont, had deposited $21,500 in the Bank of Columbia in 
November 1923, placing it at the disposal of Salvador Martínez Ibor. Greene had 
suspected that he was being investigated, when he bought six aeroplanes in San 
Antonio, Texas, and had them flown to Houston (Caja 63, p.16-19).  
On 31 March 1924, the Cuban Ambassador in Washington, Cosme de la 
Torriente, wrote to the Cuban Secretary of State Carlos Manuel de Céspedes asking 
him if he thought that a revolution was being prepared there. He asked Céspedes if 
the Cuban President thought that a statement by the US President that there was a 
danger of revolution in Cuba would do more damage than good, and would also 
hinder investigation into the potential connection to Mexican revolutionaries. 
Céspedes responded by stating that he was not aware of an uprsising in Cuba, save 
for arms discovered in Santa Clara (Caja 63, p.21-23).  
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Later Torriente explained to Céspedes that Joint Resolution No. 37 of the 
67th Congress of the United States of 31 January 1922 prohibited the export of arms 
and munitions. However, Torriente went on to explain that an American ‘Mr. 
Hughes’ had clarified to him that this was not a ‘dictatorial’ right on the part of the 
US President, but rather: 
 
it must be founded in certain facts, because if this is not the case the 
Tribunals of Justice56 can declare the embargo without effect. As an 
example, he said to me that if the President dictated today a decree 
prohibiting the shipment of munitions of War to Canada without having 
proof of the existence of a state of violence, that is, of a disruption of the 
public peace, or of a possible disruption of the same in the said country, then 
the commerce of munitions is as legitimate as in normal times (Caja 63, 
p.34-36).  
 
Torrient told Céspedes that the federal agent in Tampa, angel Solano, stated 
that he was continuing his investigations and that this would proceed better without 
a declaration on the part of the Cuban president of a state of disorder, in order to 
better make a case later on (Caja 63, p.24). For his part, agent Solano wrote to 
Céspedes that special agent Hollingsworth had informed him that Salvador Martínez 
Ibor had been in Miami and had paid the pilot and ordered the aeroplanes to be taken 
                                                          
56 This is Torriente’s phrase. Presumably by ‘Tribunals of Justice’ he meant the US 
Federal Courts, or the Supreme Court, or both in unison. Cubans themselves often 
used the phrase ‘Tribunals of Justice’ to describe the Cuban court system at varying 
levels. The fact that Cuba’s judicial system was not, however, the same, or even as 
explicitly clear, as the US system, is perhaps indicative not only of Torriente’s 
confusing term here, but also as has been seen, of the issue of judicial power in Cuba 
as a whole.  
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to Ocala. Hollingsworth had insisted on the need for photographic evidence of 
cheques signed in the name of Jaime Traumont by Salvador Martínez Ibor in order 
to link him to Gustavo Gutiérrez (Caja 63, p.25). The US federal police were active 
in New York hoping to gain evidence to present to a Grand Jury, and Torriente 
informed Céspedes that they had proof of a planned aerial attack, but that it was 
necessary for further investigations to establish a link to members of the Veterans’ 
and Patriots’ movement in both the United States and Cuba.  
In another correspondence, Torriente informed Céspedes that the Consul 
General of New York thought the Mexican revolutionaries and the Veterans’ and 
Patriots’ movement were working together. According to the Consul, the financial 
agent of the Mexican revolutionaries in Havana, Dr. Alfredo Ferrer, had paid the 
Veterans $24,000 for 325,000 7 millimetre mauser cartridges which they had given 
to the Committee of Mexican Revolutionaries in Havana. The Mexicans realised 
they were now being covertly observed in the United States and they were no doubt 
aware of the aforementioned prohibitions against the export of materials of war and 
the potential criminal consequences. The same correspondence goes on to say that 
Antonio Manero, the agent for Huerta in New York,57 had visited Havana, taking 
with him three letters for bonds issued from the house of Mendoza, two of them for 
$50,000 and one for $25,000. The Mexican revolutionaries and the Veterans and 
Patriots had apparently issued bonds of $10,000 that they invested in the banks of 
New York (Caja 63, p.27) 
Covert observation by both the US and Cuban authorities, and the Veterans’ 
cognisance of this, meant the Veterans now had to raise money for their revolution 
elsewhere. A correspondence by Alberto Treviño states that he had watched García 
                                                          
57 Huerta was a Mexican politician briefly to assume power in Mexico by force of 
arms.  
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Vélez and Manuel Despaigne visit two Cuban companies in New York, being 
unsuccessful at raising funds both times. These companies were the García Sugar 
Corporation and the Pocahontas Coal Company (Caja 63, p.51). A report from the 
Consul in Key West to Torriente states that:  
 
the Veterans’ movement has never had great sympathy among the Cubans of 
Key West, who if they did have very little, this completely disappeared after 
the view of General García Vélez was revealed during his journey to this 
country, whose opinion has been considered here as antipatriotic and 
prejudicial to the interests of our Republic…the declarations made by 
General García in the North, to the American press,…were listened to with 
interruptions and outcries of…’send them to prison for ten years’ (Consulate 
of the Republic of Cuba, 20 April 1924, Caja 63, p.52).  
 
With support from neither wealthy Cubans in the United States, nor among 
the workers of Key West (who had made up a great constituency of support for all 
the Cuban struggles for independence), it is little wonder that the Veterans’ planned 
rebellion was seemingly doomed. In fact, the workers of Key West had a point: 
Carlos García Vélez and Manuel Despaigne had been powerful políticos since the 
inauguration of Menocal, if not before, Despaigne having been the Secretary of the 
Treasury in the ‘Honest Cabinet’.  
There was an outbreak of insurrection on 30 April 1924 in Las Villas under 
Laredo Bru without the authorisation of García Vélez (Chapman 1927: 476). On 3 
May 1924 the Chief of the Judicial Police of Cuba wrote to the Cuban Secretary of 
Justice telling him that ‘prominent members’ of the Veterans’ and Patriots’ 
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Association had been detained on 29 April, including Oscar Soto. Soto carried a 
letter with him that contained references to ‘Wheeling’, ‘Molk’ or ‘Wolk’ and 
‘Standard’. It appeared that ‘Wheeling’ was Soto, ‘Molk’ or ‘Wolk’ was Despaigne, 
and ‘Standard’ was García Vélez (Caja 63, p.66).  
On 5 May Céspedes wrote to Washington that “people in general condemn 
the uprising” and that “Laredo Bru’s party is composed of some one hundred and 
thirty men, and forces of the Government are situated conveniently around its front 
and flanks” (Caja 63, p.73). Also on 5 May, Torriente wrote to Céspedes telling him 
that a ‘J. Fernández García’ and a ‘Roberto Martínez’ had been detained in Ocala, 
Florida, and six aeroplanes confiscated (Caja 63, p.79).  
Two days later, Céspedes wrote to the Cuban delegation in Germany, stating 
that the US press claimed that the same delegation affirmed to the German 
newspaper Deutsche Allegmeine Zeitung that it was of the opinion that “the present 
revolt is being stimulated by American sugar interests in order to provoke an 
American intervention” (Caja 63, p.91). A week later, Torriente told Céspedes that 
the Consul General had informed him that Despaigne, García Vélez and Gustavo 
Gutiérrez were still trying to send the arms they had acquired to Cuba via Haiti or 
Santo Domingo (Caja 63, p.98).  
For their part, the United States incarcerated Fernández de Castro, Martínez 
Villena and García Velez, who were in Florida training to fly aeroplanes (Cairo 
Ballester 1976: 111). Zayas released Despaigne and García Velez on condition that 
they ceased political agitation and he also paid Laredo Bru’s forces to disband 
(Cairo Ballester 1976: 111). On 16 May, Vicente Soler, President of the Veterans 
and Patriots of Santa Clara, wrote to the Cuban President claiming that his actions 
were “in disgraceful disagreement with the methods that until this day, were 
 263
practised by the Judicial power”, and that those imprisoned had been were there on, 
“false charges” (Caja 63, p.100).  
Shortly after this, Céspedes gave a letter to the Cuban press that had earlier 
been given to him by Torriente. It described a US agent who: 
 
spoke with Gustavo Gutiérrez who was sailing for Cuba for the purpose of 
attempting to help reorganize the threads of the late revolution. The subject 
talked as if he had some feelings against the General [Vélez]58 He further 
stated that he believed President Coolidge made a mistake in declaring the 
embargo on arms to Cuba as the Cuban Revolutionists had the sympathy of 
the American Ambassador, General Enoch Crowder. He stated that the 
principles General Crowder urged were rejected by President Zayas and his 
cohorts and that General Crowder knew the Revolionists were right…He 
stated that…in the event the United States placed another embargo on arms 
to Cuba he believed that resources and capital could be obtained in Europe 
and the necessary supplies secured from abroad.…he stated….the 
Revolutionists had 17,000 men in the field (Case no: 328, Agent: 11, Report: 
5, 24 May, 1924, Caja 63, p.109-10).  
 
From this it is clear in many ways why the Veterans’ revolt fell apart so 
easily. Divided at the highest levels among its leadership, not supported among the 
nationalist and potentially revolutionary element of workers in Cuba or Key West, 
(and indeed with no authentic attempt to garner this support), unable to raise enough 
resources and arms, and in fact tacitly supported by the United States, and with that, 
                                                          
58 The square brackets and Vélez’s name are contained in the original source.  
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the support of Enoch Crowder, the diplomat responsible for much interference in the 
Cuban state of affairs in 1921. The latter point was no doubt crucial at this juncture. 
Cubans had long resented the role of the United States in the struggle against 
Spanish imperialism and what came to be seen as the neo-colonial role of the United 
States under the Platt Amendment. The 1906 revolt, while popular and felt to be 
justified, had been ultimately vindicated by this same US hegemony. The role of 
políticos after 1906, and more crucially, under Gómez and later Menocal, many of 
whom had only managed to launch their political careers due initially to the role of 
the United States, and later their attendant corruptions, meant that this tactic of 
soliciting US intervention was not in accord with much of the patriotic feeling 
present in Cuba in 1923-24.  
Crowder had been a supporter of the Veterans’ and Patriots’ movement since 
11 November 1923 when he had drawn the attention of US Secretary of State 
Hughes to their “twelve point program and to the fact they are advocating many of 
the reforms that have been suggested by the United States in the diplomatic 
correspondence of the last two years” (Pérez 1986: 246). Popularity among members 
of the US political class was not however, a guarantee of power in the turbulent 
political ferment beginning in Cuba after the 1920s.  
 
 
The Decline of the Veterans’ movement as a nationalist force after 1924 
 
The políticos of all factions had been in various positions of power 
throughout the period 1906-24: aged leaders of 1895, revolutionaries of 1906, 
Liberal followers of Gómez, and later menocalistas and zayistas. They were all 
 265
tainted by corruption. Nothing could have more aptly summarised the situation than 
that comment mentioned earlier by the workers of Key West: ‘send them to prison 
for ten years’. Not surprisingly then, workers of Cuba and Key West, the student 
radicals involved in the FEU, as well as the civic opposition groups more generally, 
saw the Veterans’ movement for precisely what it was: one more internecine 
factional struggle among the corrupt political class.  
The Chargé d’Affairs had reported to the US Secretary of State,  
communicating his feelings about the Federation of Students of the University of 
Havana. He stated that this body: 
 
(1)…voiced essentially anti-American sentiments. This is accounted for by 
an intense feeling of nationalism, impatient alike of weakness in the 
Government and of American intervention. If reforms be necessary they 
must be made by Cubans and not by “foreigners”… 
(2) Being intensely ignorant of American aims and ideals, the students 
naturally advocate the Latin-american brotherhood as against the “danger” of 
becoming submerged by Anglo-Saxon dominance… 
…(4) An unmistakable tendency to flirt with Bolshevism is apparent in the 
founding of the so-called “Popular University”. (C Van H. Engert, Chargé 
d’Affairs, to the US Secretary of State, 10 December 1923).  
 
It was precisely this new “intense feeling of nationalism”, that was beginning 
to insist that reforms “must be made by Cubans”, that led not only to the growing 
popularity of new groups like the FEU and the PCC, but also that held the Veterans’ 
and Patriots’ movement of 1923-24 as incapable of carrying out these very reforms. 
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The Veterans were seen as complicit with, not only the corruptions of the entire 
post-independence era, but with prominent Conservatives and Liberals, with the role 
of the United States and its hegemonic practices, with the tacit endorsement of 
Enoch Crowder. Incapable of purging the Cuban state of corruption alone, complicit 
in many ways with these same corruptions, the Veterans represented the final gasp 
of the nationalism of 1895.  
With the crisis of 1923-24 new social actors, inherently more radical, were to 
take centre stage in the arena of nationalist feeling in Cuba. They were to define the 
new politics leading from the formation of the Cuban Communist Party in 1925, to 
the Machadato. While some of their more radical views on society may not have 
been ultimately enshrined in Cuban political culture, this period was to produce a 
definitive test of nationalist allegiance that groups like the Veterans’ movement 
were largely incapable of (due to their appeal to US interests): commitment to the 
abrogation of the Platt Amendment. Machado’s power coalesced around this issue, 
and while it was to take a struggle of another ten years before Batista removed the 
Amendment in 1934, even in 1924, the Veterans’ movement was not seen as 
‘intensely’ nationalist enough.  
The Veterans’ organisation then debated whether to constitute itself as a 
political entity, possibly in support of Menocal in the November presidential 
elections, with many arguing against participation in party politics, while many of 
the new members of the movement were strongly against Menocal (Cairo Ballester 
1976: 112). Others favoured involvement in politics but instead coalesced around 
support for Carlos Mendieta to be president of the movement and hence the nation. 
At this time the movement lost support among the young intellectuals like Martínez 
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Villena, who had sought a wide-ranging ‘regeneration’ and not simply reform of the 
political system (Cairo Ballester 1976: 113).  
This caused the young intellectuals to believe that profound changes, rather 
than partial remedies were needed, and that these could not be achieved through 
entities like the Veterans’ movement, and that full implementation of the Manifesto 
of Montecristi would require a revolutionary consciousness (Cairo Ballester 1976: 
114). Martínez Villena called the defeat of the Veterans in 1924 “revenge of the 
bourgeoisie” (Nuñez Machín 1974: 165). Discussing his compatriot, the writer Juan 
Marinello stated that Martínez Villena “discovered then that the rule of imperialism, 
was the fundamental cause of our problems. His path towards Marxism and the class 
struggle was opened” (Nuñez Machín 1974: 166). 
Further, the failure of the Veterans’ planned rebellion showed that in many 
ways, the conflict between the Cuban President and the Veterans movement of 
1923-24 had its own internal dynamic. It was driven more by the goal of patronage 
than a genuine ‘anti-Americanism’ of the newer groups alluded to above. The issue 
of presidential re-election, for example, while important to the Veterans, was not the 
chief cause of their revolt. Rather, it was because he was not ‘their’ president, and he 
used the powers granted to him against them, legally according to his office, and 
unconstitutionally according to the Veterans. The Popular Party had opposed re-
election in December 1923 and had posited obstructing the House of 
Representatives on the issue (C Van H. Engert to the US Secretary of State, 11 
December 1923). The Veterans however, while they may have supported this 
obstruction as individual Senators, did not form an allegiance with the Popular Party 
on this issue. This once again illustrated their narrow, factional interests, not in 
accord with the emerging radical nationalism. The young radicals were very much 
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aware of this. Like Martínez Villena, Mella was explicit about his experiences with 
the Association of Veterans. As he put it: 
 
We are taking a different path. We are revolutionaries, yes, but sincerely 
revolutionary. We do not aspire to power. We do not want to change some 
men for others…We hope to realise our ideals. Our ideals that are not the 
elevation of a few, but the liberation of enslaved people. History has shown 
us that in order for a real and just transformation the economic system must 
be destroyed (IHMCRSC 1975: 97).  
 
Indeed, the same source claims that: 
 
It is the participation of the young which led to a more radical path: the 
armed insurrection in which Rubén Martínez Villena and José Antonio 
Fernández de Castro took part (IHMCRSC 1975: 97, n.21). 
  
It had been Martínez Villena’s group that had risen in rebellion, and while 
they might theoretically have gained the support of the working class of Cuba and 
Key West, this rising was not to be, for the patronage network represented by the 
Association of Veterans again compromised with a government with which, it was 
in many ways, complicit.  
The Association of Veterans and Patriots of 1923-24 represented the last 
gasp of Cuban nationalism directly descended from the years 1895-98 with authentic 
relation to the revolts of 1906 and 1917. Even by this stage, however, many of the 
personnel were lesser-known veterans. The attempt at unity with the civic opposition 
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and radical movements was flawed from the start: by the inherent conservatism of 
veterans as such, by their male chauvinism, and by their corruption and factionalism. 
Further, despite their flowery rhetoric, the Veterans’ organisations themselves 
included many who were not untainted by political corruption. In fact the movement 
usually represented a vehicle of patronage operating sometimes against, sometimes 
with, political parties. Personnel included Conservatives and Liberals, and those 
from these factions not currently in power. However, that was exactly as far as their 
politics reached: from Liberalism to Conservativism and no further.  
While to many of the young radicals the Veterans’ organisation of 1923-24 
was seemingly a potentially revolutionary organisation, the Association was only 
revolutionary in the old sense: in terms of a ‘golpe de Estado’, bombardment of the 
presidential palace, destruction of US property – i.e., petit-bourgeois, nationalist 
opposition to large-scale US economic interests and political corruptions. In fact, 
however, many of the personnel were just as keen to seek US help under the Platt 
Amendment itself, and hence were in fact shrewd políticos, afraid of, or willingly 
complicit, with the reality of emerging US world hegemony. Not surprisingly, the 
movement was eclipsed by those more representative of the young and the working 
class – the CNOC, the PCC, women’s movements, and even the corporatist 
associations to later appear under the Machadato.  
This chapter has illuminated some of the questions intrinsic to the thesis: the 
question of a civil society organisation engaging in armed politics, and the question 
of what happened to 30,000 or more demobilised mambises and their role in the 
politics of the Cuban republic. However, by the 1920s the genuine ‘veterans’ were 
very old men, and their ideas equally as dated by this time. The Soviet revolution 
and World War I, while seemingly distant events, were to have an impact on Cuba 
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in a world increasingly inter-related in forms of commercial exchange, and as an 
inevitable consequence, with the flow of ideas. In any case, the Veterans’ protest 
had been accommodated by 1924 in similar ways to earlier revolutionary 
movements: by partial compromise and oaths of good government on the part of the 
administration, by the granting of patronage to some of the leadership, and by an 
insight on the part of those protesting into the futility of continuing the bloodshed 
characteristic of the years 1906 and 1917. However, in order to fully understand the 
decline of the Veterans’ organisations after the years 1923-25, it will be necessary to 
look at events after this, to see why such organisations were not resurrected.  
 
 
The radicalisation of politics under the Machadato 
 
In 1925, Gerardo Machado was elected President of Cuba, very much on the 
basis that he would be the candidate for Cuban nationalism, long required. However, 
his rule was to be more dictatorial than any previous Cuban President, and, hence, 
Cuban political culture was to become more radical in opposition. In many ways, the 
Veterans’ organisations were not radical enough for the ‘new’ politics, although 
their personnel did play some parts in events.  
On 15 August 1925 the third Congreso Nacional Obrero [National Workers’ 
Congress] formed the Confederación Nacional Obrera de Cuba [National 
Confederation of Cuban Workers – CNOC], which was “strongly influenced by 
anarchosyndicalist ideas”, the most important part being, its “collective refusal of 
electoral politics” (Thomas 2001: 347). Juana María Acosta was elected provisional 
president, the first time a woman held such a position (Fernández 2001: 54-5), and 
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the first Secretary-general was Alfredo López (Thomas 2001: 348). The CNOC was 
“affiliated with the Profintern, Moscow's ‘Red Union’…[but] was not necessarily 
controlled by the Soviet Union” (Liss 1987: 67). It was apparently founded because 
the “anarcho-syndicalist leadership, realiz[ed] the regional and class limitations of 
the FOH” (Aguilar 1972: 82). A few days later, the Partido Comunista Cubano 
[Cuban Communist Party – PCC] was founded in Havana by Mella, Carlos Baliño 
(Fernández 2001: 55), and Juan Marinello (Liss 1987: 91), when the existing six 
Agrupaciones Comunistas [Communist Groupings] formed an alliance (Thomas 
2001: 349). Mella also helped found the Cuban section of the Anti-Imperialist 
League in 1925 with Baliño and Marinello, and edited its journal Lucha de Clases.59  
In 1926 in Mexico Mella spoke out against the murder of anarchists Sacco 
and Vanzetti in the United States (Liss 1987: 88-9). The formation of the PCC was 
carried out with the help of Mexico's Enrique Flores Magón, one of the ideologues 
of the Mexican revolution, who was sent by Moscow to Cuba (Liss 1987: 67). The 
first Secretary-general was José Miguel Pérez, who was almost immediately 
replaced by José Peña Vilaboa, and the publication Justicia replaced La Lucha de 
Clases (Thomas 2001: 350). Mella was imprisoned by Machado on a trumped-up 
murder charge the month following the formation of the PCC. 
Gerardo Machado had succeeded Zayas as president, and, as Shaffer puts it, 
his “election…signalled the beginning of the end for anarchist control of the Cuban 
labor movement” (Shaffer 2000: 61). Machado’s repression of the anarchist 
movement was harsh. He closed the Sindicato de la Industria Fabril [Syndicate of 
Industrial Artisans], arresting its leader Margarito Iglesias, and jailed anarchist 
leader Enrique Varona, who was later murdered. López was offered a government 
                                                          
59 Thomas mentions the journal El Comunista (Thomas 2001: 350). 
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post to stop his activities, which he refused and he was later kidnapped and 
disappeared (Fernández 2001: 56). César Vilar, a Communist, then took over as 
Secretary-general of the CNOC (Thomas 2001: 352). Machado banned the 
publications of the Havana Federation of Labour (FOH), and created a pro-
government union, La Federación Cubana de Trabajo [The Cuban Federation of 
Work] (Whitney 2001: 53).  
Also in 1927, the anarchist Margarito Iglesias disappeared and Communists 
gradually usurped the CNOC, taking over positions previously held by anarcho-
syndicalists. In 1927 Machado murdered four students, Claudio Brouzón, Noske 
Yalob, Puerto Reyes, and Manuel Cotoño, after accusing them of being Communists 
(Thomas 2001: 358). Machado had also reinstated all the teachers ousted by the 
1923 student rebellion of the FEU (Aguliar 1972: 76). Militant anarchist self-
defence groups such as Espártaco, Los Solidarios and the Federación de Grupos 
Anarquistas de Cuba [Federation of Anarchist Groups of Cuba – FGAC], allied with 
university students in a violent campaign against Machado’s repression. Other 
armed opposition groups such as the Directorio Estudiantil Revolucionario 
[Revolutionary Student Directorate] likewise began armed resistance (Fernández 
2001: 57). The student group which Fernández cites confuses the issue over what 
Liss and other sources term the Directorio Estudiantil Universitario [University 
Student Directorate - DEU], who allied with the Communist Party. The DEU was 
formed by Aureliano Arango, Eduardo Chibás and Antonio Guiteras in 1927 
(Aguilar 1972: 77, 116).  
In 1927, out of the Grupo Minorista, Alejo Carpentier, Juan Marinello, Jorge 
Mañach, Francisco Ichaso, Félix Lizaso, and Medardo Vitier created Revista de 
Avance (Liss 1987: 67). The Grupo Minorista organised a tribute to Serafín Delmar 
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and was accused of plotting to overthrow the government, resulting in the 
‘Communist trial of 1927’. Although there were no convictions, the Communist 
Party was at this point outlawed (Aguilar 1972: 85-6). In 1928 Mella and the DEU 
became antagonistic to the ‘Third Period’ of the Comintern (Aguilar 1968: 15-20), 
and, “attempted to formulate Marxist strategies based on specific national realities 
and not primarily on the precepts of the Comintern’s ‘orthodox’ Marxism” (Whitney 
2001: 75). 
All these events, of course, signalled that many of the political concerns of 
the Veterans’ organisations were a thing of the past: the payment of veterans, the 
control of civil service positions, and the role of the Cuban President in appointing 
the judiciary. Much as the economic crisis of 1921 had radically changed Cuban 
political culture, so too, did the Crash of 1929. In 1930 a streetcar strike became a 
general one, the first of its kind in Cuba under a dictatorship. According to 
Fernández, the PCC collaborated with Machado in attempting to remove all 
anarchist elements from the CNOC, as testified by the anarchist members of the 
FGAC, Casto Moscú, Manuel González, Agustín Castro, and Eusebio Mujal 
(Fernández 2001: 57). Also, in 1930, a protest by the DEU led Machado to suspend 
constitutional guarantees (Aguilar 1972: 102-3). In January the following year the 
Ala Izquierda Estudiantil [Student Left Wing] split from the DEU, claiming that the 
latter was only anti-Machado, rather than anti-imperialist, and they founded the 
journal Línea (Aguilar 1972: 116-7). During this period “the Communists 
successfully broke the anarchist control of CNOC…even by betraying them to 
Machado’s police” (Thomas 2001: 362).60 At this time the Secretary-General was 
                                                          
60 Dolgoff states that “the communists, in league with the Machado government, 
connived by the foulest means to seize control of the CNOC and the labor 
movement” (Dolgoff 1976: 47), and Fernández tells us the “PCC then gave the order 
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Jorge Antonio Vivó, and others joining the party included Francisco Calderío, later 
known as Blas Roca, and the ex-anarchist Joaquín Ordoqui (Thomas 2001: 363).  
Clearly, the consolidation of the Communist Party after 1925, and the 
resurgence of the role of anarchism in Cuba, along with a dictatorship much more 
severe than anything before 1924, meant that the Veterans’ organisations were no 
longer a potent force of nationalism. In 1931 the last attempt at armed insurrection 
by the old leaders of 1895 was made under ex-President Menocal and Colonel 
Carlos Mendieta, at Gibara.61 This uprising, known as the “Rebellion of Río 
Verde…was…similar to the Veterans’ and Patriots’ Movement: it was intended to 
provoke the United States to intervene politically and remove Machado from power” 
(Whitney 2001: 71). However, this rebellion was quickly crushed, with the 
“immediate consequence” of this “political bankruptcy” being, “the 
foundation…of…a secret society, the so-called ABC” (Thomas 2001: 361). This 
movement was led by lawyers Joaquín Martínez Sáenz and Carlos Saladrigas. 
Others included the bomb expert López Rubio and the student Ignacio Mendoza. 
The group adopted a corporatist ideology with its terrorist cellular structure 
preventing the authorities from stopping it (Thomas 2001: 361). The ABC did 
support unions, an eight-hour workday, female suffrage, rural cooperative societies 
and a national bank (Whitney 2001: 85).  
On April 29 1933 rebels, led by Antonio Guiteras attacked the military 
barracks at San Luis (Whitney 2001: 96). On 15 May 1933 there was a “minor 
revolution in Santa Clara” (Thomas 2001: 373). The Conservatives under Menocal, 
                                                                                                                                                                   
that the striking workers return to their jobs,…with the help of…Machado's secret 
police, the sinister ’porra’” (Fernández 2001: 58). However, both works have rather 
poor bibliographical references 
61 Tabares del Real notes that “the mambí General Francisco Peraza rose up in Pinar 
del Rio, with a handful of co-conspirators” (Tabares del Real 1998: 292).  
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the Liberals under Gómez, the Unión Nacionalista under Mendieta, the DEU, the 
ABC and the Association of Veterans formed a Junta to discuss the replacement of 
Machado (Whitney 2001: 82-3). The PCC and the Ala Izquierda rejected mediation 
with the US (Thomas 2001: 376), and likewise the ABC Radical formed by Dr. 
Oscar de la Torre split from the main group because of this collaboration (Whitney 
2001: 91).  
The years 1925-33 were definitive, then, in the eclipse of the Veterans’ 
organisations and their means of protest. The Cuban Communist Party and the ABC 
both took on more clandestine means of opposition to the government, and in any 
case, held neither the same political principles, nor the material concerns of the 
Veterans’ organisations. As Thomas observes: 
 
The failure caused general disillusion with the men of 1895 and with all the 
old leaders surviving from the war of independence; after this date, it was 
impossible for well-intentioned members of the Cuban liberal professions to 
believe in anything, much less any survivor from the war of independence 








At the outset, the thesis argued that the topic was significant firstly because 
current historiography has not looked in detail at what happened to the forces of 
Cuban liberation, but secondly because these forces were potentially radical (due to 
their racial composition), and indeed, potentially social-revolutionary. The Veterans’ 
organisations were ostensibly successors to the Liberation Army, but, as has been 
seen, not only have they not been greatly studied, but they also were in fact clearly 
not social-revolutionary, nor indeed, inherently radical in their racial composition.                   
 Analogously, the relationship of the personnel of the Veterans’ organisations 
to the various political parties and organisations in Cuba at the time, both 
mainstream and marginal, and to the Liberal revolt of 1906 and abortive rebellion of 
1917, has also been largely overlooked. While the revolts of 1906 and 1917 have 
been looked at in detail by several historians, this thesis has produced much new 
evidence on the role of the Veterans’ organisations as a mediator in 1906, and on the 
issue of its sharing many of the same personnel and grievances as the revolt in 1917. 
 The significance of these findings is increased by the light it throws on the 
historiography that does exist concerning the Veterans’ organisations of 1911-12 
and 1923-24. The thesis has shown that the evidence illuminating the relations 
between the Veterans’ organisations and the more widespread political culture has 
shown them to be very much a part of this same culture. While most historiography 
looks at the movement of 1911-12 briefly, there is usually no mention thereafter of 
the patronage gained by many of its personnel in Menocal’s government or of how 
this affected either national politics or the Veterans’ organisations.  
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  On a similar note, the historiography on the movement of 1923-24 tends to 
see the Association as a precursor to the radical politics of the years 1922-25, as a 
means of showing where Martínez Villena and Mella cut their political teeth. 
However, while Martínez Villena was important to the movement, both as the head 
of propaganda and in acquiring fire-power for the revolt of 1924, he was by no 
means representative of the personnel of the Association. While the United States 
claimed that the prospect of reforms being carried out by Cubans themselves was 
“essentially anti-American”, and were no doubt very interested in the actions of 
Marxists like Martínez Villena and Mella, in fact the United States supported the 
demands of the Association of 1923-24, or at least Enoch Crowder did, though much 
hated by many Cubans. It has been seen that, by and large, Cubans themselves did 
want to carry out the necessary reforms, but, it was because the Veterans’ 
organisations did not represent them, or at least no longer represented them, that 
they declined as a force. The complicity of the Association with Crowder meant a 
loss of support not only from the scant number of young radicals who had supported 
them, but also of that essential constituency (at least of economic support) for an 
armed rebellion: the workers of Cuba and Key West.  
 However, to assume that the eclipse of the Veterans’ movement by the more 
radically nationalist organisations, formed in the early 1920s, was part of a 
teleological process is too simplistic. As the thesis has demonstrated, the Veterans’ 
organisations declined as a force for authentic nationalism as a logical process of 
their own internal dynamic, because of the conflicts among the social forces they 
represented. Moreover, they declined, much as did other groups of a similar political 
ideology, during the period, because of social changes deliberately engineered by 
the direct domination of the US state over Cuban political and economic life.  
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The role of the United States has, of course, been a recurring theme in the 
thesis. The thesis has not disputed the existing historiography on the role of the 
Unites States in Cuban affairs nor looked at where these commentators might 
disagree in order to further knowledge of this issue. Whether the United States 
sought to turn Cuba into a modern colony, or, whether the US political class merely 
sought a Cuban political class capable of protecting, ‘life, liberty and property’, they 
both meant essentially the same thing. Both conformed to the process of solidifying 
political hegemony: the domination of the economy by dominating this political 
class. Significantly, however, what the thesis has illuminated are the consequences 
that the policies and actions of the United States had on Cuban political parties and 
organisations, both ruling and marginal: the creation of factions and the struggle for 
patronage. 
As illustrated in the first chapter, the failure to establish an indigenous form 
of military subordination to a civilian government led to military revolt as a means 
of expressing what was thought to be a legitimate grievance by Cuban mambises in 
the republican period. This ever-present threat underlying Cuban political life was 
exacerbated, if not in fact inaugurated, by the United States, as, from the very climax 
of the war against Spain, military leaders had felt that they had not achieved 
‘absolute independence’, but rather had merely exchanged domination by Spain for 
domination by the United States.  
The role of US hegemony, in turn, created internecine struggles for the 
scarce resource of political power among the leadership of the Cuban independence 
movement. Having consolidated indirect domination, via control of the economy, 
achieved as a direct consequence of the destruction of the independence struggles, 
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United States’ interests then attained political domination by means of expressions 
of preference, threats of intervention, economic sanction, and patronage awarded to 
Cuban leaders through the US-controlled sugar and finance industries. The wealthier 
Cuban independence leaders had become economically destitute, not only by 
liberating their slaves, but also by the strategy of attrition that had characterised the 
property destruction of large industries during the wars for liberation. US 
domination of the economy had meant that Cuba’s ostensibly ‘bourgeois’ revolution 
did not in fact consolidate the power of its native bourgeoisie, but rather destroyed 
its nascent capacity. With little access to property ownership, due to the increasing 
domination of the United States in this sphere, Cuban independence leaders were to 
turn to the only resources left to them: the public payroll. The reality was, however, 
that there simply were not enough jobs to go round: hence, they would inevitably 
turn to a second resource, armed revolt. The thesis has shown, therefore, through a 
study of US actions and an analysis of the actions of Cuban political actors 
responding to this, that much of the factionalism and corruption of the period was a 
direct response to, and product of, US hegemony. Not only this, but that the 
Veterans’ organisations were themselves very much a product of this same 
hegemony.  
The Veterans’ movement fitted neatly into this context. Consisting of 
civilians as well as military men, Liberals as well as Conservatives, miguelistas as 
well as zayistas, revolutionaries of 1906 as well as members of government at the 
highest levels, the movement boasted an ideology and a practice that were as 
pragmatic and opportunistic as those of most other mainstream political parties and 
associations in the republican period. While seemingly being an expression of 
authentic Cuban nationalism, seeking harmony among the conflicting factions 
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within Cuban politics and calling for social peace, it has been shown how the 
Veterans’ movement was just as likely to share personnel with revolutionaries of 
1906 as it was with future members of Menocal’s administration. It was not the 
authentic expression of nationalism which it rhetorically claimed to be, but rather an 
alternative vehicle of patronage, and potentially a future guarantee of power, by 
those currently devoid of it. 
During the years 1906-9, many were to become disillusioned with the futile 
attempt at military revolt, given the new realities of US economic and political 
dominance. The thesis has demonstrated that the Veterans’ movement, like all the 
mainstream political parties during this period, was simply not prepared to be (and 
in fact could not, and probably did not) want to be a radically nationalist and anti-
imperialist challenge to this US hegemony. With the election of Menocal, many of 
the members of the Veterans’ movement achieved the positions of power which they 
no doubt thought they had earned. The menocalistas, however, once in power, 
showed themselves to be little other than another faction struggling for power, and, 
not surprisingly, the Veterans’ movement organised at this point virtually 
disappeared from Cuban public life. This is another significant finding of the thesis, 
for while it neither merely glances at the Veterans’ organisation of 1911-12, neither 
does it view the threatened protest as something unusual. Significantly, it examines 
the personnel and ideology of the menocalistas in order to show how, while the 
protest of these years was partially appeased by their triumph, it also explains how 
further protest was likely; for after all the menocalistas were but one faction among 
many, sharing personnel with the Veterans’ organisations, but also with many with 
little in common with them. 
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After 1914, Cuba’s dependency on one crop for sale on the international 
market, and the scale of borrowing way beyond the nation’s capacity to repay, 
meant financial crisis when the price of this one crop dramatically fell. The resulting 
destitution, not surprisingly, brought into being a radically different kind of Cuban 
nationalism: one that sought to end this mono-crop dependency, at the very least, 
and in some quarters, sought a full-scale Cubanisation, not only of the political 
culture, as the Veterans’ movement had sought, but of economic life in its entirety. 
While this radicalism was not exactly in opposition to the nationalism of the 
Veterans’ movement, it simply did not share many of the movement’s personnel 
(now often very old men), ideals (such as enhancing workers’ and women’s rights), 
strategy, or interests. Again, the thesis has sought to explain why the Veterans’ 
organisations had more in common with the politics preceding 1914 than that after 
1921, by an analysis of the personnel and ideology of the various factions involved. 
The Veterans’ movement seemed almost to portray its enemies as if they 
were Spanish collaborators, which, by 1923, 25 years after the end of colonialism, 
was no longer very convincing. The Veterans’ movement of 1923-24 was seen by 
the other pressure groups gaining ground in Cuba precisely for what it was: the 
internecine struggle of Zayas, against the hopeful revolutionary, Carlos García 
Vélez. Indeed, this is perhaps the thesis’s most significant argument, as it has 
consistently shown that this was main role of the Veterans’ organisations throughout 
the period: to create and sustain a network of patronage for those currently deprived 
of power. 
Bombardment of the presidential palace no doubt seemed a futile proposition 
to those struggling for electoral suffrage or an eight-hour day. As has been seen 
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workers openly condemned the Veterans’ movement of 1923-24, saying that they 
should be imprisoned for ten years, likewise, the young intellectual revolutionaries 
who saw themselves as the leaders of this cross-class force for radically nationalist 
social change saw no potential in the movement. Hence, after 1924, the movement 
was no longer a potent force of nationalism in the republic.  
In order to conclude the thesis, it will also be necessary to mention the events 
of 1931. Although the Machadato has not been discussed in detail in the thesis, there 
is no shortage of work on the topic. However, this in many ways represents a new 
political era in itself, which gave rise to many social forces that had, before 1925, 
been of little influence. After this date, the Cuban Communist Party was to engage 
in protracted struggles against the dictatorship, although many of its personnel were 
also collaborationist. 
The thesis has explained the phenomenon outlined at the beginning: how the 
ideology of nationalism attained through 30 years of struggle did not result in an 
‘absolutely independent’ Cuba, of what happened to the leaders of the demobilised 
Liberation Army, and how demobilisation of the Army, structurally, likewise 
demobilised the potential for a radically egalitarian republic. Also, the thesis has 
explained the relationship of the Veterans’ movement to the rest of Cuban political 
life in the period, a subject not really addressed in the historiography in any detail. 
This analysis also perhaps goes some way to explaining the decline of the nationalist 
forces which the Veterans’ movement represented, and explains its eclipse by more 
radically anti-imperialist organisations in the years of the Machadato.  
Finally, the thesis has opened up significant new lines of enquiry for 
research. Other scholars of Latin American history and politics, of the colonial and 
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republican eras, can utilise some of the findings, arguments and insights, to 
illuminate their own efforts. The thesis has shown that significantly more research 
into the disbandment of the Liberation Army and the role of ‘patriotic clubs’ at the 
local level across Cuba needs to be done. Finally, the thesis has enhanced 
understanding of the early years of the Cuban republic until 1924. While the Platt 
Amendment of 1901, the revolution of 1906, and the economic crisis of 1921, have 
all been the subject of much study, due to their role in explaining Cuba’s 
international role, and the causes of grievance which would not be fully resolved 
until the years 1933-40, the politics of Cuba during the years 1900-24 is interesting 
in its own right, as a means of understanding the consequences at a lower level, of 
international relations. This is where the contribution of the thesis lies, and it is a 
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President: General Emilio Núñez Rodríguez, 
Vicepresident: Colonel Manuel Lazo, 
Secretary of Acts: Commander Manuel Secades Japón, 
Treasurer: Colonel Manuel Aranda, 
 
Vicesecretaries: Colonel José Gálvez, Colonel Eulogio Sardiñas, Sublieutenant 
Edmundo Estrada, Commanders Miguel A. Varona and Miguel Coyula. 
 
Generals: Silverio Sánchez Figueras, Enrique Loynaz del Castillo, Juan E. Ducassi, 
Alfonso Seijas, José Miró Argenter, Augustín Cebreco, Carlos García Vélez, Pedro 
Díaz Molina, Hugo Robert, Francisco Carrilo Morales, José Fernández de Castro, 
Francisco de P. Valiente, Carlos González Clavel, Demetrio Castillo Duany, José 
Manuel Capote, Salvador H. Ríos, Javier de la Vega, Manuel Suárez Delgado, Pedro 
E. Betancourt, General Remigio Marrero, Alejandro Rodríguez, Lopez Recio 
Loynaz, Marianao Torres, Pedro A. Pérez, Francisco Estrada, Luis de Feria, José 
Rogelio Castillo, Juan Pablo Cebreco, Maximiliano Ramos, Vicente Miniet, 
Cornelio Rojas, Joaquín Sánchez, Francisco J. Pérez, Pedro Vásquez, Francisco 
Leyte Vidal, Antonio Varona, Víctor Ramos, Tomás Padró Griñán, Pedro Delgado, 
Alfredo Rego, Pedro Ivonet, Alberto Nodarse, Julián Santana, Prudencio Martínez, 
Daniel Gispert. 
 
Colonels: Cosme de la Torriente, Manuel María Coronado, Augustín Cruz 
González, Aurelio Hevia, José Nicolás Jané, Lucas Alvarez Cerice, Fernando 
Figueredo, Charles Aguirre, Francisco López Leiva, Gustavo Pérez Abreu, Manuel 
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Saumell, Roberto Méndez Peñate, Luis Pérez, José Clemento Vivanco, Benito 
Barceló, Vicente Suárez, Andrés Hernández, Manuel Sanguily, Enrique Molina, 
Matías Duque, Juan M. Galdós, Carlos Mendieta, Rosendo Collazo, Alfredo Lima, 
Carlos Masó, Francisco  Díaz Silvera, Emilio Collazo, Tomás Olivera, Miguel 
Hernández, Manual Piedra, Santiago García Cañizares, José D’Estrampes, Modesto 
Gómez Rubio, Ernesto Asbert Díaz, Manuel de Cárdenas, Alberto Nodarse, Julián 
Betancourt, José Dolares Asanza, José Lara Miret. 
 
Lieutenant Colonels: Casimiro Naya Serrano, Justo Carillo Morales, Avelino 
Sanjenis, Rafael Izquierdo, Manuel Velazco, Pompeyo Viada, F. Milanés, Luis 
Deymier, Raimundo Sánchez, Eligio Griñán, Manuel de la Torriente, Ibrahim 
Consuegra, Miguel Zaldívar, Justo Carrillo, Julián Valdés Sierra, Guillermo López 
Rovirsa. 
 
Sublieutenants: Primitivo Laza, Juan Porta Ravelo. 
 
Commanders: Eduardo Guzmán García, Manuel Lores, Alberto Villalón, Placido 
Hernandez, José Martí, Félix V. Preval, Edmund Frederick, Alberto Barrera, José V. 
Alonso, Ramón Vidal, Octavio Argudín, Arturo Primelles, Miguel Iribarren, 
Marianao Corona, Armando André, Ramiro Cuesta, Domingo Herrera, José 
Playiery, Gerardo Forrets, Miguel A. Duque Estrada, José Llorens, José Cardoso. 
 
Captains:  Armando Cartaya, José García Fevia, Baldomero Pimienta, Antonio M. 
Calzada, Mariano Chapellí, Oscar Soto y Calderón, Pedro Viera Carrillo, Fernandez 
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González Luna, Gustavo Alfonso, Enrique P. Valdés, Victoriano La Calle, Pablo J. 






Primero. – Derogación de la Ley Lotería. 
Segundo. – Evitar que llegue a adoptarse lo que crea en nuestro país el monopolio 
ferrocarrilero. 
Tercero. – Promulgar una que fija el cobro puntual de las pensiones de los veteranos 
de la independencia. 
Cuarto. – Legislación que garantice, con procedimientos prácticos, la absoluta 
independencia del Poder Judicial. 
Quinto. – Derogación de los preceptos del Código Electoral que dan voz y voto en 
las asambleas de los partidos políticos, como miembros natos, a los congresistas, 
gobernadores, etc., con lo que se hace imposible la renovación de dichos 
organismos. 
Sexto. – Votar una Ley de Contabilidad que impida disponer los fondos públicos sin 
responsibilidades efectivas.  
Séptimo. – Fijación de los límites de la inmunidad parlamentaria para evitar que se 
amparen en ella los autores de delitos comunes. 
Octavo. – Promulgación de una Ley que armonice el esfuerzo del capital y el 
trabajo, garantizando los derechos preferentes del obrero cubano contra el 
extranjero, en las industrias y trabajos del país. 
Noveno. – Abolición de las reelecciones presidenciales en la oportunidad de hacer 
modificaciones a la Constitución de la República. 
Decimo. – Que la Constitución de la República se reforme también en el sentido de 
conceder a la mujer cubana igualdad de derechos políticos para estas dos 
finalidades: ser electoras y elegibles. 
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Unodécimo. – La no promulgación de leyes de amnistías por delitos comunes. 
Duodécimo. – Que se desista de la aprobación de la Ley por la cual se le concede al 
Ferrocarril del Norte de Cuba, franquicia arancelaria, porque perjudica grandemente 
al Erario Público y a los industriales y comerciantes de Cuba. 
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